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CHAPTER 5

MITHRIDATES

JOHN G. F. HIND

Mithridates VI Eupator 'the Great' was to become a byword for his hatred of Rome and his atrocities in Asia. At the end of his life, in 63 B.C., rumour had it that he was still planning to march on Italy, like an eastern Hannibal, via Scythia, Thrace and the Illyrians. Many myths arose about him during his fifty-seven-year reign and his more than forty years of confrontation with Rome. By the end of the Roman Empire he was one of her few former enemies, alongside Pyrrhus, Hannibal and Cleopatra, to be canonized among the eighty notable ancient Romans.¹ As one who died aged sixty-nine (some said seventy or seventy-two), he almost qualified to be one of the 'Macrobioi', the 'long-lived', of the ancient world. During all but his first thirteen years of life he ruled a kingdom, Pontus, which took its name from the 'Deep Sea' itself. It lay almost beyond the world known to Rome, and had beneath its sway Thracians, Scythians, Sarmatians, the Cimmerian Bosphorus and Colchis, the legendary land of gold, poisons and witchcraft. The king himself was immensely gifted as well as resourceful. He was said to speak twenty-two, twenty-five, fifty languages; and during his 'heroic' first seven years as king, as a fugitive in the interior of Pontus, he had trained his physique to great endurance and to a high resistance to poisons:

He gathered all that springs to birth
From the many-venomed earth;
First a little, thence to more,
He sampled all her killing store;
...

— I tell the tale that I heard told.
Mithridates, he died old.²

He bore a noble Persian name, and his family claimed descent from either Darius himself or one of his associates in the rebellion against the Median

¹ *De Vir. Ill.* 76. See already Cic. *Mur.* 32 and a couple of generations later Vell. Pat. 11.18, cf. 40 on his international standing.

² A. E. Housman, *A Shropshire Lad*, 62. Languages: Val. Max. viii.7; Pliny *HN* vii.88; xxv.6; Gell. *NA* xvii.17; Poisons: Just. xxxvii.3; App. *Mith.* 111; Pliny *HN* xxv.2.5.

Magi. Small wonder that, in Persian-Parthian fashion, he claimed at the height of his success to be 'Great King' and 'King of Kings'.

The extant ancient sources for Mithridates and his kingdom are numerous, and varied in length and detail.³ Some fifty ancient writers contribute, ranging from fragments of works by his courtiers and by contemporary scholars to late Roman *breviaria* and *vitae* which derive much of their material from the now lost books of Livy. Our fullest sources are works of the first and second centuries A.D. Plutarch's *Life of Sulla* and Appian's *Mithridatica* provide overlapping narratives in Greek, and Strabo's *Geography* and Memnon's local history of Heraclea on the Black Sea add circumstantial detail about Pontus and about events in the Mithridatic Wars. Latin sources offer less, though Justin's *Epitome of the World History of Pompeius Trogus* (first century B.C.) traces the rise of Pontus under Mithridates' father and the growth of tension in Asia between Mithridates and the Roman governors. But it was the speeches of Cicero – *pro Flacco*, *pro Murena*, *pro lege Manilia* – that moulded posterity's view of the monarch as the recidivist enemy of Rome and perpetrator of the Asiatic atrocities.

I. THE DYNASTY

Mithridates was reckoned sixteenth in descent from Darius (though the claim may have been manufactured in the first century B.C.).⁴ The direct line can be traced only from the fourth century. A Mithridates inherited from his father Ariobarzanes (c. 362–337) a little fief at Cius, and perhaps Myrlea, to the west of Bithynia on the Propontis, as a dependency of Darius III, the last Achaemenid king of Persia. He lost, then recovered, his position, and eventually was 'liberated' by Alexander the Great. For a time he was a vassal of Antigonus Monophthalmus, but was killed by him for treating with Cassander in 302 B.C.⁵

The son of Mithridates of Cius, also a Mithridates, later surnamed Ktistes, 'founder', escaped eastwards. With six horsemen he entered Paphlagonia, first reaching Cimiata in the Amnias valley; later he moved further east to Amasia in Pontic Cappadocia. If this second move took place in 297 B.C. it would help to explain the era of Pontus, which dated from that year (though it may have been a court fiction of later Mithridatid date designed to give Pontus an era equal to that of Bithynia).⁶ After the defeat and death of Lysimachus at Corupedium, in

³ Sources chronologically arranged: *Greenidge-Clay*, 55f. Discussion of the sources: Reinach 1890 (D 55) 417–55; Sherwin-White 1984 (D 291) 116–18; McGing 1986 (D 35) 176–9. Footnote references are not given to the main narratives. ⁴ Meyer 1878 (D 38) 31–8.

⁵ For the dynasty at Cius: McGing 1986 (D 35) 13–15.

⁶ Pontic era: Diehl 1938 (D 12) 1850; Robert 1937 (B 229) 231; Perl 1968 (D 53) 299; Bickermann 1980 (A 11) 72.

the wake of successes won by the northern states of Cius, Tium and Bithynia, this Mithridates warred against Seleucus I and secured his independence. In 281/0 B.C. he took the title 'King' of a state which comprised eastern Paphlagonia and northern Cappadocia,⁷ and along with Nicomedes of Bithynia he settled Gaulish tribes in parts of eastern Phrygia, which came to be known as Galatia. In 279 Amastris, a coastal city on the western border of Paphlagonia, was acquired for him by his son from its ruler Eumenes. Mithridates' kingdom now reached to the river Sangarius in the west; well might he be called 'Founder' and be our choice as the first Mithridates of the dynasty which was to number six of that name, and eight kings overall, in 218 years down to the death of Eupator, 281-63 B.C.⁸

The next kings, Ariobarzanes (266-c. 250) and Mithridates (c. 250-189) had respectively a short and a very long reign, if the latter was not actually two kings (Mithridates II and III). The former added Amisus on the Black Sea to the kingdom; the latter formed a marriage alliance with Seleucus II by taking Seleucus' sister Laodice as his wife and receiving as her dowry Phrygia Maior. However he failed in an attempt to take Sinope by siege.

Pharnaces, king c. 189-c. 159, pressed upon the coastal cities and his neighbours to the west more ambitiously than his predecessors. He was successful in overmastering Sinope, c. 182 B.C., holding on to it even after a war with Eumenes of Pergamum and Ariarathes of Cappadocia, though he had to submit to the loss of some recent gains in Paphlagonia and Galatia; a Roman senatorial commission acted as 'honest broker' between the kings in these years after the Roman defeat of Antiochus III at Apamea. The commissioners were careful to rein back Pharnaces from western Asia Minor, barring him from the small city of Tium, but they were neglectful of the more remote Sinope. Pharnaces then took Cotyora and Cerasus (Pharnacia), former colonies of Sinope even further east, and he secured the overlordship of Armenia Minor, with its city of Trapezus, when the king, another Mithridates, handed it over to him.⁹ His strengthened hold on his own coastline was matched by a vigorous policy embracing all the shores of the Black Sea: he had treaties with Odessus on the west (Bulgarian) coast and with Chersonesus in the south Crimea.¹⁰ Towards the end of his life Pharnaces cemented a friendship

⁷ Syncellus 523.5.

⁸ Sources for Mithridates of Cius and Mithridates Ktistes probably go back to Hieronymus of Cardia (App. *Mith.* 8). Rostovtzeff thought Mithridates of Cius was the first of the Pontic dynasty, *CAH IX* 217-18, but the prevailing view treats Ktistes as the first: Reinach, 1890 (D 55) 7-8; Molyev 1985 (D 43); McGing 1986 (D 35) 15-19; 1986 (D 34) 250-3; Molyev 1983 (D 42A).

⁹ It reverted to independence later, but the pantomime of 'voluntary submission' was to be repeated under Mithridates the Great.

¹⁰ Strab. XII.3.11, 16; Polyb. XXIII.9; XXIV.1.14; XXV.2; XXVII.17.

with the Seleucids by marrying Nysa, a daughter or granddaughter of Antiochus III. On his death, c. 159, Pontus was an important power in Asia Minor, though a combination of local kings could still counter it and it could not stand up to Roman diplomacy or threats of force.¹¹

Under the successors of Pharnaces, Mithridates Philopator Philadelphus, perhaps his younger brother, and Mithridates Euergetes, probably his son, the kingdom prospered through calculated docility to Rome. The former is known from an inscription on the Capitol, where alliance with the Roman people is mentioned;¹² also a king Mithridates is said to have aided Attalus II of Pergamum against Prusias II of Bithynia in 155/4 B.C., and may well have been Philopator Philadelphus. There are also splendid portrait coins, whose reverses have legends in his own name and that of his sister Laodice, and show statues of Perseus and of Zeus and Hera, hinting at the dynasty's Persian origins and the elevated position of the brother-sister rulers.¹³ On any reckoning Philopator's reign can only have been short (c. 159 to 151/0).

He was succeeded by Mithridates Euergetes, who had another Laodice as his queen, the mother of Mithridates the Great. He helped Rome in the Third Punic War, c. 149, and, after the death of Attalus III, helped Rome again during the revolt of Aristonicus (ch. 2, p. 34).¹⁴ Rome dispensed bounty, in the form of other people's property, to her allies in the Asian war: to Mithridates were allowed the long-claimed lands of Phrygia Maior (a huge bribe having been paid, it was said, to the Roman commander, M'. Aquillius). Euergetes also secured, separately, Inner Paphlagonia, as heir of its king, Pylaemenes, and Galatia: both had been targets for the ambitions of Pharnaces. And when he married his daughter, yet another Laodice, to Ariarathes VI of Cappadocia he gained an interest there too, even 'invading it as though it were a foreign country' (although the circumstances are unclear).¹⁵ During this time, some eleven years before his father's death, Mithridates Eupator was born, at Sinope.

Whether at the instance of some pro-Roman faction disturbed at his over-mighty role among his neighbours, or as a result of a palace plot, Euergetes was assassinated at Sinope.¹⁶ Pontus thereupon, from c. 121/0,

¹¹ *IOSPE* 1402; Minns 1913 (D 39) no. 172; Sherk 1984 (B 239) 30; Kolobova 1949 (D 27); Molyev 1976 (D 41) 12-17; Burstein 1980 (D 256) 1-12; McGing 1986 (D 35) 24-34.

¹² *OGIS* 375; Mellor 1978 (B 202).

¹³ Polyb. xxxiii.12; Habicht 1956 (D 269) 101-10; coins: Waddington 1925 (B 253) 13, no. 7; Seltman 1955 (B 237) Pl. LVI, 10 and LVII, 1; Kraay-Hirmer 1966 (B 182) 376-7 and Pl. 210.

¹⁴ App. *Mith.* 10 makes Euergetes the first king of Pontus to be a 'Friend of the Roman People': if he is not identical with Philopator Philadelphus that must be a mistake. It is just possible that they are identical and that Mithridates V was Chrestus, Eupator's brother (see below). For Euergetes: Reinach 1890 (D 55) 42-7; Geyer 1932 (D 16) no. 11; Magie 1950 (A 67) 194f; Thompson 1961 (B 249) 422f (but dating the Mithridates-Ariston coins too early).

¹⁵ App. *Mith.* 10; Just. xxxvii.1.4; xxxviii.5.4. ¹⁶ Strab. x.4.10; Memnon *FGRH* 434 22.2F.

underwent a period of weakness, with Laodice ruling in the name of her two sons Eupator and Chrestus, both minors. She pursued a philo-Roman policy, but from a far weaker position than her husband. In 119 or 116 Rome withdrew Phrygia Maior from Laodice's Pontus, thus nullifying the fruits of the bribe to Aquillius and nurturing resentment among Pontic patriots for the future.¹⁷ Soon it became clear that Laodice sided with her younger son, Chrestus: indeed, for a few years he may have been regarded as the reigning Mithridates, and Laodice may have ruled through him. Eupator is now said to have escaped from a suspicious riding accident; and the great romantic episode now follows (perhaps part of the later Mithridates-myth): he retired secretly to the mountains of eastern Pontus and Armenia Minor, moving ever on from day to day, building up his resistance to poisons and his physical endurance, and getting to know many of the peoples of Pontus and their languages. The period was said to have lasted seven years, though the figure may be conventional, even magical, and represent the ideal education of an Iranian prince.¹⁸ Finally, *c.* 113 (according to the date most scholars have deduced from Appian and Justin: perhaps in fact a few years earlier) Eupator returned to Sinope and overturned affairs at the court, throwing Laodice into prison, but allowing his brother to continue as a colleague without the title of king¹⁹ for some while, before in the end, at an unknown date (though after 115), he was put to death.

II. THE KINGDOM

The proper name of Mithridates Eupator's kingdom was 'Cappadocia by the Euxine' or 'Cappadocia by Pontus', in distinction to the inland region of 'Cappadocia by Taurus' or 'Greater Cappadocia'.²⁰ This coastal, northern region grew to be much the more prosperous, possessing fertile areas in the major river valleys behind the coast (Amnias, Iris, Lycus) while politically centred on the Greek cities of the southern shore of the Black Sea, first Amastris and then Amisus and Sinope.²¹ To the west lay relatively minor states, Paphlagonia, Tium and the strong city state of Heraclea. Inland to the south-west were Phrygia Maior and Phrygia Epictetus and the three tribes of the Gauls. Directly south lay the related and extensive, but economically weak, kingdom of (Greater) Cappadocia. Eastward was Armenia Minor, and along the coast beyond Trapezus were the principalities of the Colchians; and around the further shores of the Black Sea were Greek cities struggling to maintain their independence against Thracians, Getae and Scythians.


¹⁷ *OGIS* 436. Date: Glew 1977 (D 18) 388f; Sherwin-White 1977 (D 75) 70; 1984 (D 291) 96.

¹⁸ Widengren 1960 (D 83).

¹⁹ *IDélos* 1560-1.

²⁰ Polyb. v.43.1; Strab. xii.1.4.

²¹ Magie 1950 (A 67) 177-86; McGing 1986 (D 35) 2-10.



Only Armenia Maior, in the wider arc of Anatolia, might have been a rival to Pontus, and its period of greatness was still to come, under king Tigranes, c. 83–65 B.C.; this coincided with Mithridates Eupator's own collapse at the end of the first war with Rome and lasted until the end of their joint resistance in the third war. Since the Peace of Apamea Rome had been the 'Cloud in the West', which Hellenistic kings had to keep a weather eye on. It had loomed closer with the annexation of Pergamum as the 'province of Asia' after 129 and Rome's further intervention in the form of consular appointments to Cilicia and Lycaonia, certainly by 102 and possibly as early as 116.²² Mithridates Euergetes had been very circumspect in his dealings with Rome, and so was Eupator, who waited twenty-three years before being pushed into war with Rome.

Mithridates' ancestral kingdom was not large, but had economic, military and naval potential.²³ Pontus is a land of east–west mountain ranges and river valleys. The latter, running parallel to the shore of the Black Sea at a distance of 110 to 160 kilometres, were the heartland of the kingdom; as for the mountains, south of Cotyora and Cerasus they reach 3,000 metres and further east toward Trabzon and Rize 4,000.²⁴ There was a north–south route from Amisus to Tarsus via Amasia and Zela in Pontus and Mazaca and Tyana in Cappadocia – an ancient route that linked the Black Sea with the Mediterranean, mentioned by Herodotus.²⁵ The only other real north–south route ran from Trapezus in Colchis south-west over the Zigana Pass and then south-eastwards into the valley of the river Acampsis: it was the path taken – in reverse – by Xenophon in the *Anabasis*.²⁶

Pontus was rich in minerals. Iron and silver were mined near the coast south of Pharnacia, the fabled source of 'Chalybian steel'. Studies of the mineral resources of modern Turkey have stressed the concentration of metalworking in north-eastern Pontus. There are also copper, lead, zinc, arsenic, and ruddle (for painting ships), found especially inland of Sinope.²⁷

The climate of the Pontic coast is much less harsh than that of inland Cappadocia, and it is the best-watered part of Asia Minor, the Pontine mountains in the east ensuring that more of the precipitation is deposited at that end of the coastal strip. The consequence is a splendid forest growth, ever denser towards the east – oaks, alders, beeches, chestnuts

²² Syme 1939 (D 294); Sherwin-White 1976 (D 74); 1984 (D 291) 97–101.

²³ Geography: Ramsay 1890 (A 94); Anderson, Cumont and Grégoire 1910 (B 131); Maximova 1956 (D 37) 13–31, Weimert 1984 (D 82).

²⁴ G. Williams, *Eastern Turkey* (London, 1972); Calder and Bean 1958 (D 257).

²⁵ Hdt. 1.72.

²⁶ Other routes: Munro 1901 (D 45); Winfield 1977 (D 85).

²⁷ C. W. Ryan, *A Guide to the known Minerals of Turkey* (Ankara, 1960); P. de Jesus, *Prehistoric Mining and Metallurgy in Anatolia*, BAR S.74, 1980; R. F. Tylecote, 'Ironsands from the Black Sea', *AS* 31 (1981) 187–9.

and walnuts, with above them coniferous forests and below them many species of fruit tree, including the cherry, which takes its name from *Cerasus*, the plum, pear, apricot and apple. The region was famed for ship-timbers, and the fleet of classical Sinope, the very large Pontic fleet of the Mithridatids, and the later Roman Black Sea fleet based at Trapezus, all had a ready supply. Olive-growing produced a vigorous trade in Sinopian oil and a pottery industry making amphorae in which to export it. On some of the coastal plains, e.g. Themiscyra, and in the Iris-Lycus valleys horses were grazed in great numbers and sheep and cattle pastured.²⁸

The organization of Pontus as observable under its last two kings, Mithridates the Great and his son Pharnaces II, reflects the geographical, climatic and ethnic facts and the historical traditions of the region. On the Black Sea coast the Greek cities had councils, assemblies and magistracies, some by long tradition, such as Sinope and Amisus, others as a result of re-foundation on the Greek pattern, such as Amastris (by Amastris the daughter of Oxyathres) in the late fourth century or Pharnacia (by Pharnaces I). Sinope and Amisus were chosen by Pharnaces I, Euergetes and Mithridates the Great to be their capitals and were adorned with public buildings accordingly: Sinope was also the site of the tombs of these later Mithridatids.²⁹ The major inland centres were much more Paphlagonian or Cappadocian in character, with an Iranian aristocracy going back three or four hundred years. The most important were in the fertile Iris-Lycus valleys. Amasia on the river Iris was the old capital from before the time of Pharnaces I and the resting-place of four earlier kings, with an uncompleted fifth tomb perhaps intended for Pharnaces.³⁰ The region to the west of Amasia was called Chiliocomum, 'The Thousand Villages', which gives a hint as to the source of the city's wealth. Strabo was proud of his Amasian origin.³¹ But there were other rich areas: Phanaroea east of Amasia, on the river Lycus, Dazimonitis to the south on the upper Iris, and Phazimonitis north of Amasia between the Halys and the Iris. In the time of Mithridates Eupator Pontus was divided into eparchies, perhaps governed by *strategoi*, and there may have been subdivisions called hyparchies. Nobles of Iranian ancestry ruled some localities from their castles: the villages under their control could be very numerous for, while Chiliocomum's thousand is unlikely to have been literal, L. Murena, in his brief campaign into Pontus, is reported to have overrun four hundred 'villages'. The political centre of the economic heart of Pontus was clearly Amasia. Its central area was garrisoned under a *phrourarchos*, usually a eunuch, in charge of entry into

²⁸ Strab. XII.3.11-40.

²⁹ Rostovtzeff 1932 (D 61) 212-13; 219-20; Möll 1984 (D 44); Olshausen and Biller 1984 (D 51); Robinson 1906 (D 56); 1905 (B 233).

³⁰ Rostovtzeff 1932 (D 61) 218.

³¹ Strab. XII.3.39-41; Lomouri 1979 (D 31).

the citadel:³² there was a royal palace and a temple to Zeus Stratios, a Hellenized form of the Iranian Ahuramazda, chief protector of the dynasty.

In addition to the royal towns, forts and treasuries and the castles of the Pontic nobility, another major characteristic of inland Pontus, as of southern Cappadocia, was the temple estates, drawing revenue from huge areas. Ameria, near Cabira, was a 'comopolis', a 'village-city', dedicated to the divinity Mēn Pharnacou: near Pontic Comana was another temple-town dedicated to the goddess Ma; and to the south-west, near Zela, was a temple of the Iranian Anaitis. They were served by priests, temple slaves or serfs: many of the females were temple prostitutes. Comana channelled trade to and from Armenia: Strabo calls it an *emporion*, and it was bustling with soldiers and merchants, not the least of its attractions being the temple establishment of 6,000 sacred slaves.

The chief deities of Pontus all have a syncretistic (mixed) aspect to them. There were Paphlagonian (at Sinope) and Cappadocian (former Hittite?) native elements, overlaid by 'magian' and other Iranian elements dating from the Achaemenid Persian period. These had been reinterpreted in Greek guise and with Greek names during the period of formation of Pontus as a kingdom. Hence Ahuramazda (Persian 'Sun') was addressed as Zeus Stratios at Amasia. Mēn at Ameria, the great moon-god, was given the Iranian title Pharnacou. Ma of Comana was equated with Rhea/Cybele, the 'Great Mother'. In view of the important role played by the cults of Zeus Stratios and Mēn Pharnacou in the official ritual of the Pontic dynasty, it is not unreasonable to connect these sun and moon deities with the 'star and crescent' badge of Pontus and its ruling family.³³


III. MITHRIDATES' BLACK SEA EMPIRE

With the accession of Mithridates Eupator a period of vigorous assertiveness began. He championed Hellenic and Iranian elements alike against a Roman influence which, even in the province of Asia, had roots only fifteen years deep; but his anti-Roman sentiment, fuelled by the retraction of the grant of Phrygia Maior, was probably not yet as overriding as his Iranian and Seleucid pride. His ambition was to achieve great things amongst his regal peers. Among his friends from childhood were an elite group of *syntrophoi*: for his wider ventures beyond Pontus he needed the help of such a trusted set, some of whom were Greeks from Sinope and Amisus.

Mithridates' first move, probably, was to accept a hegemony over

³² *OGIS* 365; Anderson, Cumont and Grégoire 1910 (B 131) nos. 66; 94; 95A; 200; 228.

³³ Strab. XII.3.32-7; XII.3.31; App. *Mith.* 66, 70.



Armenia Minor from its king, Antipater, perhaps c. 115–114 B.C. (though some scholars think as late as 106); and the next gain will have been Colchis. Only Strabo and Memnon mention the annexation, and they give no date, Strabo merely linking it with Armenia Minor and Memnon making it fall to Mithridates early in his career of expansion: some date it before, and some after, the campaigns in the Crimea.³⁴ It was certainly subject to Mithridates by 89, for it was mentioned as one of his possessions in Pelopidas' speech on behalf of his master to the Roman generals at the start of the first Roman war. The land was a useful addition, with alluvial gold, honey, wax, flax, hemp and timber; it was also the western end of an important trade route to the Caspian, up the Phasis and down the Cyrus rivers, and a vital land and coastal sailing link with the Cimmerian Bosphorus. Mithridates' domination of Colchis was the long-term end of the process of economic and cultural penetration of the eastern shore of the Black Sea achieved by Greek cities such as Sinope as early as the fifth century B.C.; and now those well-tried connexions, plus the growing reputation of Mithridates and his generals, attracted an appeal from Chersonesus, across the narrow waist of the Black Sea.

Chersonesus appealed, at some date between 114 and 110 B.C. (perhaps 113),³⁵ to Mithridates as its only source of aid. Sinope was now the capital of Pontus, while Heraclea, the mother-city of Chersonesus, was no longer equal to the task of sending troops against her colony's enemies, the Scythians and the Tauri of the steppeland and piedmont parts of the Crimea. The call was answered with an expedition of 6,000 Pontic troops under Mithridates' general Diophantus,³⁶ and subsequently with two further expeditions; after several major campaigns against the Scythians in the steppelands north of Chersonesus and the crushing of a rebellion by one Saumacus in Panticapaeum on the Bosphorus, Mithridates was master of all the Crimean region. He later developed links in the north-west and west of the Black Sea, where we hear of military aid to Olbia and Apollonia. Thus, in a decade or so, Mithridates had converted the whole of the Sea (Pontus) into a lake dependent on the kingdom (Pontus), and had unified politically the complementary economic elements of the various shores, which had been tending towards a unity for 300 years.³⁷ Only the mountainous

³⁴ Strab. xi.2.17, 18; xii.3.1; Memnon *FGrH* 34 223F. Colchis before Crimea: most lately Molyev 1976 (p 41) 24–8; Shelov 1980 (p 71). First coins of Eupator from Dioscurias dated c. 105–90 B.C., Dundua and Lordkipanidze (p 14); Todua 1990 (p 77B) 48–59.

³⁵ Date: Niese 1887 (p 48); Vinogradov (p 78) 644–5. Some prefer 111/10 B.C. Tauri and Scythians: Leskov 1965 (p 28); Savelya (p 66); Sheglov (p 68); Solomonnik 1952 (p 77A) 116–17; Schultz 1971 (p 67); Vysotskaya 1972 (p 80); 1975 (p 81).

³⁶ The main sources for all these campaigns are Strab. vii.3.17; 4.3 and 7 the great 'Diophantus-Inscription', *IOSPE* 1.352; *SEG* xxx, 963. See Minns 1913 (p 39) 582–91; Molyev 1976 (p 41) 28–43; *CAH* vi², ch. 11.

³⁷ *IOSPE* 1.226; *IGBulg* i².392; Shelov 1985 (p 72), and 1986 (p 73) 36–42; Vinogradov 1989 (p 78A) 257–62.

Caucasus coast, with its unruly piratical tribes, the Achaei, Heniochi and Zygi, remained outside Mithridates' bidding, but even they normally let him pass if he was on his way through with an army. Still independent, to the west and in the direction of the Roman province of Asia, were Heraclea Pontica and the kingdom of Bithynia, centred on the Propontis.

Prolific coinages are an index of the prosperity of Mithridates' kingdom at this time. The bronze coins are of a number of standard types, some referring to the dynasty, such as the head of Perseus, and most having on the obverse heads of the major Greek deities and their attributes. They were struck in some thirteen mint centres in Paphlagonia and Pontus, and one or two related types were struck also on the Bosphorus between c. 110 and 70 B.C. They are frequently found on sites in Colchis and in the cities to the north of the Black Sea.³⁸ From 96/5 (the first dated issues, year 202) silver drachms and tetradrachms and gold staters were struck in the name of Mithridates Eupator. On the obverse his portrait is done in a realistic style with hair following the contours of the head: on the reverse Pegasus stoops to drink and the eight-rayed sun-star points to Persian ancestry. A few years later a more idealizing head of the king appears (c. 92-89), with wilder hair: perhaps an attempt to hint at him as the New Dionysus.³⁹

IV. KINGS AND ROMANS IN WESTERN ANATOLIA, 108-89 B.C.

In the last decade of the second century B.C. Mithridates, still in his late twenties and early thirties, was compared by his court flatterers to Alexander and to Dionysus, though he had not won his northern empire in person but presided over it from his capital at Sinope. He had also studiously avoided confrontation with Rome; and the Romans at that time were disinclined to involve themselves beyond the province of Asia because the Jugurthan and Cimbric Wars and the raids by the Scordisci from the north-east kept them fully in play in Europe. Rome's attitude, however, gradually changed after Mithridates' acquisition of his Black Sea empire and after they had watched his interventions in states only just beyond the Roman province, during the years 114-101 B.C.⁴⁰

Shortly after his Black Sea conquests, perhaps in 109/8 he travelled incognito through Bithynia and even into the province of Asia,

³⁸ Head 1911 (B 171); 502; 505; Imhoof-Blumer 1912 (B 175); Golenko 1965 (B 162); 1969 (B 163); Karyshovsky 1965 (B 178); Mattingly 1979 (D 283) 1513-15; McGing 1986 (D 35) 94-6; Golenko 1973 (B 164); Shelov 1983 (D 71B); 1982 (D 71A).

³⁹ Head 1911 (B 171) 501-2; Seltman 1955 (B 237) Pl. 57, 2 and 3; Kraay-Hirmer 1966 (B 182) Pl. 211; Price 1968 (B 221); McGing 1986 (D 35) 97-9.

⁴⁰ Just. xxxvii.3.4-5. Appian *Mith.* 13 makes Nicomedes' envoys play on Rome's fear of a powerful Asiatic king getting a foothold in Europe, just as in the case of Antiochus III.

gathering information; not surprisingly he was subsequently believed to have been spying out the land for his wars against Rome, though these were twenty years later.

In 108–107 Mithridates and Nicomedes of Bithynia saw a narrow window of opportunity and marched into Paphlagonia and partitioned it.⁴¹ A Roman embassy ordered them to restore its freedom, but was fobbed off with royal speeches of justification, while Mithridates proceeded to occupy a piece of Galatia as well, which his father was supposed to have inherited from former rulers, and Nicomedes, far from restoring Paphlagonia to its king, installed his own son instead as a puppet ruler: the embassy, having no brief to deal with the veiled or open defiance of the kings, returned to Rome.⁴²

Cappadocia is a longer tale. Mithridates had occupied himself with its affairs already, earlier, because his father had intervened there and his sister Laodice was still there as queen of Ariarathes VI, who had ruled since 130 B.C. Some time after 116 Ariarathes was murdered by a Cappadocian noble named Gordius (later, Mithridates was rumoured to have been behind the murder), and his two young sons succeeded to his throne under the tutelage of their mother: some fourteen years passed under that regime,⁴³ until in about 102 B.C. Nicomedes, no loyal partner in the annexation game, saw fit to send a garrison into Cappadocia and induce Laodice to marry him. Mithridates reacted sharply, expelled the garrisons, and handed the kingdom back to one of his nephews, Ariarathes VII Philometor. Soon, however, we hear that Mithridates was promoting the return of Gordius to Cappadocia and inciting him to add the son's murder to the father's. Ariarathes, warned of the plot, turned to all-out war against his erstwhile benefactor, levying a large Cappadocian army and adding troops from neighbouring kings. Mithridates is said to have invaded Cappadocia with 80,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry and 600 scythed chariots – hugely exaggerated figures, no doubt, but in any case a battlefield parley and the assassination of the young king removed the need for an engagement (c. 101). Mithridates installed his own son as Ariarathes IX, and Gordius was made regent, for the boy was only eight.⁴⁴ This puppet regime seems to have lasted some four or five years.

About the time of the battle, or a little before, an embassy from Mithridates went to Rome, apparently attempting to bribe senators to ratify his presence in Paphlagonia and Galatia since 107/6 and to counter

⁴¹ Waddington, Babelon and Reinach 1925 (B 253) 231 no. 40, dated year 190 of the Bithynian era; the palm on the reverse may refer to the victory in Paphlagonia. Paphlagonia: Liebmann–Frankfort 1968 (D 276) 160–3; Olshausen 1972 (D 49) 810–11.

⁴² Just. xxxvii.4; xxxviii.7.

⁴³ Chronology of Cappadocian kings 130–85 B.C. and their regnal years on coins: Mørkholm 1979 (B 208); Coarelli 1982 (B 142).

⁴⁴ Just. xxxviii.1.

the more recent claims of Nicomedes and Laodice to joint control of Cappadocia. That is the occasion on which Appuleius Saturninus is said to have been rude to the Pontic envoys and to have been impeached – perhaps really for attacking the king's Roman patrons.⁴⁵ And soon C. Marius was to show a predatory interest in the region:⁴⁶ he travelled to Asia in 99 or 98, and, in the short way Roman statesmen adopted with foreign kings, is said to have admonished Mithridates 'either to be greater than the Romans or to obey them'.⁴⁷

In about 97 the Cappadocians rebelled against the cruelty of Mithridates' proxy rulers, and called in the brother of the former king from the province of Asia, where he was being educated. Mithridates moved promptly, defeated him and chased him from the kingdom, and the young man died of an illness – at which point Nicomedes played another card in the game, taking up the claims of another young man, said to be a third brother. He sent this pretender, and his wife Laodice, Mithridates' sister, to Rome to testify that her former husband had recognized three legitimate sons. Mithridates counteracted by sending Gordius to Rome to claim that *his* Cappadocian king was a son of the earlier Ariarathes (V) who had aided Rome in the war against Aristonicus. The Senate found all this too tiresome to attempt to unravel, and reacted by ordering Mithridates out of Cappadocia and – perhaps more unexpectedly – Nicomedes out of Paphlagonia:⁴⁸ both peoples were to be 'autonomous' and free from taxation. Mithridates did withdraw (and perhaps stepped back from his portion of Paphlagonia at the same time – at least in 89 B.C. he claimed to have done so), and the Cappadocian nobility chose themselves a king, one Ariobarzanes. It was Sulla, the current governor of Cilicia who, on instructions from the Senate, went with a few troops from his province plus some Asiatic levies, and actually established Ariobarzanes in power.⁴⁹

On the other hand, two major developments tipped the balance of power in Asia Minor in favour of Mithridates. In 96 or 95 Tigranes I, 'The Great', succeeded to the throne of Armenia and was happy to ally himself with Mithridates by marrying his daughter Cleopatra:⁵⁰ and in 94 Nicomedes of Bithynia died, leaving his kingdom to his son Nicomedes

⁴⁵ Diod. xxxvi.15; Badian 1958 (A 1) 287.

⁴⁶ Marius' designs: Luce 1970 (C 101). Badian dates them to 98 B.C. 1959 (D 3) 173; Sherwin-White to 99, 1984 (D 291) 108–9. ⁴⁷ Plut. *Mar.* 31.2–3.

⁴⁸ Aemilius Scaurus was accused of taking bribes, perhaps in connexion with this diplomacy in 97/6 B.C., Val. Max. iii.7.8; Ascon. 21C; Badian 1956 (D 2) 120f; 1959 (D 3) 172–3; Marshall 1976 (D 282).

⁴⁹ Dated by scholars at 93/2 B.C., 97/6, 95/4. Vell. Pat. ii.15.3, Val. Max. v.7 ext. 2, and the Cappadocian regnal years are the main sources. J. Rich, reviewing McGing 1986 (D 35), *JRS* 77 (1987) 244, warns against undue confidence in conclusions from the coinage.

⁵⁰ Tigranes' accession date only approximate: Badian 1964 (A 2) 167–8, 176 n. 49. Tigranes as overlord of kings: App. *Syr.* 48; Plut. *Luc.* 21.

IV. In 91/0, Rome being in any case distracted by the Social War, Mithridates urged his new son-in-law to walk into Cappadocia, again using Gordius as agent. At the first appearance of Tigranes' generals Ariobarzanes fled to Rome: Mithridates was rid of a hostile king on his borders without himself making a move. But then, much more provocatively, he expelled the young Nicomedes from Bithynia, after an initial assassination attempt had failed. When the Senate found time it ruled that both the exiled kings were to be restored, and M'. Aquillius, cos. 101, the son of the organizer of the province of Asia, was appointed to lead a commission, along with Manlius Maltinus,⁵¹ to deal with the troublesome monarchs of Pontus and Armenia. So far, in Bithynia Mithridates claimed to be acting for a half-brother of Nicomedes called Socrates Chrestus – in which he probably had as much, or little, right as the older Nicomedes had had in Paphlagonia or he himself in Cappadocia:⁵² but that gained him no credit at Rome, even though he still disclaimed direct aggression in Bithynia.

V. THREATS AND BLUFFS

Mithridates was at the height of his power, secure in his alliance with Armenia and in the friendship or even (so his ambassador Pelopidas claimed) alliance of the Arsacid king of Parthia, another 'Mithridates the Great'. With Tigranes he had a division-of-spoils compact: Pontus was to take any conquered cities or territory, Armenia all captives and movables. He called for contingents from his Black Sea dependants and – more hopefully than realistically – from the Cimbri, already a spent force in Gaul: certainly, also, from the nearer Gauls, the Galatians. Far beyond his normal range of activity, he sent to the kings of Syria and Egypt, perhaps rather to secure their friendly neutrality than their active aid. And Memnon says he approached the Medians and Iberians. Rome, by contrast, was still in trouble with the Italians and had to maintain large forces in the Alpine region, Macedonia, Gaul and Spain: no more than five legions could be made available against Mithridates, and then only after much delay.⁵³

Yet, after all the impressive preparation, Mithridates again retired from Bithynia in response to Rome's demand: he even had his own Bithynian puppet-ruler, Socrates, put to death.⁵⁴ Further, when Aquilius and his colleagues directed a small force drawn from the troops of the province of Asia under Cassius, plus some others from Phrygia and Galatia, towards Armenian-occupied Cappadocia, Tigranes also retreated.

⁵¹ Better, perhaps, Mancinus. There was a third, but his name is garbled, *MRR* II p. 39, n. 19.

⁵² *Just.* xxxvii.4; xxxviii.2. Bithynia under Nicomedes IV: Vitucci 1953 (D 79) 107–10.

⁵³ Sherwin-White 1984 (D 291) 126–8.

⁵⁴ *Just.* xxxviii.5.

But now the Roman protégés in Bithynia and Cappadocia were faced with the bill to the Roman commissioners for their restoration and the repayment of their debts, and neither could do so. The commissioners, making Roman foreign policy on the spot, urged their protégés to recoup their losses and pay their debts by invading Mithridates' own kingdom. Ariobarzanes declined, knowing the vulnerability of his own kingdom to the power of Pontus, but Nicomedes reluctantly drove into Pontic territory as far as Amastris, and, as an economic measure, closed the exit of the Black Sea to ships from Pontus. That pressure put on their clients by the Roman commissioners was the disastrous and fatal miscalculation: they had misread the signs, and had made up their minds that Mithridates was a craven spirit, branded as such by twenty years of backing away from Rome.⁵⁵ Mithridates did retire into his own territory, but it was to be for the last time, before he struck back hard at the Roman province. He complained, through his general and envoy Pelopidas, about Nicomedes' action. Rebuffed, he sent his son Ariarathes, fast, into Cappadocia and drove Ariobarzanes out yet again. A second time Pelopidas was sent to the Roman commissioners, and proudly listed the peoples of Mithridates' empire and his allies, adding that even Rome's provinces of Asia, Achaea and Africa might be vulnerable.⁵⁶ Those words were taken by Aquilius and his colleagues as threat of war. They had Pelopidas put under close arrest and then sent him back to his master with orders not to return. The First Mithridatic War (or Mithridates' first Roman war) was under way – without, it must be said, the ratification of the Senate and People of Rome.

VI. MITHRIDATES' CONQUEST OF ASIA, 89–88 B.C.

Much of the action probably took place in the campaigning season of 89, Mithridates taking advantage of the war still raging between Rome and the *socii*.⁵⁷ Some of the *socii* appealed to him when he was at the height of his success and in control of Asia, but it was already too late for him to give effective aid. His victories in the field in western Pontus and Bithynia, and his occupation of Phrygia, Bithynia and some cities of Ionia, may be assigned to 89. His organization of the coast of Asia (Magnesia, Ephesus, Mytilene), the conquest of outlying areas to north and south (Paphlagonia, Caria, Lycia and Pamphylia), and the massacre

⁵⁵ Luce 1970 (C 101) 186f; *contra*, Sherwin-White 1984 (D 291) 119–20. Economic interests of Mancinus (if the name is right): Harris 1979 (A 47) 90; 98 n. 1; 100.

⁵⁶ Aristion (Athenion) is alleged to have claimed that Carthaginians were negotiating with Mithridates in 88 B.C. (Ath. v. 214A), perhaps actually Numidians.

⁵⁷ Historians used to give 88 B.C., based on App. *Mith.* 17 (Olympic year 173); Cic. *De Imp. Cn. Pomp.* 7, for all down to the Asiatic massacre. But see Badian 1976 (D 4) 109–10; Sherwin-White 1977 (D 75) 74 n. 86; 1980 (D 77) 1979–93; 1984 (D 291) 112; 121–7; McGing 1986 (D 35) 108–9.

of the Italians, may reasonably be thought to belong to the spring and summer of 88; and in the autumn he was drawn into the unsuccessful siege of Rhodes, which he had to break off by the early winter. Appian's narrative at this point perhaps reflects the experiences of P. Rutilius Rufus who wrote a history in Greek, while in exile from Rome. During Mithridates' advance and occupation of Asia he fled from Mytilene to find safety with the Smyrnaeans.⁵⁸

M'. Aquillius set about raising troops from Bithynia, exiled Cappadocians, Paphlagonians and Galatians. C. Cassius, the governor of Asia, had his own forces, and Q. Oppius, probably praetor in 89, had another army, mainly of allied troops, on the borders of Lycaonia. Each Roman contingent is said to have comprised 40,000 men.⁵⁹ In addition, Nicomedes had a national levy estimated at 50,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry. The dispositions were defensive, guarding four routes from Pontus into Bithynia and Asia, though these bases, in a semicircle round Pontus and its puppet-regime of Cappadocia, might well turn into launching-points for offensives. Nicomedes was to be based in eastern Paphlagonia, that portion recently ceded by Mithridates; Cassius was to guard the boundary of Bithynia and Galatia; Aquillius stood on Mithridates' line of march into Bithynia, and Oppius was by the foothills of Cappadocia.⁶⁰ To strengthen further Nicomedes' hold on the key to the Black Sea, a fleet was posted at Byzantium under Minucius Felix and Popillius Laenas. Total numbers were 176,000 men, not counting the fleet. Against that, Mithridates is said to have had 250,000 infantry and 40,000 cavalry: Memnon says he left Amasia and entered Paphlagonia with an invasion force of 150,000. All the figures are suspicious multiples of 10,000, and undoubtedly exaggerated; Mithridates' fleet, however, did have the potential to dominate the eastern Mediterranean, for he had 300 decked ships plus 100 with two banks of oars; he also had a terror-weapon against enemy infantry in the shape of 130 scythed chariots.

Nicomedes made the first move in the war, from Bithynium (later Claudiopolis) through Paphlagonia into western Pontus, and the first battle took place on a plain by the river Amnias. The Pontic generals, Archelaus and Neoptolemus (brothers, who came perhaps from Sinope or Amisus) caused panic among Nicomedes' infantry with the scythed chariots, and Nicomedes' camp was captured and he fled to the Roman armies, while as yet Mithridates' main arm, the Pontic infantry phalanx, had not even been in action. After the battle Mithridates adopted a magnanimous stance, recalling that of Alexander, by dismissing

⁵⁸ The end of App. *Mith.* 21 (see also *BCiv.* 1.55) probably marks the end of the campaigning season. Rutilius: Cic. *Rab. Post.* 27; Dio fr. 97.4; Athen. 14.66; Sherwin-White 1984 (D 291) 117-18.

⁵⁹ There were only a few actual Roman citizens in these armies; *FGrH* 434 22.6 F Memnon; Just. xxxviii.3.8. ⁶⁰ Magie 1950 (A 67) II 1093 n. 57 and 1101 n. 26.

prisoners to their homes. It was a pose he was to hold on to on several occasions during the following months, and he could afford it, for in this one day he had destroyed the largest of the armies and the power of his main rival in Asia Minor.

Nicomedes joined M'. Aquillius, who guarded the line of approach from Paphlagonia into Bithynia. Mithridates' army crossed Mount Scorobas into eastern Bithynia; and when a mere 100 of Mithridates' allied Sarmatian cavalry met a regiment of 800 Bithynian horse, Nicomedes' men were again defeated, and he retreated further to join Cassius. The Pontic generals now came upon the nearest of the Roman-led armies, that of Aquillius, at a stronghold called Protopachium in eastern Bithynia. In the Roman defeat that followed Aquillius lost about a quarter of his alleged 40,000 men; 300, probably Asiatic Greeks, who were captured and led before Mithridates, were set free; Aquillius' camp was taken; and Aquillius fled by night back to Pergamum, the seat of the governor of Asia. Further south, Cassius had taken in Nicomedes, and perhaps had the other commissioners with him: they occupied a fortress in Phrygia called Leontoncephalae, thus falling back into the *provincia* too, if not so far. There they spent some time drilling their ill-assorted troops, but gave up in disgust and retreated even further, Nicomedes betaking himself to Pergamum, having given up hope of retaining Bithynia. Although Cassius still had his army he obviously had little faith in it, in spite of help from Chaeremon of Nysa; he fell back to the Aegean coast and crossed to Rhodes. The Roman fleet that was sealing the Bosphorus straits dispersed after the news of Mithridates' victories, and the latter's 400 ships had free passage into the Propontis and the Aegean.

The king in person now made a progress through Bithynia, and moved on to occupy Phrygia, Mysia to the north of Pergamum, and the nearby Roman-administered areas. The take-over proceeded quietly and quickly: officers were despatched to receive the submission of outlying Lycia and Pamphylia, and of Ionia, where the chief Greek cities of Roman Asia lay. Caria, at least, offered more resistance. Oppius had fallen back into the city of Laodicea, where he had time to seek, and obtain, reinforcements from Aphrodisias;⁶¹ so at Laodicea Mithridates met his first threat of organized resistance since entering the Roman province – which he met by proclaiming an amnesty to the citizens if they would surrender Oppius. The Laodiceans handed Oppius over in mock formality, preceded by his lictors, and Mithridates kept him in his entourage in some style as a captured Roman general and later set him free, whereupon Oppius made his way to Cos. Cassius was safe in Rhodes. Aquillius, the main culprit, suffered the worst fate. He, too, abandoned the mainland of Asia for Lesbos, but was handed over by the

⁶¹ Chaeremon: *SIG* 741; Aphrodisias: Reynolds 1982 (B 226) 1–4; 11–20 nos. 2 and 3.

citizens of Mytilene. Mithridates had him tied to an ass and put him up to public ridicule, wearing a placard; and eventually, hauled back to Pergamum, he was to die through having molten gold poured down his throat, in mockery of the avarice that had brought on the war.⁶²

Mithridates' campaign in Asia Minor had been totally successful. Four armies had either been defeated or had disintegrated. Rome's forty-year-old administration of Asia had collapsed. Many cities welcomed Mithridates, especially tax-paying communities and those where Roman and Italian money-lenders had been most active. Mithridates set about appointing satraps in western Asia, underlining his claims to a Persian heritage, and *episcopi*, 'overseers', in many cities. In a bid for popularity he remitted taxes for a five-year period and cancelled debts owed by states and private persons: being now in control of the wealth of Bithynia and the revenues of Asia he was able to make an early and impressive show of that *philanthropia* which was an important part of his programme and befitted the son of Euergetes.⁶³ One can understand the current of good will in certain cities, Delos, even Chios and Rhodes, on which he might hope to capitalize. On the other hand, cities that had privileged status in relation to Rome, such as Ilium, Chios, Rhodes and the Lycian cities, might be expected, in spite of all, to stick to Rome and their own interest. At Stratonicea near the coast of Caria Mithridates placed a garrison and imposed a fine, showing something of the iron fist he had so far kept hidden in Asia. His generals were delegated to deal with outlying areas, to the far south in Lycia and to the north in Mithridates' rear, where Pylaemenes may have been acting as a focus of resistance in his homeland of Paphlagonia. At Magnesia (probably the Carian one on the Maeander) resistance was offered, and Archelaus was wounded. Tabae in Caria and Patara and Telmessus in Lycia subsequently recorded their loyalty to Rome: Termessus also, remote on the western extremity of Pamphylia, stayed firm and some Pamphylian cities supplied ships to Lucullus in 86/5 B.C. Sanctuary was offered to Romans on Cos for a while, but soon Mithridates took that island over also. There he gained a hostage, in a son of Ptolemy Alexander, and Egyptian treasures, possibly including 800 talents raised by Jews for the Jerusalem Temple.⁶⁴

Meanwhile, perhaps in the autumn of 89, news of Mithridates'

⁶² App. *Mith.* 21; Pliny *HN* xxxiii.48. But McGing 1980 (D 32) argues for confusion of father, cos. 129 B.C., with son. Gran. Lic. (xxxv. p. 27 Flemisch; *Greenidge-Clay* 187) describes Sulla asking for the return of Aquillius in 85 B.C.

⁶³ Diod. xxxvii.26, Just. xxxviii.3. *Philanthropia*: Glew 1977 (D 17); McGing 1986 (D 33) 109-10. Mithridates' letter: Welles 1934 (B 258) 295, nos. 73-4; his repair of earthquake damage at Apamea: Strabo xii.8.18.

⁶⁴ Mithridates' Athenian supporters adorned Delos with a Heroön, Gross 1954 (D 21); Bruneau-Ducat 1965 (B 265) 140. See also *I Délos* 2039. Victories of Mithridates at Chios and Rhodes in equestrian games (not in person): Robert 1960 (B 231) 345, n. 4.

victories, and the collapse of Roman rule in Asia, reached Rome, still preoccupied with internal dissensions and the severe war against the allies. Senate and People declared war on Mithridates,⁶⁵ but steps to deal with the eastern crisis were implemented only slowly (ch. 6, pp. 166–73). When the command against Mithridates was given to L. Cornelius Sulla it took him some eighteen months to assemble five legions and to feel secure enough about the political situation he was leaving behind him in Rome (and he was, of course, wrong about that). And financially, Rome was in dire straits: the so-called ‘Treasures of Numa’ were in part sold off to support the coming war.

And now occurred the high point of horror, probably in the first half of 88: the ‘Asiatic (or ‘Ephesian’) Vespers’, in which 80,000 (less credibly 150,000) Roman and Italian expatriates were massacred in the cities of Asia.⁶⁶ Mithridates wrote secretly to all regional satraps and overseers of cities that, on the thirtieth day after the day of writing, they should have all Italian residents in their communities killed, along with their wives and children and any freedmen of Italian birth, and have their corpses cast out unburied. Mithridates offered freedom to slaves who killed or informed on their Italian masters, and relief of half their debt to any who dealt similarly with their creditors. His treasury would share the property of the victims half-and-half with their assassins or informers. The response from many Greek cities was enthusiastic, displaying as much their hatred of the Roman and Italian expatriates as their fear of Mithridates: Ephesus, temporarily his residence, Pergamum, Adramyttium, Tralles and Caunus were all the scene of atrocities. Mithridates’ order was surely a calculated response to the news of Rome’s declaration of war: besides exploiting the widespread unpopularity of the westerners, it ensured that no city that did his bidding now could ever hope to be received back into Roman allegiance. Many of the Asian cities were by now under ‘tyrants’, such as Philopoemen, *episcopus* at Ephesus; others are known at Adramyttium, Apollonis, Colophon and Tralles. The social divisions characteristic of the ancient city helped to produce these changes of local regime, to which Mithridates’ present power in Asia was the spur. It was now the time for pro-Roman councillors and their sympathizers among the well-to-do to suffer for their real or perceived abuses; and Rome’s own representatives, the governors and the *publicani*, were held responsible for the prevailing climate of

⁶⁵ Keaveney 1982 (C 87) 56–76; 1987 (C 94) 144. The last occasion on which the Roman assembly passed a vote for war? Rich 1976 (A 95) 14; 17; *contra*, Harris 1979 (A 47) 263.

⁶⁶ Sarikakis 1976 (D 65). Badian 1976 (D 4) 110–11, dates the massacre somewhat before the middle of 88, Sherwin-White 1980 (D 77) puts it in winter 89/88. The numbers probably exaggerated: Dio fr. 109.8, believed that the mutual pogroms of Marius and Sulla were far worse. Magic 1950 (A 67) I 216; Brunt 1971 (A 16) 224–7.

aggressive greed (*pleonexia*) and acquisitiveness (*philokerdia*), and for encouraging the evils of malicious litigation.⁶⁷

Mithridates was now master of all western Asia Minor. He was hailed as the preserver of Asia, and a new era was proclaimed, upon the liberation of the cities from Rome, which lasted from 88 to 85 B.C. A short but splendid series of tetradrachms was issued from Pergamum,⁶⁸ and now, too, Mithridates could claim his Hellenistic and Iranian titles as overlord: *megas*, 'Great' and *basileus basileon*, 'King of Kings'. The latest holder of that Persian title, Mithridates II of Parthia, had died, and our Mithridates was now king over many vassals.⁶⁹

VII. OVERREACH

It was tempting to push further into the Aegean and into Macedonia and Greece: it was also politic, and not obviously overreach, to strike into Europe before Rome collected a consular army under competent commanders: C. Sentius, the Roman commander in Macedonia, with only two legions, was kept fully occupied by Thracian tribes. Mithridates had large, victorious armies and command of the sea; all that was needed was an invitation to intervene, and that was to be forthcoming from anti-Roman parties at Athens, and to elicit first moral backing and then military support for pro-Mithridatic tyrants at Delos and Athens. But first he must deal with Rhodes, his only possible remaining challenger in the Aegean and the main remaining haven for Romans and Italians.⁷⁰

In autumn 88, knowing what must come, the Rhodians strengthened their walls, constructed artillery against besiegers, and called in aid from the Lycians and the Telmessians. On Mithridates' approach they withdrew inside the harbour, closed their gates, and prepared to fight from the walls. Mithridates tried to enter the harbour but failed, and sat to await the arrival of his main-line infantry. When intervening skirmishes brought some advantage to them the Rhodians grew bolder: on two occasions sections of their fleet came off best, and then, when Mithridates' expected land forces set sail from Caunus they were scattered by a storm, and the Rhodians capitalized on the confusion to capture, ram and burn scattered ships and took 400 prisoners. Mithri-

⁶⁷ *Orac. Sibyll.* III. 350-5; *Cic. De Imp. Cn. Pomp.* 7; *Flac.* 60-1; *Diod.* xxxvii. 5; *Just.* xxxviii. 7.8; *App. Mith.* 16; 21; 56. *Dio fr.* 101. Tyrants: *Strab.* xiii. 1.66; xiv. 1.42; *App. Mith.* 48; *Plut. Luc.* 3.4.

⁶⁸ For coins dated by the new Asiatic era of Pergamum see Reinach 1888 (B 224) 195; Kraay-Hirmer 1966 (B 182) 377, no. 774.

⁶⁹ Golenko and Karyshkovski 1972 (B 165) 29 n. 2; Karyshkovsky 1985 (D 25) 572-9; Yailenko 1985 (B 261) 617-19; Vinogradov, Molyev and Tolstikov 1985 (B 252) 596-9.

⁷⁰ *Diod.* xxxvii. 28; Reinach 1890 (D 55) 144-7; *Magie* 1950 (A 67) 1218-19.

dates, while preparing for another naval engagement, pressed on with the investment of the city. He had a structure built, on two ships fixed alongside, which served as a huge bridge fitted with catapults, to assist the scaling of the walls. It was nicknamed *sambuca*, probably after a triangular four-stringed instrument favoured by Rhodian musicians.⁷¹ The huge device caused great alarm amongst the Rhodians, but in the event it collapsed under its own weight. Finally, Mithridates gave up the attempt to take the city and sailed off to the mainland, where he laid siege to Patara in Lycia, but failed to take that, either. Psychological warfare at once exploited the dent in his prestige resulting from the two failed sieges: religious propaganda began to be heard. The goddess Isis had been observed hurling fire from her temple upon the *sambuca*, and at Patara Mithridates had had a dream warning him not to cut down the sacred trees in the grove of Latona to make siege engines. He left Pelopidas to pursue the war against the Lycians, and applied himself to raising more troops in Asia Minor. He also conducted trials of people accused of plotting against him or considered to have pro-Roman sympathies – a further presage of the growth of opposition.

VIII. ATHENS, DELOS AND ACHAEA

Athens had not remained unaffected by the stirring events in Asia, and an envoy to Mithridates was found in the politician Aristion,⁷² whose return was received with rejoicing at Athens by anti-Roman elements (in, perhaps, late spring, 88 B.C.). According to Athenaeus they were the 'mob' and according to Pausanias the 'turbulent element', but the apologia for Athens in Velleius and Plutarch, that the city was compelled by force to collaborate with Mithridates' generals, rings very hollow.⁷³ Aristion had himself elected *strategos epi ton hoplon*, 'magistrate in charge of the arms', and appointed colleagues and archons: some opposing aristocrats were killed and their property confiscated.⁷⁴ Philo, head of the Academy, escaped to Rome, with other important persons.⁷⁵

A naval adventure was staged by this regime to try to seize Delos, the old possession of Athens, and install one Apellicon (another philosopher, said to be Peripatetic) as puppet-ruler in Aristion's interest, but it

⁷¹ Marsden 1971 (A 70) 90–4; 1969 (A 70) 108–9.

⁷² So named on the coins and in all literary sources except Athenaeus (from Posidonius), who calls him Athenion and makes him a Peripatetic. An old, unresolved crux.

⁷³ Strab. ix.1.20; Ath. v.212c; 213c; Paus. i.20.5; Vell. Pat. ii.23; Plut. *Sulla* 12. Aristion coupled with Nabis and Catiline: Plut. *Mor.* 809c.

⁷⁴ But some upper-class support for Aristion: Dow 1947 (D 13); Laffranque 1962 (B 61).

⁷⁵ Cic. *Brut.* 306. Epicureans and Peripatetics may have hated the Athenian and the Roman establishment: Zeller 1923 (H 138) III 1, 386; Badian 1976 (D 4) 514–15; Candiloro 1965 (D 258) 158–71; Deininger 1971 (D 10) 245.

failed, because a Roman prefect, Orbius, with a few ships, plus the strong Italian merchant presence, was able to stiffen resolve there.⁷⁶ However, the naval fortress of the Piraeus, the ship-sheds with their space for hundreds of warships, and the actual navy of Athens, were on offer to Mithridates. Before long, the fleet of Mithridates' general Archelaus took Delos with overwhelming force and restored it and other strong points to Athens' control: there were put to death some 20,000 opponents of what was becoming known as the 'Cappadocian Faction' in the Aegean.⁷⁷ The sacred treasure of Delos was sent under guard to Athens to bolster the prestige of Aristion's regime, and 2,000 troops were sent to ensure its security.⁷⁸ The time of Archelaus' naval advance was probably late summer to autumn of 88. Part of his fleet made for Piraeus, but a contingent under Metrophanes split from it after Delos, destined for the ports of central Greece.


The states of southern and central Greece reacted variously. The Achaeans and the Spartans went over to Mithridates easily, as did Boeotia, except for Thespieae, which had to be besieged. Metrophanes' army had less success on Euboea, at the stronghold of Demetrias, and against the Magnesians, who resisted firmly. One reason for that was the presence of Bruttius Sura,⁷⁹ a legate of C. Sentius, the governor of Macedonia. He played a vital role in holding up the Pontic advance during the autumn and winter of 88/7, buying time for the arrival of Sulla's consular army, which eventually arrived in Greece in spring 87. With his small force Bruttius made naval raids on the island of Sciathus and perhaps on Piraeus itself. He ruthlessly crucified recaptured slaves and cut off the hands of the free-born, as an earnest of Rome's reaction to rebellious Greeks. He won a small naval victory, in which two Pontic ships were captured and their crews put to death; and receiving another 1,000 infantry and cavalry he fought a series of actions over three days near Chaeronea in which he came off on equal terms with the joint forces of Aristion and Archelaus – but his run of success was halted when Spartans and Achaeans turned up to their aid. Archelaus, whose forces were probably not yet as large as they were to become, pulled back to Athens and Piraeus, retaining Euboea as a safe base for his army and sheltering behind the protecting fleet. Bruttius Sura's reward for his services from Sulla's quaestor L. Lucullus, in the vanguard of the approaching army, was to be brusquely ordered back to Macedonia to join Sentius and leave the business of Mithridates to the new appointee.

⁷⁶ Strab. x.5.4; Ath. v.214D. The Pontic general Menophanes on Delos: Paus. III.23.5.

⁷⁷ The 'Kappadokizontes', App. *Mith.* 53 and 61. Mithridates was 'the Cappadocian', Cic. *Flac.* 61; Ath. v.215B.

⁷⁸ Coin hoards on Delos reflecting its fate at this time: Hackens and Lévy 1965 (B 295).

⁷⁹ Brettius in the Greek literary sources, Brattius in the inscriptions, *JG* 1x.2.613; Plassart 1949 (B 219) 831.



6 Central Greece

IX. THE SIEGES OF ATHENS AND PIRAEUS

Early in 87 B.C. Sulla with his five legions left Italy for Greece. He is first found in Thessaly, summoning provisions, reinforcements and money from Thessaly and Aetolia. He approached Attica through Boeotia, where most of the cities, headed by Thebes, returned to Roman allegiance; and on his arrival he was faced with conducting two sieges independently but simultaneously. Aristion and his supporters were shut up in the city of Athens from autumn 87 until 1 March 86, and in their redoubt on the Acropolis for several weeks after that. Separate from them, no longer linked to the city by the Long Walls,⁸⁰ was Piraeus, easily provisioned from the sea and so the obvious place for Archelaus to keep his garrison of Pontic troops. (The two main sources, Plutarch and Appian, oddly concentrate each on a different one of these related, but separate, sieges.) Sulla's greater effort and personal participation were directed against the strategically more important Piraeus. Twice he retired to Eleusis and Megara, largely because of lack of timber and other materials for siege engines: twice, unsuccessfully, Archelaus, himself closely beleaguered, tried to get supplies through to Athens city, where some of the defenders were reduced, it was said, to cannibalism. The Pontic troops in Piraeus were better off, because supplies, and reinforcements, arrived from Mithridates; but, to offset that, a Pontic army was defeated, with the loss of 1,500 men, by a northern detachment of Sulla's forces near Chalcis, just as Archelaus' intended aid to Athens was being cut off. The siege of Piraeus settled into a tough phase of building, mining, countermining and fighting in underground tunnels; the besieged kept Sulla at bay, and when he returned to Eleusis in the winter he had to protect his camp against cavalry raids.

Mithridates' command of the sea was still undisputed, and so was his ability to supply his strongpoints in Euboea and Piraeus. Sulla had no navy, to speak of, but he had control over north-west and central Greece, where it was in his interest to provoke a major land battle. The impasse lasted into the spring of 86. In an attempt to break it Sulla sent Lucullus, early in winter 87, to collect a fleet from naval powers as far away as Syria and Egypt, the Rhodians being in no position to help. For his part, Mithridates, contrariwise, determined to win land superiority in Greece, and sent a great army, under his son Arcathias, overland into Greece via Thrace and Macedonia. The small Roman army in Macedonia was overcome, and by spring 86 Arcathias' army, probably the largest ever sent by Mithridates even after it had left garrisons at Philippi and Amphipolis, was in Magnesia in north-east Greece. It was the trump

⁸⁰ In ruins at this time and used to refurbish the fortifications of the city and the port, Livy XXXI.26; Paus. I.2.2.

card to win the war in Greece for Mithridates while Sulla's forces were divided between Athens, Piraeus and garrison duty opposite Euboea and in other towns in central Greece.

The besiegers of Athens city now had a lucky break. Indiscreet talk within informed them of a weak point in the defences, by the Heptachalcum between the western and Dipylon gates, and an attack was directed there. The Athenians were sapped also by dire famine, and the tyrant Aristion had become more and more unpopular and isolated. On 1 March they surrendered the main city to Sulla's troops: Aristion and his followers went up to the Acropolis, burning the Odeum in order to deny its materials to Sulla's forces. There was much destruction in the main city, though total burning was forbidden by Sulla in recognition of Athens' glorious past; and when the followers of Aristion finally gave up the Acropolis, many weeks later, at about the time of the battle of Chaeronea, they were summarily executed. Some forty pounds of gold and six hundred of silver fell into the hands of Sulla's legate, Curio.

Meanwhile, the siege of Piraeus was being pressed ever harder by Sulla: the groves of the Academy and Lyceum were cut for siege timbers and he took the temple treasures of Epidauros, Delphi and Olympia.⁸¹ Archelaus conducted a stout defence, but after losing 2,000 troops in a battle outside the *enceinte*, where he had ventured, he finally came to the decision to evacuate and, sailing off northwards, made contact with the northern army, flushed with successes in Thrace and Macedonia but commanded no longer by Arcathias, who had died of illness at Tisaeum in Magnesia; in fact, when the armies met at Thermopylae the overall command passed to Archelaus. Piraeus, abandoned, was destroyed by Sulla, and the arsenal of Philo burnt.

X. THE BATTLES IN BOEOTIA

The summer that followed the sieges of Athens and Piraeus saw two major battles, close to one another in both space and time. Our sources are Plutarch and Appian, with Plutarch, a native of Chaeronea, offering the fuller account of the battle in his city's territory. Both sources give only a brief sketch of the second battle, fought some weeks later at Orchomenus.⁸² Chronology, strategy, numbers, tactics are all subject to doubts and variant interpretations. Chaeronea was fought in the early summer at about the same time as the surrender of the Acropolis, and Orchomenus in the high summer, before the autumn rains.⁸³ The total of

⁸¹ H. A. Thompson 1934 (B 320) 394; 1937 (B 321) 223-4; D. B. Thompson 1937 (B 319) 411; Young 1951 (B 324) 155; 183; 262-3; Ervin 1958 (B 289). Temple treasures: Paus. ix.7.5.

⁸² Sulla's memoirs were amongst the material available to Plutarch and Appian.

⁸³ Reinach 1890 (D 55) 168-76; Ormerod. *CAH* ix¹ 244-54; Sherwin-White 1984 (D 291) 139-40.

the original Pontic army is given by Appian as 120,000 men: Memnon is much more modest, saying 60,000, but the late writers Eutropius and Orosius agree with the higher estimate, and that some 110,000 were lost at Chaeronea.⁸⁴ Weeks later, with a new army of 80,000 incorporated into his surviving force, Archelaus lost almost the whole army at Orchomenus – a further 90,000 (i.e. he had no effective army left). Sulla's calculation, in 85 B.C., of Mithridates' total losses was 160,000, more modest than the implications of Plutarch and Appian. In any case, all the figures are exaggerated, because units were counted at their paper sizes – and casualties probably likewise reckoned by corps lost rather than corpses counted. Numbers on the Roman side were apparently minimized by Sulla: he seems to have reported that he had at Chaeronea only 15,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry, of whom only fourteen or fifteen were missing, and two of those turned up by the evening! But others may have been engaged separately at Thurium and by the city of Chaeronea itself. It is usually believed that most of Sulla's five legions were at Chaeronea at least in the wider sense, which would make some 30,000 Romans, to which must be added some Macedonians and local Greeks: Appian says that the forces of Archelaus outnumbered the Romans by three to one, which would make Sulla's total army at Chaeronea about 40,000.⁸⁵

One respect in which the Pontic forces most undoubtedly outnumbered the Roman was cavalry, and Archelaus' strategy was determined by the nature of his now very large army, whose cavalry contingent required plains, such as those of Macedonia and Thessaly, or, at the most southerly, those of Phocis and Boeotia. If he did lose control of the plains of central Greece he had in mind a retreat eastwards to Aulis and, from there, the crossing into Euboea, under the protection of the fleet. But at the time when the two armies were coming close to contact Archelaus was actually moving into Phocis, in a dangerous move to cut off an isolated Roman brigade to his north.

Sulla's strategy had taken him out of Attica. He was criticized in his own camp for transferring the war to central Greece, but in reality he had no option. He had an army which he believed could beat that of Pontus in the field, but the land of Attica was poor, and exhausted by his long presence there during the sieges: his troops needed the relative prosperity of Boeotia and Phocis for supplies. Most urgent of all was the need to link up with the brigade, of some 6,000 men, commanded by Hortensius, which was stranded in Thessaly and likely to be cut off by Archelaus. Hortensius did manage to join Sulla by crossing one of the passes unnoticed by the Pontic commanders, and met Sulla's main force at Patronis. It was a welcome addition: Hortensius was a vigorous and

⁸⁴ Eutropius v.6.3; Oros. vi.2.5.

⁸⁵ App. *Mith.* 41; *BCiv.* 1.79.

resourceful officer, and Sulla's men were spared the panic that might have been caused by the loss of their comrades in a separate engagement.

The first actions and counteractions of the two armies now took place on the plain of Elatea at Philoboeotus.⁸⁶ The Pontic generals offered battle, but Sulla declined several times because of their superiority in numbers, and kept his men digging earthworks. However, after the three days thus occupied, his troops besought him for something more interesting to do, so he set them the task of seizing an isolated steep hill, the acropolis of Parapotamii, to the south of Archelaus' camp. The successful Roman occupation of this strongpoint at once made Archelaus' position in the plain of Elatea impossible, so he struck camp and moved south-eastwards towards Chaeronea, in the direction of Aulis, Chalcis and the coast. The folk of Chaeronea begged for Roman help for their city, and Sulla sent his legate Gabinus with a legion, which reached the city even before the deputation got back. Sulla likewise moved south-eastwards across the river Assus and settled near Mt Hedylium, while Archelaus' position was between Mt Hedylium and Mt Acontium. Archelaus' move had in fact been a disastrous one: he was in an area that was rocky and cramped and gave no scope to his cavalry. It was the sign for Sulla now to work for a decisive engagement.

For one day Sulla waited, and then, leaving another legate, Murena, with a legion and two cohorts to face Archelaus, moved towards Chaeronea. Through Gabinus he got two citizens of Chaeronea to lead a small contingent of his men along a hill-track to a part of Thurium hill above the point where the Pontic detachment already stood; and then he drew up his own battle-line on the plain, with himself on the right and Murena on the left. Presently the men of Chaeronea and Sulla's detachment surmounted the track over Thurium and appeared above the Pontic troops: they caused great panic, and Archelaus' men rushed down the hill, badly upsetting the dispositions of the main force below. When Archelaus at last got his battle-line drawn up he sent into attack a cavalry force, which had little effect, and then the weapons of terror, the scythed chariots. But scythed chariots were only practically effective at a gallop or canter, and without momentum were easily neutralized. Sulla's men allowed the slowly lumbering things to pass through open lanes in the ranks; they jogged harmlessly by, to Roman jeers, and their crews were despatched by javelins from behind. When the main battle-lines joined, the Pontic phalanx yielded only slowly and there was much tactical movement; but ultimately the Romans pushed the phalanx back to the river Cephissus and towards Mt Acontium. Archelaus' troops were killed in huge numbers on the plain, and even more in the flight across the

⁸⁶ Hammond 1938 (p 23) with differences in detail from Kromayer 1907 (A 58) 353f, followed by Ormerod *CAH IX*¹ 249-52.

stony ground to their camp, because at first he excluded them, trying to rally them to fight, and only as a last resort admitted the survivors. Archelaus made off eastwards to the coast with, it was said, only 10,000 left of his great army.

Sulla was master of the field, even though he still had no means of finishing Archelaus off because of his continuing lack of a fleet: he had demonstrated his, and Rome's, superiority to the mightiest army Mithridates could assemble, led by a first-rate general. From the field he dashed with some light troops to the coast to try to deny Archelaus the crossing of the Euripus, but failed; so he marched back to central Greece to deal harshly with the Thebans, handing over half their territory to the sanctuaries to recompense the gods for the moneys he had taken himself for his sieges. In Athens, he took over from Curio the recent followers of Aristion; them he executed, Aristion he kept alive for the moment, and the Athenians in general were graciously allowed their liberty.⁸⁷ Meanwhile, Archelaus, from his base at Chalcis, was far from inactive: his fleet raided up and down the coasts of Greece, reaching Zacynthus, and destroyed some of the transports conveying the advance guard of the new Roman army under Flaccus sent by the government of Cinna.

From his base in southern Greece Sulla heard that Flaccus' army had landed and was on its way eastwards, nominally against the armies of Pontus but in fact to supersede him if he did not co-operate. He set off towards Thessaly to meet them, but, while at Melitaea in Phthiotis, heard that the lands behind him, Boeotia particularly, were being ravaged by a reassembled Mithridatic army – the rump of Archelaus' army plus a brigade of 80,000 led by Dorylaeus, freshly arrived in Chalcis. So he turned south to fight his second great battle of the summer; and it was Archelaus who opted for a deciding battle on the same scale as at Chaeronea,⁸⁸ and chose the ground, by Orchomenus some 10 kilometres east of Chaeronea in the largest plain in Boeotia, eminently suited to his cavalry. Less favourably, however, the river Cephissus debouched into Lake Copais and its marshes and the short but navigable river Melas flowed by Orchomenus and also lost itself in the marshes.

Sulla accepted the challenge, a strategy that might at first have seemed an error. But he now put to good use the entrenching skills he had made the troops practise before Chaeronea. First, they dug a series of three-metre-wide ditches across the plain to contain the Pontic cavalry and hem Archelaus' troops in to the eastern, marshy end of the plain. The two armies drew their battle-lines quite close to each other. Archelaus' cavalry charged in force to sweep away the digging-parties, and nearly

⁸⁷ Gran. Lic. 24F (*Greenidge-Clay* p. 182); Paus. 1.20.5; Strab. IX.1.20.

⁸⁸ Mommsen assigned Orchomenus to 85 B.C., but see Magie 1950 (A 67) II 1107 n. 47; Sherwin-White 1984 (D 291) 140 n. 32.

succeeded.⁸⁹ All depended, for Sulla, on containing those cavalry: he seized his sword (or a standard) and rallied his men on foot,⁹⁰ and two cohorts from the right wing, and his own escort, stabilized the danger area. After that turning-point the Romans won a decisive victory, even against a renewed cavalry attack. Meanwhile, Sulla's trenches had hemmed in Archelaus' main army so narrowly that in the closing phases of the action some Pontic archers had no room to draw bow and were reduced to stabbing with their arrows. Archelaus' men spent the night pent up in their fortifications together with the dead and wounded; and next day Sulla resumed the process of penning them in with entrenchments now no more than 200 metres from the camp. In a battle outside the camp to try to break this final investment the Pontic troops were defeated, and the camp fell. There followed total disaster for Archelaus' men: they were pursued and slaughtered, they lost their way in the marshes and were drowned. The commander himself hid in the marshes for two days, and then escaped in a boat, making his way to Chalcis.

All that Archelaus was able to collect from the wreckage of Mithridates' armies in Europe was a scattered detachment or two that had not been at Orchomenus. Sulla now turned to ravaging Boeotia, especially the coastal towns opposite Euboea, in revenge for their continual changes of sides: he then intended to turn once more northwards to Thessaly, to confront Flaccus. Before he left Boeotia, however, he learnt that Archelaus wanted an interview with him. Archelaus was treating from much the weaker position, to be sure, and although Mithridates had probably authorized these diplomatic moves his general could not be sure of their reception by the king. In the event Sulla and Archelaus reached a cordial agreement on terms, which were indeed then not fully acceptable to Mithridates, but which his deteriorating position in Asia over 86 and 85 B.C. was eventually to force him to underwrite. The terms were that Mithridates was to give up Asia and Paphlagonia and to hand back Bithynia to Nicomedes and Cappadocia to Ariobarzanes. He was to hand over seventy (or eighty) ships fully equipped to Sulla, plus a war indemnity of 2,000 (or 3,000) talents. In return Sulla would guarantee Mithridates his rule in Pontus and the rest of his territories, and secure for him the status of an ally of Rome. These terms remained on offer for some months, but Sulla did not waver in the demands he made. Meanwhile, Archelaus became his personal friend and stayed in his camp, was promised 2,500 hectares of land in Euboea, and was spoken of as a 'friend and ally of the Roman people' – a fate notably better than that of his personal enemy Aristion, who had now been executed by poison. Sulla marched north to Thessaly to winter, build ships, and await the arrival of Lucullus' fleet garnered from Cyprus, Phoenicia and Pamphy-

⁸⁹ Frontin. *Str.* II.3.17; Plut. *Sulla* 21.

⁹⁰ Frontin. *Str.* II.8.12; Amm. Marc. XVI.12.41.

lia: the seventy ships of Archelaus in Greece were detained as the first part of Sulla's demands or as the core of an invasion fleet if Mithridates should fail to accept the terms.

XI. REACTION IN ASIA, 86 B.C.

After Chaeronea, Mithridates met with increasing unrest amongst his new subject-allies of Asia. He had already harboured suspicions: sixty nobles from the cantons of Galatia had been lodged in Pergamum as hostages: now, they and their families were killed, some arrested by a stratagem and some slaughtered at an evening banquet. Three survivors fled to organize rebellion in Galatia. In Ionia, Mithridates resolved to deal finally with Chios, whose citizens he had suspected of disloyalty ever since some Chiots had collided with his flagship at the siege of Rhodes. What now followed was a warning to all the states of Asia of what would happen if Mithridates held them suspect. He had already demanded the confiscation of the property of Chiots who had fled to Sulla: now his general Zenobius seized the walls, disarmed the citizens and sent the children of the most prominent to Erythrae as hostages. In a bitter letter he listed his grievances against the Chiots and imposed a fine of 2,000 talents. They collected temple ornaments and the women's jewellery and paid up, but were accused of delivering short measure. They were led out of the theatre where they had been assembled, men, women and children, to be deported by ship to Mithridates' power base on the Black Sea. (This Achaemenid-style deportation was actually aborted by the people of Heraclea Pontica, who freed many of the Chiots when they reached the Black Sea.) The Ephesians then openly revolted, cancelling debts and taking other measures to maintain political unity, though they should have been a stronghold of the 'Cappadocian Faction', and other cities as far north as Smyrna and south as Tralles followed suit. Mithridates sent an army to reduce those in revolt – Colophon, Ephesus, Hypaepa, Metropolis, Sardis – and take terrible vengeance on those captured. In an attempt to stave off further desertions he proclaimed freedom for cities still loyal, cancellation of debts, citizenship for resident foreigners and freedom to slaves;⁹¹ but defections continued. Four former supporters in Smyrna and on Lesbos formed a conspiracy, which one of them betrayed to Mithridates: the king himself is said to have overheard the final session at which the plot was hatched, hiding under a couch. The conspirators were tortured and executed. Further inquiries implicated another eighty

⁹¹ Chiots: Ath. vi.266; revolt: App. *Mith.*48; Oros. vi.2.8. Ephesus: *SIG* 742. Mithridates is not likely to have sympathized with the lower orders beyond his political interest: de Ste Croix 1981 (A 100) 525; Magie 1950 (A 67) 1 222–6; McGing 1986 (D 35) 126–30. Nor did the whole of the lower orders support him: Bernhardt 1985 (A 10) 33–64.

citizens of Pergamum, and denunciations spread into other cities. The total killed in this witch hunt for Roman sympathizers was 1,600. (On the other hand, the following year those who had sided with the 'Cappadocians' were killed, committed suicide, or fled to Mithridates in Pontus.) Some time late in 86 or early in 85 Cos and Cnidus defected from Mithridates, on the appearance of Lucullus with a fleet: Rhodes added its ships to those of Lucullus, and, sailing up the coast of Ionia, they drove the 'Cappadocian Faction' out of Colophon and Chios. Mithridates' cherished mastery of the sea was now under challenge.

The wild card in the Roman pack was the consular army of Flaccus, sent by Sulla's enemies in Rome. It had marched across Epirus and Macedonia and Thrace to Byzantium, but Flaccus had acquired a reputation for greed, harshness and unfairness, and there were desertions and indiscipline. C. Flavius Fimbria, usually thought to have been Flaccus' *legatus*,⁹² seized the fasces and drove Flaccus off, with the support of the troops: the repulsed commander hid ignominiously in a house and then fled to Chalcedon and on to Nicomedia, where he found refuge within the walls, but Fimbria pursued him even there and had him dragged out of a well, where he was hiding, and beheaded. Fimbria appointed himself commander of the consul's army, and was in due time recognized as such by Cinna's regime in Rome: they needed a vigorous commander – and they had got one.

From such unpromising beginnings this Roman army, now under a competent, however literally 'self-made' general, began to have successes in Bithynia, though descending to the shocking despoliation of cities such as Nicomedia and Cyzicus as well. Fimbria's army fought several battles against Mithridates' generals, including a resounding one on the river Rhyndacus against a quartet of them. Mithridates' son escaped from that action to join him at Pergamum, but Fimbria's speed was such that the king himself had to leave in haste for the coast at Pitane. There, Fimbria almost encircled him with earthworks, leaving only the coastal side as an exit for him. Lucullus was off the coast with his fleet at the time, but refused to help corner Mithridates and hand the credit for completing the war to Sulla's adversaries; so Mithridates escaped by sea, later to attend his conference with Sulla. Fimbria rampaged through parts of Asia, punishing the 'Cappadocian Faction' and devastating the territory of any city that shut its gates to him. At Ilium, he treacherously burnt down the town and slaughtered its inhabitants, even though he had been admitted.

To Mithridates an agreement with Sulla, who now had a fleet to

⁹² Plut. *Luc.* 2–3; Diod. xxxviii.8; Livy *Per.* lxxx; Plut. *Mar.* 43; Magie 1950 (A 67) 1 226–8; Bulst 1964 (C 35) 319–20. Fimbria's status: commonly said to have been *praefectus equitum* and *legatus*; according to Appian a *privatus* on Flaccus' staff; perhaps ex-quaestor, Lintott 1971 (C 100).

pursue him into Asia, was preferable to the humiliations he was now undergoing. There was a go-between of standing in Archelaus, and terms had been on the table for about a year, to get used to. The hostility of Fimbria's army to Sulla might yet be used as a bargaining counter; so might the still large Mithridatic fleet, and Sulla's starved financial situation.⁹³

XII. THE TREATY OF DARDANUS, THE FATE OF ASIA AND THE FELICITY OF SULLA

The summit meeting between Sulla and Mithridates took place at Dardanus in the Troad, probably in autumn 85 B.C.⁹⁴ It opened with complaints by Mithridates about Roman dealings with him over western Asia Minor before 89; Sulla replied with a speech going back to his own dispositions in Cappadocia when he was commander in Cilicia, but concluding with the contemporary fact of the collapse of Mithridates' adventure in Greece with the loss of 160,000 men. Sulla insisted on the terms already adumbrated in his talks with Archelaus; Mithridates was compelled to consent, and Sulla welcomed him to the formal cessation of hostilities with a kiss of friendship. If he was to pay 2,000 talents indemnity,⁹⁵ it was after all only the sum demanded as reparations from Chios alone by his general Zenobius. He was to evacuate the part of Paphlagonia in dispute; the kings of Bithynia and Cappadocia were to get back their kingdoms, and Sulla's legate, Curio, was to see to that, once Fimbria had been eliminated. Prisoners were to receive their freedom and deserters to be handed over for punishment. Seventy ships and 500 archers were to be handed over. In return, Mithridates was confirmed as king in his own prosperous and untouched kingdom, and his Black Sea empire was intact. No king, not even Antiochus the Great, had emerged so little scathed after a full-scale war with Rome.

Mithridates sailed away through the Bosphorus to his Pontic fastness with another twenty years of opposition to Rome ahead of him, for all that he was now an 'ally of the Roman people'. Fortunately for him, Rome's war with the allies in Italy had been superseded by civil war, and Sulla had western preoccupations: he was prepared to insist on his terms, but not to load them with provocations that might goad the king into further present resistance.⁹⁶ As for Fimbria, his legions submitted on Sulla's approach, and after an assassination attempt on Sulla had failed

⁹³ For the speech given to Mithridates by Sallust: Raditsa 1969-70 (D 54).

⁹⁴ Date: Reinach 1890 (D 55) 190-206; Ormerod *CAH* ix¹ 256; Magie 1950 (A 67) I 229-31; II 110, n. 58; Liebmann-Frankfort 1968 (D 276) 183f; Sherwin-White 1984 (D 291) 143-8.

⁹⁵ So Plut. *Sulla* 22. 5, but 3,000 Memnon *FGrH* 434 F 25.

⁹⁶ Florus 1.40; Badian 1970 (C 13) 19; Keaveney 1982 (C 87) 104-5; 122-7; 1987 (C 94) 117-61; Sherwin-White 1984 (D 291) 144-8; McGing 1986 (D 35) 130.

and a proffered conference had been declined, he committed suicide. His legions, in fact, were left behind in Asia to become its garrison under Murena.

The settlement of the cities of Asia – reparations, rewards, administrative and financial arrangements for the future – was set in hand. Sulla took his time over it, not leaving Ephesus until 84. Even then he dallied in Athens, being initiated into the Eleusinian Mysteries and appropriating the libraries of his tyrant opponents, before sailing to Italy with his by then enormous fleet of 1,200 ships and arriving in Rome in the spring of 83. The collaborating cities, and the ‘Cappadocian Faction’ in the others, were now to pay heavily.⁹⁷ Some eight or nine cities were rewarded with keeping their own government and with the title of ‘Friend of the Roman People’: Chios, Rhodes, the Carian cities Stratonicea, Aphrodisias and Tabae, some Lycian cities, Magnesia-on-the-Maeander, and Ilium far away to the north-west. All had resisted Mithridates. Rhodes even received back control of her Peraea, the mainland coast opposite the island, which she had forfeited in the aftermath of the Third Macedonian War.⁹⁸ Such exceptions made the reparations forced on the other cities all the more harsh. Sulla’s troops were quartered on the errant cities over the winter: each legionary was to receive four tetradrachms a day, and centurions fifty drachmas. Slaves freed by Mithridates had to be returned to their masters. If cities resisted this harsh treatment, a massacre of free men and slaves followed. Communities were sold into slavery and city walls pulled down. Sulla called the representatives of the cities to Ephesus and delivered a harangue justifying Rome’s policy towards them since the time of Antiochus III and the revolt of Aristonicus; he finished by reimposing the unpaid taxes of the last five years. The appalling total of 20,000 talents was to be paid (perhaps 8,000 indemnity and 2,400 arrears of tax annually since 89 B.C.): coming on the top of the billeting and the destruction of private and public fortunes, it was crippling, far into the future.⁹⁹ Loans had to be sought at high interest, theatres, gymnasia, harbours and city walls had to be mortgaged. Although Sulla’s quaestor Lucullus is said to have been scrupulously honest, the communities of Asia were in a parlous state for years, and some of the arrangements were

⁹⁷ Memnon *FGrH* 434 F 25 says the cities that had supported Mithridates were given an ‘amnesty’, but it did not let them off the burdens. Most hardly treated were Adramyttium, Clazomenae, Ephesus, Miletus, Mytilene, Pergamum, Tralles and perhaps Phocaea, with Caunus suffering because of unwillingness to be subject to Rhodes, Keaveney 1982 (C 87) 110–12; 114–15.

⁹⁸ Chios: *SIG* 785; Rhodes: Strab. xiv.2.3; App. *Mith.* 61; *BCiv.* v.7; Stratonicea: *OGIS* 441; Tabae: *OGIS* 442; Aphrodisias: Reynolds 1982 (B 226) 1–4; Lycians: *ILLRP* 174–5; Magnesia: Strab. xiii.3.35; Ilium: App. *Mith.* 53.

⁹⁹ Asia was organized into forty-four regions, Cassiod. *Chron.* (Greenidge–Clay p. 191), perhaps for direct tax-gathering, the Asian *publicani* having been wiped out: Brunt 1953 (D 254).

being endorsed or revised by the Senate for some time afterwards.¹⁰⁰ Nor were all recalcitrancies immediately suppressed: as late as 81/80 Mytilene was still defiant and had to be eventually subdued by Minucius Thermus.¹⁰¹

The destruction of cities, the financial ruin of those that survived, the liberations of slaves and the proclamations requiring their re-enslavement, the removal of the fleets that had controlled the Aegean, first that of Mithridates, then that of Sulla, all led to a great increase in pirate activity. The pirate squadrons progressed from taking ships to assaulting forts, harbours and even cities, among which were the island of Samos, Clazomenae in Ionia and Iasus in Caria. They are said to have robbed the temple of the Cabiri on Samothrace of treasure worth 1,000 talents at a time when Sulla himself was on the island.¹⁰² Even so, he may not have realized the scale of the monster he had helped to conjure up and the threat it was to pose throughout the Mediterranean down to 67 B.C.

Mithridates had been lucky to get the treaty he did and to win Sulla's support for his status as 'king and friend of Rome'. However, the outlook for him and for Pontus in the future was uncertain. At Rome, many thought the terms of the peace were not fair punishment for Mithridates' crimes: they had, after all, been granted by a political faction, that of Sulla, albeit the dominant one at the moment. There was nothing to prevent future Roman provocation designed to push Mithridates into another war in which he could be made to pay more adequately for the first one. The relative weakness of the Pontic field armies had been thoroughly exposed by Sulla's five legions, and even quite small forces like Bruttius Sura's, and renegade armies, like that of Fimbria, had been able to defeat Mithridates' generals. Those revelations made such a provocation all the more likely, and within two years Murena was invading Pontus in response to a call from Archelaus.¹⁰³ In the meantime, between 83 and 80, Mithridates was to be kept busy with revolts in his Black Sea empire, in Colchis, and among the tribes north and east of the Cimmerian Bosphorus.

Sulla, by contrast, was everywhere victorious, having recovered all Mithridates' conquests in less than three years. Even his image and propaganda outdid Mithridates, though in terms more appropriate to the Republican than the Iranian tradition. His byname among the Greeks, after he had been induced to dedicate a double-headed axe to Aphrodite of Aphrodisias in Caria, was 'Epaphroditus', and a counter to Mithridates' identification with Dionysus. From the date of his triumph

¹⁰⁰ Magic 1950 (A 67) 1 232-40; Brunt 1956 (D 254); Sherwin-White 1984 (D 291) 148; 244f.

¹⁰¹ Mattingly 1979 (D 283) 1494 with n. 10.

¹⁰² App. *Mith.* 63.

¹⁰³ He argued that the Peace of Dardanus had not been ratified: App. *Mith.* 64; Glew 1981 (D 19).

he took officially (he had had it unofficially for a long time) the *cognomen* 'Felix', 'The Fortunate', an answer to Mithridates' names of 'Megas' and 'Basileus Basileon'.¹⁰⁴ And if Mithridates had his 'historians in the service of, and writing to please, barbarian kings',¹⁰⁵ so did Sulla have his partisan writers, and his own *commentarii*, to influence contemporaries and posterity. *His* next business was with his enemies at Rome.

¹⁰⁴ Vell. Pat. II.24; App. *BCiv.* I.76; Balsdon 1951 (C 18).

¹⁰⁵ Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* I.4.3.

CHAPTER 8a

LUCULLUS, POMPEY AND THE EAST

A. N. SHERWIN-WHITE

I. PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS: MURENA AND SERVILIUS

Mithridates might have accepted what the Peace of Dardanus seemed to offer – the recognition of his independence within his kingdom and freedom of action to the north and west, in the regions of his Crimean, Sarmatian and sub-Caucasian territories. The Peace required his withdrawal from the Roman dependencies south and west of the Halys in Bithynia, Paphlagonia, Galatia and Cappadocia, though he retained the coastal zone of Paphlagonia that his father Euergetes had acquired. So too a century earlier the Seleucids were left free by the Peace of Apamea in their activities ‘beyond Taurus’. But in 83–82 B.C. Licinius Murena, left by Sulla to re-establish the Roman province of Asia, intervened against Mithridates, first in Cappadocia, where the king was attempting to restrict the territorial recovery of the restored Ariobarzanes, and then in western Pontus, where Murena carried out two extensive raids on the pretext that the military preparations of Mithridates for the recovery of the rebellious Greek cities of the Crimea were in fact aimed against Rome. After suffering the devastations of two great raids without resistance, when Murena appeared for the third time despite the intervention of a Roman arbiter who gave ambiguous advice, Mithri-

The principal sources for the campaigns and other activities of Lucullus and Pompey in the East are the *Mithridatica* of the historian Appian, the *Historia Romana* of Cassius Dio, and Plutarch's biographies of the two proconsuls. The local historian Memnon provides an independent account of the campaigns of Lucullus, including a lengthy internal history of the misfortunes of Heraclea and Sinope. All are relatively late works, written between the late first and early third centuries A.D., and except for Memnon derived ultimately, so far as can be judged, from the now fragmentary *Historiae* III–V of Sallust, the lost books 93–102 of Livy, and the little-known histories of Pompey written by his contemporaries Posidonius and Theophrastus. Much particular information about Mithridates and Tigranes is preserved by the geographer Strabo, who devoted about half of his twelfth book to the kingdom of Pontus, and also related the fortunes of many Greek cities of the Anatolian region, which are independently illuminated by a number of lengthy epigraphical documents. Of various brief epitomators Velleius Paterculus alone provides an independent survey of events, dating from c. A.D. 14. Finally the actions of Pompey and Gabinus in southern Syria are recounted mainly in the *Jewish Antiquities* and the *Jewish War* of Josephus, written in the Flavian period. Thus apart from civic inscriptions and sporadic information in speeches of Cicero, notably his *De Imperio Cn. Pompeii*, the surviving sources were written in the Principate. For the first decade they are collected in *Greenidge-Clay*.



dates led his army out and inflicted a series of defeats on Murena's forces, which he pursued through northern Galatia to the borders of Phrygia. An emissary of Sulla himself now arrived who put an end to the fighting and secured the evacuation of Cappadocian territory by Mithridates. Murena withdrew to hold an unearned triumphal celebration in Rome.

This affair reveals the existence of contrary policies at Rome. While Sulla was determined to maintain no more than the former protectorates beyond the borders of Asia in Cappadocia, Galatia and Bithynia, and to recognize Mithridates as a Roman vassal, his own man was bent on renewing war with Mithridates, and after Sulla's death a majority within the Senate connived at a refusal to ratify the Peace of Dardanus, of which Murena had denied the very existence on the grounds that it was not formulated in a written text. Yet Mithridates tried hard through his emissaries to secure the ratification of the Peace. When his agents failed to secure a hearing by the Senate in 78 he realized that powerful men were keen to renew a war that offered the prospect of vast enrichment. But he respected the Peace for the long period, in a king's reign, of eight years after his troubles with Murena.

After the withdrawal of Murena it was decided at Rome to restore Roman control over Pamphylia, Pisidia and Lycaonia, which had seen no Roman proconsul since 89 B.C. A permanent province was now established in the southern region, which was still known as 'Cilicia', though it contained no Cilician territory, because the suppression of pirates, known to have Cilicia as their main base, fell to the proconsuls. But the first enemy was Zenocoetes, who held maritime strongholds on the Lycian coast to the west of Pamphylia such as Olympus, Phaselis and their mountainous hinterland. The first effective proconsul was the consular P. Servilius, who operated with a considerable fleet of unknown composition and a force of five legions. In his first two years (78-77) he drove the light vessels of the pirates out of Pamphylian waters after a considerable but unlocated naval battle, and captured the strongholds of Zenocoetes by a series of land assaults.¹ He then set about the reconquest of mountainous Pisidia and the adjacent region of Isauria, which lies between the westernmost chain of Taurus and the open plateau of Lycaonia.

Through Pisidia and Isauria there passed the sole useful route for wheeled transport from Pamphylia to Iconium in western Lycaonia, on the main route from Apamea to Cappadocia. After the laborious capture of the central strongholds of Isaura Vetus and Isaura Nova, and the subjection of the Orondeis people around Mithion and Pappa to the north, beyond Lake Caralis, Servilius completed his conquest by

¹ Land assaults, cf. Strab. xiv. 5.7 (671) with Cic. II *Verr.* 1.36, 4.21, *Leg. Agr.* 1.5, 2.50, Sall. *H.* II fr. 81-4, Florus 1.41.5.

constructing a military highway along his main route, to be identified with the imperial road known from the late *Itineraries* which led from Side in Pamphylia by Pappa to Iconium. He thus opened for the first time, as the sources record, the direct route from the military region of Pamphylia to the confines of Cappadocia. There is no evidence whatever that his campaign into Isauria was conducted from the north, as has been supposed, through southern Phrygia, which was in the province of Asia, by Apamea and Philomelium. This campaign had nothing to do with the suppression of piracy: it opened up a new approach to Pontus from the south through Lycaonia and Cappadocia.² The threat of Mithridates mattered more to the Romans than the activities of pirates in the eastern Mediterranean, against whom a naval command was eventually established in 74 at the praetorian level. Mithridates was now faced by a dual threat from the Roman commanders in Asia and Cilicia. When war seemed likely in 74 the consul L. Lucullus secured the province of Cilicia rather than Bithynia, which was now available, because it was regarded as the centre of action against Mithridates, who rightly claimed that 'the Romans were awaiting an opportunity to attack him again'.³

II. THE OPENING OF THE THIRD WAR

Mithridates did not propose to fight his third war with Rome single-handed. He rebuilt his fleet, shattered by the surrender of 70 major vessels to Sulla: some 150 warships can be traced in the operations against Lucullus, out of an alleged strength of 400 ships of all types. He also made an agreement with the Cilician pirates, whose power had not yet been broken, and secured their active assistance in the first two years of the war. Further, before the war began he secured the advice of a military commission from the Roman forces that were maintaining themselves under C. Sertorius in Spain against the central Roman government (ch. 7, pp. 213 and 219). With this help he reorganized some part of the Pontic infantry on the Roman legionary pattern, armed with the heavy Roman spear and stabbing sword, and secured the aid of Roman military commanders in the field.

The immediate cause of the war was the Roman annexation of Bithynia. Nicomedes at his death, probably late in 75, having no legitimate heirs, left his kingdom to Rome, following the pattern of Attalus III in Asia and Ptolemy Apion in Cyrenaica. The Senate accepted the inheritance after rejecting the claims of a bastard son of Nicomedes to

² Strab. xii.6.2 (568), Oros. v.23.22; on Isaura Nova, Sall. *H.* ii fr. 87 with Cic. *Leg. Agr.* i.5, 2.50, and the inscription commemorating Servilius' payment of his vow (*AE* 1977 n. 816). Festus *Brev.* 111 improbably links the Isauri with Cilician pirates (*ibid.* 12.3). Military road, cf. Oros. v.23.22 with Eutropius vi.3, Festus *Brev.* 11. Cf. Ormerod 1924 (A 88) 214ff; Magic 1950 (A 67) II. 1169-74 nn. 21-5.

³ App. *Mith.* 70.

the kingdom, and instructed the *propraetor* of Asia to take over the new province. In the early summer of 74 the news arrived of the death of the *proconsul* of Cilicia, who had recently arrived in succession to P. Servilius. In the following months there was a remarkable rearrangement of the consular commands for 74–73, originally made the previous year under the provisions of the Sullan *Lex Cornelia*. L. Licinius Lucullus gained Cilicia together with Asia in the place of Gallia Cisalpina, previously assigned to him, in expectation of war with Mithridates, and his colleague M. Aurelius Cotta secured Bithynia (ch. 7, p. 213). At this moment Mithridates had made no hostile move: Cotta had to argue during the senatorial debate on the new commands that the war with Mithridates had not ended in 82 but had merely been interrupted. Later in 74 the consuls were commissioned for war. Lucullus was instructed to take command of the legions in Asia and Cilicia, together with a legion from Italy, and in the words of Cicero ‘to pursue Mithridates’. Cotta was left to hold the naval command in Bithynia, using the existing provincial flotillas, together with an unspecified military force, against the threat of the Pontic fleet.⁴

What action of Mithridates prompted these decisions is not clear. It is likely that he mobilized the great forces that he used in the first campaign during the summer of 74, and gave the Senate grounds for the despatch of the consuls, and it is also possible that Mithridates established advanced forces in eastern Paphlagonia before his westward march. The ambiguities of the principal historical sources have led to much debate about the moment when the consuls left Italy and when the war began, about whether they departed in the late summer of 74 and were immediately involved in the battle of Chalcedon and the siege of Cyzicus, or whether these campaigns took place in 73. But the neglected evidence of a passage in Cicero’s speech *pro Cluentio*, the earliest of all relevant documents, solves the problem. Lucullus was present in Rome as consul late in November 74, when he was involved in the aftermath of the affair known as the *causa Iuniana*, which the tribune Quinctius investigated about the end of the tribunician year. Hence Lucullus cannot have arrived in Asia and mobilized his forces much before the end of the first quarter of 73.⁵ Appian, the principal source, places the advance of Mithridates into Bithynia ‘in the beginning of spring’. Though he gives no indication of the year it can only be 73.⁶

At that time Lucullus, after a training programme, mustered his five

⁴ Plut. *Luc.* 6.1, 5–6, Cic. *Mur.* 33; Sall. *H.* 11.71, on whose chronology see Bloch 1961 (B 6) esp. 70.

⁵ Cic. *Clu.* 90, 108, with 136–7. Lucullus operates straightaway from a base in Asia (Plut. *Luc.* 7.1); he never reached Cilicia. For the former controversy over the initial date see Magie 1950 (A 67) 11.1127 n. 47, 1204 n. 5, and MRR 11 106–8. Cf. Vell. Pat. 11.33.1, ‘ex consulatu sortitus Asiam’, though *sortitus* is inaccurate.

⁶ App. *Mith.* 70.

legions in northern Phrygia near the Sangarius river, for an invasion of Pontus, presumably through Galatia to the lower Halys, the route that he followed in the next year. Mithridates anticipated him by marching rapidly through Paphlagonia into Bithynia in nine days, met with his fleet and defeated Cotta in a naval battle off Chalcedon, destroying the Roman fleet and driving Cotta with whatever land forces he had behind the walls of the city. Thence Mithridates marched westwards with the intention of capturing Cyzicus, the great port on the northern coast of Asia in the Propontis. Lucullus abandoned his planned invasion and turned westwards to the relief of Cotta, meeting only the rearguard of Mithridates at Otryae in the Bithynian lowlands, between Nicaea and Prusa.⁷ After a successful engagement Lucullus pressed on to Cyzicus, where he found Mithridates vigorously organizing the investment of the city. He required Cyzicus, with its double harbour on either side of the peninsula in which the city stands, as the supply base for the large army with which he intended to destroy the Roman forces in Asia, as he had done in the first war. The sources may exaggerate when they give figures of 12,000 to 16,000 cavalry and up to 150,000 infantry for the Pontic army, twice or thrice the number that fought against Sulla at Chaeronea. But there is no doubt that they greatly outnumbered the forces of Lucullus.⁸

While Mithridates invested Cyzicus by land and sea, Lucullus occupied a strong defensive position with his five legions on high ground from which he could threaten the enemy's communications, in a strategy of siege and countersiege. He avoided a general engagement, and in a telling phrase attributed to Lucullus by Plutarch, he 'stamped on the stomach of Mithridates'.⁹ Though the king controlled the sea with his naval forces he lacked an adequate maritime base for the supply of his large army. Cyzicus under its civic leaders, aided by a small Roman force that managed to enter the city across the sea channel, courageously held out against all the efforts of Mithridates. The king used every device of siegecraft, with assaults by land and sea, by ships and machines, and by tunnels, to take the city. But he was eventually compelled by the approach of winter first to dismiss most of his cavalry eastwards through Bithynia, and later, as supply difficulties increased, to withdraw his infantry westwards to the small harbour of Lampsacus for evacuation by sea.

Lucullus, harrying both attempts at the river crossings, inflicted heavy losses, taking at the Rhyndacus river (it is said) some 6,000 horses and

⁷ For Otryae or Otroia cf. Strab. xii.4.7 (566) and Plut. *Luc.* 8.6. who sufficiently clarify the location.

⁸ Numbers: Strab. xii.8.11 (575), Plut. *Luc.* 7.5, Memnon (*FGrH* 2 B 434) F 27. 2-3; App. *Mith.* 69. ⁹ Plut. *Luc.* 11.2.

15,000 men, and inflicting losses of the same scale on the infantry at the Granicus crossing. Mithridates, supported by his fleet, withdrew the remnants of his forces to Nicomedia in eastern Bithynia. Lucullus meanwhile had taken command of the ships that he secured from the Asian cities after the destruction of the fleet of Cotta at Chalcedon. When the Pontic forces were withdrawn from Lampsacus he was able in the spring of 72 to destroy the squadrons left to block his passage through the Hellespont, off Lemnos. The legates Triarius and Barba, likewise provided with a flotilla from Asia, sailed through the Propontis and rapidly captured Apamea, Prusa and Nicaea. Mithridates promptly withdrew from Nicomedia and passed through the Bosphorus to Sinope in Pontus, but paused at the free-state of Heraclea, where he left a force of some 4,000 men to delay the Roman advance.

In the previous summer forces had been sent by Mithridates into Lycaonia and southern Asia to stir up the troublesome Isaurians and Pisidians, but they were driven out by the active Galatian tetrarch Deiotarus. The two proconsuls were now able to gather their forces at Nicomedia, where they debated the new situation with their legates. Despite suggestions that a diplomatic settlement could be arranged, the decision was taken to advance into Pontus and to destroy the power of Mithridates, while Triarius was despatched with a fleet that now numbered seventy ships to deal with the last Pontic naval force that survived in the southern Aegean. Total victory, with the consequent extension of provincial rule, was the objective.

Lucullus had utterly defeated Mithridates in the campaign of Cyzicus without ever risking a pitched battle against his united forces. The contrast with the method of Sulla's double annihilation of the Pontic forces in Boeotia is remarkable. It suggests that the calculations of Mithridates about his advantages in warfare based on mainland Anatolia were not ill founded. Only an exceptional military genius could have foreseen the strategy of Lucullus, who entirely neglected the usual Roman preference for pitched battles and quick results. Mithridates' mistake lay not in the initial attempt to capture Cyzicus but in his persistence with the siege when the method of his enemy was revealed. But the only alternative to an advance into Asia was to remain on the defensive at Nicomedia in Bithynia, where he would not have been waging war against the heartland of Roman power in the East. If he took Cyzicus his land forces could combine with his naval power to exclude the Romans from the whole Propontic area. But sea-power had its limitations when the Roman legions were already established on the Asiatic mainland before the Pontic fleet passed through the straits of Bosphorus.

III. THE CAMPAIGN IN PONTUS

In the summer of 72 B.C. Lucullus advanced with his main forces through Galatia, south of Paphlagonia, to western Pontus. Meanwhile the legate Triarius with his fleet of seventy vessels disposed of the last Pontic fleet off Tenedos, and the proconsul Cotta with the remnants of his original forces and Bithynian reinforcements neutralized the fortress of Heraclea, where the Pontic commander Connocorix was besieged for the duration of two years. With five legions of uncertain strength Lucullus reached the lower Halys and marched downstream to the coastal zone around Amisus unopposed. The gates of Amisus were closed against him, and the city withstood a leisurely siege through to the year 70. Early in 71, if not sooner, Lucullus marched with his main forces through the Iris and Lycus valleys into the heart of Pontus. There Mithridates had gathered near Cabira a new army numbering some 40,000 infantry (it is said) and 4,000 cavalry. Lucullus had delayed his advance deliberately, according to the version of Plutarch, to allow Mithridates to commit himself to a campaign in central Pontus. Aware of the extent of the Pontic empire he had no intention of allowing himself to be drawn into distant campaigns among the mountains of eastern Pontus and Lesser Armenia.¹⁰

The decisive operation took place in the summer of 71. To avoid the forays of the effective Pontic cavalry Lucullus established his legions in a defensive position on high ground opposite Cabira. His food supplies came, somewhat surprisingly, across southern Pontus from Cappadocia, where the aged Ariobarzanes still held his throne. Mithridates attacked the supply route with his cavalry, but his assaults were repelled with heavy losses. Having learned his lesson from Lucullus, Mithridates was unwilling to risk a general engagement, and now attempted to withdraw his forces eastwards into the mountains of Lesser Armenia, where his resources of gold and silver were said to be stored in seventy strongholds, and where he could hope for the support of his powerful but hitherto unhelpful ally Tigranes, ruler of Great Armenia and many adjacent principalities. The attempted retreat turned to total disaster, thanks to the previous destruction of the bulk of the Pontic cavalry. Organization and discipline broke down as soon as the evacuation of the encampments began. Lucullus was able to assault the retiring columns unopposed, and succeeded, it seems, though it is never clearly stated, in destroying the bulk of the Pontic army.¹¹ Mithridates fled south-east

¹⁰ Dates: the clearest evidence is in Phlegon *Ol.* 12.4 (*FGH*, 2 B 257), who indicates that in the course of 72–71 B.C. after initiating the siege of Amisus, Lucullus wintered near Cabira and then defeated Mithridates in the next year. Cf. Magie 1950 (A 67) II 1210 n. 24.

¹¹ Lucullus succeeds: *Mith.* 81–2, *Plut. Luc.* 17–18.1. Numbers slain; *Livy Per.* xcvi has 60,000, Eutropius vi.8, 30,000.

through Comana to Armenia, where he became an unwelcome guest of Tigranes, who left him a virtual prisoner in an isolated fortress for the next eighteen months, through the last part of 71 to the end of 70.

Lucullus was left free to complete the territorial conquest of Pontus. The royal residences of Cabira and Eupatoria were captured quickly, and the Greek cities of Sinope and Amisus were taken after lengthy sieges. Lesser Armenia was occupied, and in the zone to the north the remote Chaldaei submitted and the wild Tibareni were chastised. These successes led Machares, son and regent of Mithridates in the Crimean Bosphorus, who had recently been supporting the resistance of Sinope with sea-borne supplies, to seek terms as an 'ally and friend' of Rome. Earlier, the great Greek families that provided much of the administrative personnel of the kingdom, including the kinsmen of the later geographer Strabo, had betrayed their master and brought armies and provincial districts over to the Romans. But to complete his conquest Lucullus required the king himself, in whose person the authority of the kingdom resided, just as a generation earlier Marius had sought the capture of the Numidian king Jugurtha. Hence he sent the young Appius Claudius to treat with Tigranes for the surrender of the king's person.

Tigranes had no previous connexion with Rome. For the past twelve years he had been the most powerful ruler of the lands beyond the middle Euphrates. He succeeded about 96 B.C. to the throne of northern Armenia as the vassal of the Parthian monarch Mithridates Megas. His kingdom at that time was apparently restricted to the basin of the upper Euphrates tributaries and the upper Araxes, to the north of the watershed of the Antitaurus massif, though he may have held some territory to the south of the Bitlis pass. The western sector of southern Armenia, known as Sophene, was held by Artanes, descendant of one Zariadris, who like Artaxias, the grandsire of Tigranes, originated as a military commander in the time of Antiochus III (the Great). Gordyene, the south-eastern sector in the mountains separating southern Armenia from Mesopotamia and Adiabene, was ruled by the independent prince Zarbienos. While the Parthian dynasty was being weakened by dynastic feuds Tigranes extended his power by the annexation of Sophene and the submission of Gordyene under its prince. After the death of Mithridates Megas he secured Mesopotamia proper, between the two rivers, and Adiabene beyond the middle Tigris in northern Iraq, while in the north-east he gained control of the enclosed region of Media Atropatene. Finally, in about 82, he expelled the much weakened Seleucid kings from northern Syria and lowland Cilicia, and took the title of King of Kings.¹²

¹² For the chronology of Tigranes' reign see Plut. *Luc.* 21.6 and Just. *Epit.* XL.1.3-4, 2.3, with Will 1982 (A 127) II.457f.

When Appius Claudius finally reached Antioch in his quest for Tigranes he showed little respect for the king. In the absence of Tigranes, busy with the organization of Phoenicia, Appius intrigued with subject rulers present at Antioch, including Zarbienes of Gordyene. When Tigranes on his return received him with the ceremonial of an eastern court, Appius behaved in the crudest Roman fashion. After delivering a letter from Lucullus, of which the contents are not reported, he stated that he had come either to take Mithridates off for the triumph of Lucullus or to declare war on Tigranes. The king inevitably refused to surrender Mithridates and said that he would defend himself against any Roman attack. Appius barely preserved diplomatic decencies by accepting a single goblet from the many valuable gifts that Tigranes offered.

In the course of 70 B.C. Appius made his report to Lucullus, now busy at Ephesus with the reorganization of Asia. When rumours circulated about the king's preparations for war Lucullus expressed his astonishment that Tigranes should prepare to fight the Roman power 'with cold hopes' after failing to help Mithridates before his defeat.¹³ Lucullus quickly left Asia for Pontus, where he made his arrangements for the invasion of Armenia. About this time he also secured the despatch of the usual commission of senators 'for the settlement of affairs in Pontus'. The commission arrived to find that the proconsul had departed to wage war in Armenia, and awaited his return.¹⁴

IV. LUCULLUS IN ARMENIA

Appius Claudius could provide Lucullus with an excuse but not a legitimate justification for making war on Tigranes. His actions at Antioch were not those of a legate commissioned by a senatorial decree. There is no evidence that Lucullus himself had any authority from Rome for his invasion of Armenia. It is unlikely that he could have secured a senatorial decree extending his zone of operations in the year 70, when the radical consuls Cn. Pompeius and M. Crassus were in control of the senatorial agenda throughout the year. Cicero, speaking in the interest of Pompey in the first weeks of 66, implied that Lucullus had no Roman authority for the invasion of Armenia, which he described as though it was a private affair: 'When Lucullus came into the kingdom of Tigranes with his army . . . fear fell on those tribes which the Roman People had never thought to provoke or to try out in war.' The tone echoes the remarks of the hostile praetor Quinctius who had alleged in 68 B.C. that Lucullus was 'making one war out of another . . . he has sacked the

¹³ For the reported remarks of Appius, Tigranes and Lucullus see Plut. *Luc.* 21.6, 23.7.

¹⁴ The report of victory to Rome and the arrival of the commission are mentioned retrospectively by Plut. *Luc.* 35.6.

capital of Tigranes as though he had been sent not to defeat the kings but to strip them of their kingdoms'.¹⁵

These critical remarks suggest that Lucullus found it hard to defend the invasion on legitimate grounds. Tigranes was known to have had some form of alliance with Mithridates, but, as Lucullus was well aware, he had never yet helped him in a Roman war. A passage of Appian suggests that Lucullus tried to distinguish between his enemy Tigranes and the king's subjects in Sophene, with whom the Romans had no quarrel: 'Lucullus asked the barbarians only for necessities . . . they expected to suffer no harm while Lucullus and Tigranes settled their differences.'¹⁶ But by crossing the Euphrates Lucullus greatly extended the foreign commitments of Rome, by making war against an independent empire that hitherto had no connexions with the Roman state of any sort, and eventually by invading territory to which the Parthian monarch rather than Tigranes had the prior claim.

In the summer of 69 Lucullus selected the best of his troops for the invasion of Armenia, numbering some 12,000 Roman legionaries – the better part of three legions – with the unusually large force of 4,000 provincial cavalry and light-armed troops. He marched through Cappadocia to the Euphrates crossing at Tomisa and entered northern Sophene. Thence he crossed the Antitaurus by, presumably, the only easy passage of the massif east of Lake Gölcük, down to Amida in the plateau of the upper Tigris basin, which constitutes southern Sophene. The invasion was aimed at the southern sector of the Armenian kingdom around which clustered the new dependencies, Mesopotamia in the south, leading to northern Syria and coastal Cilicia, Gordyene and Adiabene in the east and south-east beyond the upper and middle Tigris. All these lands had fallen to Tigranes at the expense of the Seleucid and Parthian dynasties. So Lucullus and his army entered for the first time the lands beyond Taurus and the Euphrates river. Armenia and Parthia took the place of Pontus and the Seleucid kingdom in Syria as the limits of Roman intervention.

What Lucullus intended can be seen from his actions, which reveal a change of method from his system of warfare against Mithridates. He now sought a quick result from a great pitched battle by making for the southern capital of Tigranocerta, on the border of Mesopotamia, which Tigranes was busy completing to be the centre of his new empire. The exact location of Tigranocerta is still somewhat uncertain. All the early evidence from Strabo and his sources places the city in the frontier zone of southern Armenia and Mesopotamia, but the *Annals* of Tacitus set it some fifty kilometres from the well-known fortress-city of Nisibis.¹⁷

¹⁵ Cic. *De Imp. Cn. Pomp.* 23, Plut. *Luc.* 35.5–6.

¹⁶ App. *Mith.* 84.

¹⁷ Site of Tigranocerta, see Strab. xi.12.4 (572), Tac. *Ann.* xv.5.2. For the controversy see Dillemann 1962 (D 262) 247ff.

Tigranes departed to muster his main forces and returned, when Lucullus had invested the city, with a great army organized largely in the old oriental style with tribal contingents armed and armoured in their native fashion. The most formidable elements were the squadrons of cataphracts, heavy cavalry clad in chain-mail derived from a Sarmatian model and armed with long and massive spears. Tigranes was astounded (it is said) at the small scale of the Roman army, 'small for an army, large for an embassy'.¹⁸ But in the engagement near Tigranocerta Lucullus led a charge of Roman cohorts against the flank of the advancing cataphracts, ordering his men to attack horses rather than riders. The cataphracts were driven back in confusion on to the main body, which broke into total disarray. There was an immense slaughter, variously reckoned at 10,000 to 100,000 men.

The Roman victory, the only formally arranged battle among the operations of Lucullus, took place late in the season on 7 October. Tigranes fled northwards to be strengthened by the arrival of a reserve force under the command of Mithridates, who had been in no hurry because in his experience Lucullus was not given to rapid action. The flexibility of Lucullus in assessing the strategic situation and in his management of the tactics of battle showed a high military quality. But it was too late in the year to pursue his advantage through the high mountains, and after some rearguard actions the kings were able to retire to northern Armenia. Lucullus busied himself in the milder southern region with the capture and destruction of Tigranocerta. But if Tigranes had eluded him, he made other political gains. The local rulers of Sophene came to terms, and various Arab princes with whom Appius Claudius had negotiated at Antioch, made their submission. Lucullus himself visited Gordyene, where the disloyal ruler Zarbienos had been executed and buried in dishonour. He gave the dead prince royal obsequies, and secured control of the treasures and supplies of the principality. Meanwhile he sought to put an end to the imperial claims of Tigranes by the dismemberment of the population of Tigranocerta. The inhabitants, drawn from Syria and Cilicia, were restored to their homelands, Greeks and native persons alike, the cost being met from the spoils of the city. In the extreme south the last Seleucid prince Antiochus was allowed to return to claim the Syrian throne at Antioch.

During the winter of 69/8 B.C. Lucullus became aware of the Parthian factor. Phraates III had recently emerged as the ruler of all the Parthian territories westwards to Babylonia, reunited after a lengthy period of domestic strife. Tigranes opened negotiations with him for military support, offering the surrender of Adiabene, Mesopotamia and the 'Great Valleys', adjacent (it seems) to Gordyene. But Phraates made

¹⁸ Plut. *Luc.* 27.4.

contact with Lucullus. According to the most probable version Lucullus sent a mission of distinguished Greeks, and the Parthian was invited either to join the Romans or to remain neutral. Eventually it seems that he was unwilling to commit himself, and either maintained a watchful neutrality or, as Memnon has it, came to terms with both sides.¹⁹

In the summer of 68 Lucullus sought to finish with Tigranes. Marching through the Antitaurus passage into northern Armenia, his devastations brought into the field the Armenian forces, which had been trained by Mithridates in the past months in methods of warfare learned from Lucullus himself. The kings avoided pitched battles with the Roman infantry and used their own cavalry to check the movements of the small Roman army and to attack its supplies. The zone of operations is not defined by the sources until Lucullus moved deeper into northern Armenia, crossed the Arsianias, the southern tributary of the Euphrates, where he brushed the Armenian resistance aside in a considerable engagement, and marched across central Armenia towards Artaxata.²⁰ The northern capital, set in north-eastern Armenia, beyond Mt Ararat in the upper Araxes valley, sheltered the king's family, barely rescued the previous year from Tigranocerta. But it was late in the season, and the Roman troops, hampered by autumnal storms, protested against continuing their advance, having now endured, apart from their military engagements, a march of some 1,500 kilometres 'as the crow flies' from Cyzicus. Lucullus promptly turned south and marched across the breadth of Armenia through the Antitaurus, presumably by the Bitlis pass in the east, to the southern edge of the upper Tigris basin. There he invested Nisibis, a strongly fortified town with a famous double wall, on the Mesopotamian border, still held by the king's brother. Tigranes cautiously followed the path of Lucullus but did nothing to help Nisibis, which he believed to be impregnable. Lucullus, after delaying his assault in the hope of enticing Tigranes, captured the city by a night attack, and spent the winter there, while Tigranes recovered minor fortresses in southern Armenia. Scraps of somewhat contradictory evidence suggest that Lucullus now planned an abortive campaign against Adiabene, still under the suzerainty of Tigranes, for the spring of 67 from a base in Gordyene. This may be connected with a similar scheme to march 'up country' from Gordyene, placed by Plutarch at an earlier date. He suggests that legates were being summoned from Pontus to assist, allegedly against the Parthians.²¹

Lucullus thus sought in military terms to bring Tigranes to battle by

¹⁹ Parthia: Plut. *Luc.* 30.1, Memnon F 38.8, App. *Mith.* 87, Dio xxxvi.1-3; see below, pp. 262-5.

²⁰ App. *Mith.* 87 and Dio xxxvi.5.1 explain the Armenian methods, ignored by Plut. *Luc.* 31.3, 5-9.

²¹ Campaign from Gordyene in 69-68 'against the Parthians', Plut. *Luc.* 30.2-3, 31.1; in 68-67, *ibid.* 34.6, cf. Eutropius vi.9, 'against the Persians'.

aggressive campaigns or by threatening his cities when he refused to be drawn. Politically, as he learned about the nature of the Armenian empire, he set about dissolving it into its original kingdoms. He was hardly concerned about Parthia, which at this time seemed a secondary power that had been stripped by Tigranes of its western dependencies in Adiabene and Mesopotamia, and was separated from the Roman world by the broad gravel deserts between Syria and Babylonia.

Meanwhile, late in 68, events in Pontus turned against Lucullus. Mithridates, with a force at the reported strength of 8,000 men, marched westwards into Lesser Armenia and set about attacking the Roman troops dispersed through Pontus, amounting to a couple of undermanned legions with supporting Asian levies. The legate Fabius was defeated and besieged in Cabira, where he was relieved by the forces of Triarius, marching from Asia or Bithynia at the summons of Lucullus for his abortive last campaign.²² During the winter the peoples of Pontus, alienated by a hostile administration, flocked to join Mithridates. In the early summer of 67 he succeeded in luring out the Roman troops, then concentrated at Gazioura, some eighty kilometres south of Cabira, by threatening their principal storehouse of war material and booty located in the neighbourhood of Zela. He caught them and inflicted a great defeat on the field of Zela: the Romans lost 7,000 men and more than their quota of officers, including 24 military tribunes. This was the greatest success of Mithridates against Roman forces. Though it prolonged his survival in Pontus for only another year, it provided a golden promotion for the ambitious Roman consular Pompey, who in that same year was conducting naval operations on a grand scale against the persistent plague of piracy throughout the Mediterranean area.

Lucullus in southern Armenia at the end of 68 suffered from the insubordination of his troops, particularly the Fimbrian legions, which had served in the East since 86. The sporadic fighting since the fall of Tigranocerta had brought them no substantial booty, despite the recent capture of Nisibis. In a series of disturbances the dissatisfied troops demanded an end to the war. The young P. Claudius Pulcher, later known as Clodius, brother of the legate Appius Claudius, began his stormy political career by quarrelling with his proconsul Lucullus. He incited the troops against their commander, invoking the name of Pompey, and contrasting their supposed poverty with the proconsul's wagon-loads of personal booty. But when the news arrived of the defeat of Fabius in Pontus discipline was temporarily restored. Lucullus withdrew from Armenia in the spring of 67, but arrived too late to prevent the disaster of Zela. The defeated remnants met him in south-

²² Dio xxxvi. 10.1.

eastern Pontus. Lucullus, learning that Mithridates had withdrawn to the stronghold of Talaurea in Armenia Minor, found the route blocked by Median cavalry. Then, ever aware of strategic advantages, he proposed to march south-eastwards against Tigranes, who was slowly advancing from southern Armenia by the Tomisa crossing. Lucullus' precise location is not given in the sources, but his base could have been the route centre later known as Megalopolis (*mod.* Sivas), where the routes to northern Pontus, Lesser Armenia, western Cappadocia, and the Euphrates transit at Tomisa, meet. However, the dissatisfied troops refused to co-operate and he retired westwards into Cappadocia.²³

By this time it was known that Lucullus had been formally replaced in his command by two new consuls, who reached Roman Cilicia and Bithynia during the summer of 67 (see below, p. 249). Marcus Rex, instructed to eliminate the pirates from their Cilician bases, brought three new legions from Italy. Acilius Glabrio, consul in 67, was commissioned to take over the eastern command from Lucullus by a plebiscite of the tribune Gabinius, following his creation of the general piracy command for Pompey, before the disaster of Zela was known at Rome. Learning the true situation on his arrival Glabrio lingered in Bithynia while Lucullus withdrew his battered forces into Galatia. Mithridates recovered the whole of Pontus, and Tigranes entered Cappadocia, whence Ariobarzanes had once more fled. The campaigns of Lucullus, who had never suffered defeat in battle, appeared to have been waged in vain.

V. LUCULLUS AND THE CITIES

The Greek cities of the coastlands of Propontis and the Pontic zone, whether fighting on the side of Mithridates or for Rome, showed a remarkable determination to defend themselves and their overlords in the third war. Cyzicus, no longer a free-state after the first war, sent its considerable navy to support the Romans at Chalcedon. Despite the heavy losses suffered in the naval battle the city offered a desperate resistance when heavily attacked by Mithridates, and with minimal direct aid from the forces of Lucullus repulsed every assault until Mithridates withdrew. Cyzicus received its reward afterwards in a renewal of its former status of 'free city' and in a considerable grant of adjacent territory.²⁴

The story of Heraclea is told at length by the local historian Memnon.

²³ Movements of Lucullus: winters 68–67 B.C. in Gordyene, Plut. *Luc.* 34.6; in summer 67 B.C. is in Pontus, Dio xxxvi.14.1–2; frustrated perhaps at Megalopolis, Plut. *Luc.* 35.3–4 with Dio xxxvi.14.1–2.

²⁴ Cyzicus: Plut. *Luc.* 9–11.1, App. *Mith.* 73–5. Rewards, Strab. xii.8.11 (576).

When after the annexation of Bithynia Roman *publicani* ignored the independence of Heraclea and set up tax-collection centres in the civic territory, the citizens yielded to the pressure of Mithridates, sent five ships to join the Pontic fleet, and committed themselves irrevocably by murdering the Roman tax-collectors. Mithridates, on his return from the disaster of Cyzicus, occupied the city with partisan assistance and left a large garrison to hold it against the Roman advance. For the next two years Aurelius Cotta ineffectively besieged Heraclea where the civic fleet played a notable role, until the king's men and their supporters betrayed the city in the absence of Cotta to the legate Triarius, while the populace, determined to maintain their liberty, tried to continue resistance. The garrison sailed off to safety, but the city was ruthlessly sacked: the proconsul returned to the scene belatedly to claim his share of the spoils.²⁵

A similar story of dissension between a royal garrison and the local citizens is related in the course of the siege of Sinope, the former Greek colony that became the principal city of Pontus. Two garrison commanders, Cleochares and Seleucus, murdered their colleague Leonippus, the favourite of the city population, said to be in touch with Lucullus. They gained control of the city and sought to eliminate the popular faction. Their greatest success was an attack by the civic fleet on a Roman supply squadron. But when Lucullus intensified the siege, and the city's food supplies from the Crimea were cut off by the transition of the Bosporan ruler to the Roman side, the garrison and its partisans seized what plunder they could and sailed away, leaving Sinope to be taken by Lucullus. At a third city, Amisus, resistance was better unified. The city stood a long siege at the same time as Sinope, aided by the skill in siege works of the garrison commander Callimachus. But Lucullus eventually stormed the city by a night attack, and Callimachus sailed off with his forces under cover of firing the city walls.²⁶

In these civic sieges the garrison commanders and the city leaders followed a policy of vigorous resistance until the position grew desperate, when they turned to collusion and abandonment. They disregarded the interest of the resident population, who persisted in their course, either out of a justifiable fear of Roman reprisals or out of a determined loyalty to their king. The effective action of the civic fleets at Heraclea and Sinope, by themselves or in conjunction with the king's ships, must reflect the independence and prosperity of the citizen bodies that provided the ships and their crews.²⁷

These three great cities were in a state of desolation after their capture.

²⁵ Heraclea: Memnon F 27.29, 34-5.

²⁶ Sinope: Memnon F 37, Plut. *Luc.* 23.1-4. Amisus: Memnon F 30.3-4; Plut. *Luc.* 19.2-4.

²⁷ Fleets: Memnon F 34.7; 37.2-3, 7.

But Lucullus set a notable example for Roman victors in his treatment of Amisus and Sinope. At Amisus he not only tried to check the conflagration, wholesale plunder and massacre of citizens at its capture, but set about a restoration as if the city had been, in the Roman formula, not 'taken in war' but 'surrendered into trust'. He aided the rebuilding of the city, the recovery of fugitive citizens, and the settlement of new colonists on abandoned lands. Sinope was likewise restored, and both became autonomous Greek cities within the provincial system. Lucullus was establishing a generous attitude towards Greek cities, which despite hostile actions in the past were the only possible base of Roman power at this time. He cited the precedent of Sulla who authorized the preservation of Athens, however reluctantly, despite its flagrant support of Mithridates. (The royal town of Cabira in Pontus surrendered on terms that preserved its existence.) In complementary style after the destruction of Tigranocerta the colonial inhabitants, Greek and non-Greek alike, were not sold into slavery but sent back to the cities in Syria, Cilicia and Cappadocia, from which they had been drafted to found the new capital.²⁸

The eventual restoration of Heraclea was not due to Lucullus, because at the time of its capture it was in the power of the independent proconsul Aurelius Cotta. But Lucullus was not the only senator with rational opinions about the treatment of conquered peoples. Certain distinguished exiles from Heraclea organized an appeal to the Senate at the time when the proconsul Cotta, after his return to Rome, was being prosecuted by a tribune for misappropriation of booty. The Senate, accepting the plea that the defection of Heraclea was due to the pressure of Pontic forces, granted freedom to the enslaved Heracleots and restored their lands and the status of the city, though only some 8,000 of the inhabitants could be recovered.²⁹

In the province of Asia the problem was different. The wealthy classes and the civic revenues were still burdened by the impositions of Sulla for arrears of tribute and payment of indemnities for the first war, amounting to 20,000 talents. The sum was not unreasonable: Mithridates had imposed a fine of 2,000 talents on Chios alone during the war. But the Asian cities, whose annual dues were hardly less than 2,000 talents in all, were steadily drained of their reserves by the continued warfare and the later exactions of Mithridates. To meet the Roman demands after the war they turned to the Roman financiers who came back to Asia after the reconquest. Many of these *negotiatores* had lost large sums when they had fled from Asia to escape the massacres of 88. Italy itself had been weakened and devastated by years of civil war, which continued after the

²⁸ Cabira, cf. Memnon F 30.1; Plut. *Luc.* 18.1 with Strab. xii.3.30 (556). Tigranocerta, cf. Plut. *Luc.* 29.5. ²⁹ Heraclea restored, cf. Memnon F 39-40.

death of Sulla. Hence there was a general shortage of liquid funds that enabled the returning *negotiatores* and *publicani* to impose exceptional rates of interest, and to enforce the most severe conditions, both upon the depleted civic treasuries and upon the individual tax-payers. The cities were reduced to selling or pledging their public buildings, art treasures and revenues to the *negotiatores*, while the agents of the Roman tax-collectors were occupying the lands of private citizens and imprisoning or maltreating the landowners, in the process of securing payment of their extreme demands. Hence it is said that general indebtedness increased sixfold by the year 70, when Lucullus turned from warfare to deal with the affairs of Asia.

Lucullus established a system that freed Asia from its servitudes by the time of his departure to Rome in 66. Interest was fixed at the normal rate of 12 per cent a year, accumulated debts of interest in excess of the original amount of a loan were nullified, and the exaction of compound interest was forbidden under the penalty of the total cancellation of the debt. Conditions being thus alleviated, debtors were required to pay off their debts at the rate of 25 per cent of their annual income. The system worked well, so that within four years the wealthy classes were freed from public debts and restored to relative prosperity.³⁰

It seems that the landed gentry from small and moderate estates suffered most under the Sullan system. But there were a number of financial magnates whose wealth appears untouched amid the financial distress of the property-owning classes. Some of these helped the cities in the post-Sullan period, anticipating or supplementing the general reforms of Lucullus. A decree of Priene records how the wealthy Zosimus paid for the restoration of the civic festivals that had been in abeyance since the first war, and at Pergamum the citizen Diodorus Paspasros was honoured for securing from the Senate some diminution of a long list of financial exactions and abuses, excessive rates of interest, and confiscation of estates. Joint appeals to Rome were also successful in alleviation of burdens: the Council of the Hellenes of Asia, created in the early years of the province, sent a mission to Rome to protest about the treatment of the province by the tax-collecting agencies. A special part was played by two leading citizens of Aphrodisias, whom the Council honoured for finally securing 'good results for Asia'.³¹ The great magnates possessed exceptional wealth based on the ownership of vast estates. The accumulation of great fortunes seems to be a somewhat new development in the economy of Asia. It possibly arose from the sharp

³⁰ Debts and reforms: Plut. *Luc.* 20.3-5, App. *Mith.* 83, cf. Cic. *Flac.* 32, *QFr.* 1.1.33. Asian dues for the amount cf. Sherwin-White 1984 (D 291) 244 n. 21.

³¹ Zosimus, see *IPriene* 113, 37-63; 114, 17-29. Diodorus Paspasros, cf. *IGRR* iv.292, now firmly dated to the period after Sulla by Jones 1974 (D 273). Hellenes of Asia, see Drew-Bear 1972 (D 265) 443ff, revised in Reynolds 1982 (B 226) no. 5.

exploitation by enterprising individuals of the disturbed conditions of the times at the expense of the less fortunate. Among these Hiero of Laodicea may be mentioned, who in this period left no less than 12 million drachmae from his estates to his city. Later Pythodorus of Tralles, an intimate of Pompey, was able to buy back his estates, confiscated by Caesar, for a similar great sum.

The changed conditions of the cities of Asia in these years is shown by a senatorial decree of 78 that lists the detailed privileges allowed to certain citizens from the provincial cities of Clazomenae and Miletus who had served as captains in the Roman fleets during the past twelve years. Their cities were required to free them from all local dues and liturgies, to withdraw any sentences passed against them by local courts, and to restore any property confiscated in that period. They were allowed in future to refuse the jurisdiction of their civic courts in favour of the tribunal of a free-state of proven loyalty to Rome, or else the jurisdiction of a Roman magistrate and a jury of Roman citizens. They were also freed from any obligation to contribute to the payment of their city's public debts. The Senate thus interfered with a heavy hand in the internal finances and the judicial rights of the civic courts in favour of their protégés, who were evidently on bad terms with their fellow citizens.³²

Altogether in the late Republican period favoured or extremely wealthy individuals tended to gain the precedence in the cities, whether these were oligarchically or democratically organized communes. From this milieu there emerged in the triumviral period the civic dynasts who secured dictatorial control of their cities.

VI. POMPEY IN THE EAST

When the reports of Lucullus about the defeat and expulsion of Mithridates from Pontus and the great victory over Tigranes at Tigranocerta reached Rome, politicians led by the praetor L. Quinctius began to agitate that the Anatolian provinces, now freed from the threat of Mithridates, should be made available to the regular magistrates. Lucullus had held them long enough, and was said to be maintaining the war in his own interest. Hence some time in 68 Asia was restored to praetorian allocation, and Cilicia, where Lucullus had never operated, was assigned to the consul Marcius Rex, with three new legions and a naval force, for his proconsular year 67. The transfer of Asia, and possibly that of Cilicia, was effected by a law of the people.³³ The Cilician

³² Hiero's estates, cf. Strab. XII.8.16 (578). Pythodorus, *ibid.* XIV.1.42 (649). Captains privileged, *FIRA* 17, n. 35.

³³ Asia, cf. Dio XXXVI.2.2, App. *Mith.* 90. Cilicia, cf. Dio XXXVI.15.1, 17.2, with Sall. *H.v* fr. 14. For the politics at Rome see ch. 9 below.

commander was commissioned to renew the warfare against the pirates of upper Cilicia that had been suspended after the operations of Servilius in 78–75 by the war with Mithridates. Naval operations had been initiated earlier, in 74, when the praetor M. Antonius was empowered to repress piracy throughout the Mediterranean area by means of a newly created fleet of considerable, though unrecorded, size. He operated with some success in the West, along the Spanish and Sicilian coasts, but when he turned east to deal with the pirate bases in Crete his fleet was defeated in 71 or 70 by the light flotillas of the pirates, which received support from the organized cities of Crete that had remained in free alliance with Rome down to this time.

The Senate assigned Crete to Q. Metellus, consul in 69 and issued an ultimatum to the Cretan cities that led to open war in 68. But the menace now extended far beyond the Cretan area. The coasts of Italy suffered a series of piratical raids in which two praetors and their retinue were captured travelling along the road to Brundisium, the eastern trade routes were endangered, and the corn supplies of Rome itself were interrupted. Early in 67 the tribune A. Gabinus with strong support from many quarters proposed a bill that overrode the assignation of provinces to Q. Metellus and Marcius Rex by creating a great naval command for Pompey, now without office after his notable consulship. He was commissioned with proconsular powers to eliminate piracy throughout the Mediterranean area, within a territorial limit of fifty Roman miles inland from the coasts, and with *imperium* (the power to command) equal to that of any proconsul within the area. To assist him he was given a staff of fifteen *legati* – later increased to twenty – each of whom held praetorian *imperium*, an exceptional development that enabled the legates to act independently in areas far removed from their proconsul, though still under his authority. These arrangements, extended in the next year by the Lex Manilia, transformed the scope of a proconsular command, though they did not subordinate other proconsuls in their provinces to Pompey.³⁴ Gabinus next proposed a second bill, before the news of Zela reached Rome, that transferred the provincial area of Bithynia and Pontus, with the legions of Lucullus and the remnants of the war with Tigranes, to the consul Acilius Glabrio. No fresh troops were assigned to Glabrio, who reached Bithynia after the disaster of Zela in the summer of 67, his consular year, to find an alarming situation with which he made no attempt to cope: Mithridates had reoccupied his kingdom, and Cappadocia, from which Ariobarzanes had fled, was open to the raids of Tigranes.

³⁴ Powers under the Lex Gabinia and Lex Manilia, cf. App. *Mith.* 94 and 97; Dio xxxvi. 37.1–2, 42.4, with Plut. *Pomp.* 25.3–6; 30.1. Cf. Asc. *Corn.* 38c. The inscription of Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Marcellinus now confirms App. *Mith.* 94 on the power of Pompey's legates, cf. Reynolds 1962 (D 287) 97ff.

In the course of 67 Pompey and his legates cleared the seas of organized piracy in a brief campaign of three months. His method was to divide his great fleet into separate divisions under the command of his legates, and they patrolled the Mediterranean area section by section, while he himself set about the central strongholds of the Cilician coast. Resistance rapidly collapsed and – though no detailed accounts of any engagements survive – Pompey with a fleet of sixty ships defeated the main fleet of the Cilician sector off Coracesium. But in Crete, the main centre of piracy in the southern Aegean, the proconsul Q. Metellus, who had been active the previous year, refused to allow a Pompeian legate to operate: he drove the man and his forces out of the island and completed the subjection of Crete with his own legions. Exploiting against Pompey the careful wording of the Lex Gabinia, he would tolerate no interference with his own consular power by a praetorian legate.

By the late summer of 67 organized piracy was effectively eliminated. Pompey was preparing to interfere personally in Crete, where he had powers of making war technically equal to those of the proconsul, when early in 66 his friends at Rome, acting through the tribune C. Manilius, were able to capitalize on the disaster of Zela by proposing the transfer of the command against Tigranes and Mithridates to Pompey. This bill set aside the commands of Marcius and Acilius, who had been assigned the territorial provinces of Lucullus. Acilius was so slow to take up his authority under the second Lex Gabinia that Lucullus was still quartered in Galatia with his legions when Pompey arrived to take over his new command. Since the former proconsuls were legitimately deprived of their commands before the end of their normal tenure this was in no way a *coup d'état*. By the Lex Manilia Pompey was given powers extending what he had already secured through the Lex Gabinia to enable him to deal with what appeared to be a great military crisis. Men and money were assigned to him on an exceptional scale because normal arrangements had proved inadequate. Though Plutarch and Appian write loosely as if Pompey had control of the armies of the whole empire, his powers were limited to a provincial and military area that corresponded to the extreme limits of the Armenian empire that Lucullus had invaded. Allied 'kings and dynasts, tribes and cities' were required to assist him, as was normal in any provincial war. An innovation was the grant of the power of making peace and war and forming alliances, as Lucullus had done without specific authority (see above, pp. 239–43). The vast distance of the area of warfare from Rome made any consultation with Rome impracticable: the consuls of the previous century, operating in the Aegean zone, had regularly secured retrospective authorization of their arrangements.

The size of the army allocated to Pompey is never clearly indicated.

Plutarch's figure of a force of 120,000 men authorized by the Lex Gabinia – no less than the strength of twenty-four legions – is wildly out of scale for any army of the later Republican period before the last years of the second triumvirate, and in no way fits the grant of 6,000 talents for the expenses of three years. In the campaign of 66 against Mithridates Pompey used the remnants of the army of Lucullus, amounting at most to three weakened legions, and the three legions of Marcius Rex from Cilicia, together with whatever legionary forces he held in lowland Cilicia after the reduction of the pirate bases. Though no other figures are known, it can be calculated from the total sum of money that Pompey distributed to his troops at the end of his command in 62 that his army then numbered some 45,000 serving legionaries – if one counts by the scale of individual grants that Caesar made in 48 B.C. These would comprise the manpower of some nine or ten legions, the largest army that had yet served in Anatolia.³⁵

The Lex Manilia that proposed this command was supported by the praetor M. Cicero in a speech of skilful misrepresentation. The province of Asia, with its public revenues and the private investments of Roman financiers, is said to be threatened with invasion by the old enemy Mithridates. Border villages of Bithynia have been burned, and the inadequacy of the proconsul Glabrio is noted. There is no mention of the five or six legions present in Galatia and Cilicia. Instead Cicero insists on the necessity of sending a great general to save the richest source of Roman revenue. There is no hint of a war of expansion that would reduce the whole Armenian empire to subject status and lead to the annexation of Syria as a province. Not a word is said about the vast treasures that still awaited collection in the royal strongholds or the extension of the system of imperial taxation to great new provinces that would enrich the revenue of Rome. Instead the avarice of previous proconsuls is contrasted with the restraint of Pompey. Even Lucullus is not spared: though his successes against Mithridates are fairly summarized, his achievements in Armenia are minimized, with a dark reference to the plunder of a shrine of great wealth.³⁶ Cicero, like Sulla, appears to lack interest in the expansion of the Roman empire. But he reveals the political strength of the economic class of the tax-farmers and bankers that supported the despatch of Pompey and equally the crude desire for vast enrichment that possessed many members of the magisterial class.

Pompey, hearing of his new appointment early in 66, set about preparations for land warfare, gathering his forces inside Asia and

³⁵ Legions: the financial argument depends on the comparison of Plut. *Pomp.* 45.4, App. *Mith.* 116, Pliny *HN* xxxvii. 16, with App. *BCiv.* 11.102 (422), on the distribution scale of Caesar.

³⁶ Cic. *De Imp. Cn. Pomp.* 23.

Galatia for an invasion of Pontus. Having learnt of the negotiations of Lucullus with the Parthian monarch, he renewed contact with king Phraates and secured his assistance. Tigranes was consequently occupied by a Parthian invasion from Media aimed at Artaxata in the summer of 66, and Mithridates was denied any help from Armenia when Pompey made his attack. But first Pompey opened negotiations with Mithridates, who was prepared to parley, as he had done in the past. When formal submission was required, and the surrender of his organized bands of Roman deserters, Mithridates broke off these negotiations. Pompey was following normal Roman procedure: as recently as the Cretan War the enemy was offered terms that were severe but not outrageous before fighting began.³⁷ Throughout his eastern command Pompey was to secure as much by military diplomacy as by naked force: after the summer of 65 his only considerable military operation was the siege of the fortress at Jerusalem.

Mithridates concentrated his forces, reduced to a figure of some 30,000 infantry, predominantly bowmen, and 2,000 or 3,000 cavalry, at the head of the Lycus valley in Lesser Armenia, a land that had suffered little from the past campaigns and housed the royal treasure-stores. In this mountainous zone he occupied a strong position on the unidentified heights of Dasteira, where Pompey endeavoured to encircle him with a series of fixed positions. After some six weeks of evenly balanced fighting Mithridates extricated his forces and withdrew by night eastwards towards the borders of the Armenian kingdom. Pompey pursued, and managed to cut off the Pontic army in a defile, where a night battle was fought in which the Pontic resistance rapidly collapsed. Ten thousand casualties were said to have been inflicted, and Mithridates escaped with about two thousand men to Sinora, the most easterly of his treasure-houses in Lesser Armenia. This is the essence of the story that can be recovered from the somewhat contradictory narratives of Plutarch and Dio, a brief summary in Strabo, the earliest source, and the elusive account of Appian, who describes an unlocated final battle in different terms. The only firm evidence for the location of the campaign is that the final phase took place in the district where Pompey later established the memorial settlement of Nicopolis, and that the last battle was within the territory of Lesser Armenia.³⁸

At Sinora Mithridates learned that Tigranes had turned against him. He disbanded most of his followers and made his way with an essential quantity of coined money through northern Armenia to the coast of northern Colchis. There he remained for the following winter in the

³⁷ Cretan terms, cf. Diod. XL.1.2-3, App. *Sik.* 6.

³⁸ Sources, cf. Strab. XII.3.28 (555), Plut. *Pomp.* 32.4, Dio XXXVI.48, Oros. VI.43, App. *Mith.* 99-100 has an unlocated battle description.

stronghold of Dioscurias, situated near Sorghum, where the outermost chain of the Caucasus mountains reaches the sea. Next spring he withdrew across the mountains through hostile tribes to the coastal steppes beyond, whence he made his way round the sea of Azov, to his last strongholds in the Crimea, held by his disloyal son Machares.

In the latter half of 66 Pompey quickly abandoned the pursuit of Mithridates to secure the submission of Tigranes, the second part of his task. Tigranes, harassed by the Parthians, whom he forced to withdraw by a defensive strategy, yielded straightway to the overwhelming power of Pompey. When the Roman legions, marching through the upper Euphrates and the Araxes valleys, approached Artaxata, the northern capital, Tigranes rode out in royal attire to meet Pompey. He set his diadem at the feet of the *imperator*, and made a traditional *proskunēsis* or obeisance to him, thereby recognizing him as his overlord. Pompey co-operated by bidding the king rise and replacing his diadem. Later Tigranes was told that he was to retain his inherited kingdom, but that all his gains since he became king were to pass under Roman control as lands won by the spear of Rome, with direct reference to the victory of Lucullus at Tigranocerta. The formulation was the normal phraseology of the Hellenistic world, avoiding the cruder Roman style of a demand for *deditio*, or unconditional surrender.³⁹

This scene revealed the intentions of Pompey in the Roman 'Far East'. He claimed for Rome the sovereign control over all the provinces of Tigranes' former empire, but allowed the central kingdom to survive as a dependent state without any change of dynasty or of the king's person. Somewhat later the status of Tigranes was confirmed by recognition as a 'friend and ally of the Roman people', but all his conquests were taken from him. Even Sophene, his first acquisition, was handed over to his disloyal son, who had guided Pompey and his legions to Artaxata. Plutarch does not name Mesopotamia, Adiabene or Gordyene in his somewhat inaccurate list of the provinces that Tigranes lost, saying that he was to retain what he held 'down to Pompey'.⁴⁰ But Lucullus had occupied Gordyene and the northern district of Mesopotamia, by the capture of Nisibis, and Pompey acquired control of Iberia, Albania and Media Atropatene by direct action, which transferred their nominal allegiance to Rome. Hence Pompey undoubtedly confined Tigranes to the core of Armenia, and claimed direct suzerainty over the rest of his empire for Rome. But in the south the Parthian king was already reclaiming his family's rights in Adiabene and Mesopotamia, which Pompey eventually for the most part conceded.

³⁹ Plut. *Pomp.* 33.5, App. *Mith.* 106, *Syr.* 49, Dio xxxvi.53.2. For the Greek formula see *LSJ* s.v. *ΔΟΠΥ* and compounds.

⁴⁰ Plut. *Pomp.* 33.5.

VII. THE END OF MITHRIDATES

After a hazardous journey through the Caucasus, beset by hostile tribesmen, and across the steppes bordering the sea of Azov, where he had friends and dependants, Mithridates reached the Crimean Bosphorus some time in the summer of 65 B.C. There he set about restoring his power, despite the hostility of his family and many of his former subjects, and prepared to defend himself against the naval forces that Pompey had stationed at Phasis to control the approaches to the Bosphorus. Mithridates garrisoned the mainland port of Phanagorea across the straits of Taman, and sent forces to hold the Crimean harbours – Chersonesus, Theodosia and Nymphaion – evidently in expectation of a sea-borne attack. This rational and modest plan was upset by the revolt of the harbour garrisons that enabled his son Pharnaces to stage a successful *coup* within the army, particularly through the support of the regiment of Roman deserters. Pharnaces was declared king in 63 B.C. and his father secured either a voluntary death or assassination – both versions are given credence – at the hands of a Celtic warrior.

This rational account, related at length with many details by Appian, displays Mithridates making a shrewd and practical use of his limited forces to defend the last bastion of his power until the inevitable counterplot destroyed him. But the story is confused in Appian with a very different version. In this Mithridates proposed to march with a well-found army of 36,000 men, organized in sixty regiments, by the coast of the Black Sea to the Danube delta, and thence to descend upon Italy through Alpine passes. When the Scythians in the Crimea refused to join this adventure, he is said to have turned to a mysterious horde of Celts in a distant land, 'who had long been his associates for this purpose'. This story, told at length by Appian, is repeated briefly in sources derived from Livy with other additions. Plutarch reveals its origin by remarking that Pompey was criticized for 'planning to attack the Nabatean Arabs at the very time that Mithridates, *as men said*, was about to invade Italy through the lands of the Scyths and Paionians'. The intrusion of Celts and Paionians into the story is instructive. Celts were the traditional enemy of Rome at all periods, latterly involved in the invasion of Gaul and Italy by Cimbri and Teutones, whom the ancient geographers regarded as Celtic peoples, and most recently identified with the persistent attacks of the Scordisci on Roman Macedonia, precisely through Paionia, in the past generation. This tale about Mithridates and the invasion of Italy is drawn from the history of rumour, as Plutarch implies, and was elaborated by the political enemies of Pompey at Rome. But it was unknown to Cicero when late in the year of Mithridates' death he spoke at length, in his defence of the consular election of Murena,

about the fear that Mithridates inspired even when driven out of his kingdom, which was ended only by his death. Cicero's advocacy of Murena's consulship would have been even more effective if he could have added the hints about the invasion of Italy, evidently not yet concocted.⁴¹

VIII. THE CAUCASIAN CAMPAIGNS

After the submission of Tigranes Pompey set about the imposition of Roman authority upon the peoples of his empire. Legates were despatched to the southern regions of Mesopotamia, Gordyene and Adiabene, but he reserved for himself military action against the more formidable peoples of Iberia and Albania, who held the regions between the northern Armenian mountains and the Caucasus massif, where only the coastal zone of Colchis had been part of the Pontic kingdom. This was not merely an outburst of personal ambition, or a substitute for the capture of Mithridates, as many modern and ancient critics have held, but a deliberate extension of Roman power at the far end of Anatolia. Instead of wintering his legions in the fertile zone of Artaxata, which has been reckoned among the candidates for the Garden of Eden, Pompey marched them northwards through the mountain frontier of Armenia by the gorges of the upper Cyrus river into the Iberian highlands, and thence eastwards towards Albanian territory. There they were stationed in three separate camps on the southern bank of the Cyrus.⁴²

The Iberians inhabited the highlands between the Caucasus ranges and the frontier mountains of Armenia. The region is drained by the Phasis river, flowing westward from the Tiflis area to the Black Sea, and by the middle sector of the Cyrus, which rises in northern Armenia and breaks through gorges to enter the Iberian highlands, whence it flows eastwards to pass through the Albanian lowlands to the Caspian Sea. The Iberians were a relatively civilized people with an agricultural economy, settled villages and townships. Their society was organized in a system of four functional castes – rulers, military leaders who were also judges, peasants who provided fighting men, and 'royal serfs'. The Albanians were more primitive, primarily a pastoral people with a rudimentary economy, and much less suited to provision the legions of Pompey than the Iberians. The core of their fighting men was formidable, armed with bows or javelins and lightly armoured with breastplates and shields, though the mass was ill armed and wore skins.⁴³

⁴¹ The invention in App. *Mith.* 109, Plut. *Pomp.* 41.2, and Dio xxxvii.11.1, is defended by Havas 1968 (D 24).

⁴² App. *Mith.* 103, alone displaces the Caucasian campaigns, setting them before instead of after the subjection of Armenia; cf. Plut. *Pomp.* 34–5, Dio xxxvi.53–4, with Vell. Pat. 11.37, Livy *Per.* ci.

⁴³ Iberi, cf. Strab. xi.3.1–6 (499–501). Albani, cf. *ibid.* 4.1–6 (501–3), Pliny *HN* vi.29.

The direction of march and the site of the winter camps indicates that the prime objective of Pompey was to demonstrate Roman power in an area where no proconsul had ever operated. In his previous military career he had waged internal wars against the political enemies of a senatorial faction, and assisted in the last phase of the servile war in Italy, while his naval warfare against piracy, however well organized, carried only glory of a secondary sort. In his first foreign war against a great kingdom the power of the enemy had been substantially weakened by his predecessor Lucullus. Hence Pompey had good reason to select for his attention what was reckoned the most formidable element among the allies and subjects of Tigranes, and to force a conquest that was entirely his own achievement, but yet served to establish Roman power in the far east of the Roman world.

During the winter of 66/5 Oroises, the supreme chief of the Albanian peoples, mustered his forces and crossed the Cyrus river to attack the Roman encampments in three separate actions. Pompey and his legates mastered the onslaught and imposed a truce upon the Albanians without entering their country. In the following spring he moved westwards into Iberian territory. While negotiating with the Iberian king Artoces, Pompey is said to have found that he was preparing for war – as he well might – and struck the first blow. Vigorous fighting ended with a Roman victory in the highlands of central Iberia, when Artoces failed to hold the crossing of the Pelorus river. Pompey made a formal peace, guaranteed by the surrender of the king's sons as hostages, and marched down the Phasis valley into the coastal zone of Colchis, where there was no serious resistance. At the port of Phasis he was met by his naval legate Servilius, who had reached there with a detachment of the Roman fleet.

Belatedly Pompey now considered and dismissed the possibility of pursuing Mithridates either by land through the Caucasian mountains or by sea to the Crimean Bosporus. Leaving Servilius to control the sea routes he marched his army back to Armenia. His failure to eliminate Mithridates was much criticized at Rome, where his supporters in 63 maintained that the Bosporus was beyond the reach of a Roman army. The historical tradition that represents Livy unites in regarding the march through Iberia as aimed at the pursuit of Mithridates, which was unfortunately impeded by the resistance of the Iberians and Albanians.⁴⁴ This evidently echoes the defence that Pompey concocted when it was learned that Mithridates had escaped to the Crimea and was preparing to defend himself again. Pompey underestimated the relentless vigour and resources of the aged king, as is revealed by his incautious remark that he had left a worse enemy than a Roman army to deal with him – hunger.

⁴⁴ Defence of Pompey, cf. Cic. *Mur.* 34, Plut. *Pomp.* 34.1, 35.1, Dio xxxvii.3.1–3, Livy *Per.* ci.

For Mithridates was in one of the principal granaries of the Greek world.⁴⁵

Pompey next led his army through the whole length of Armenia to open a campaign against the Albanian people, whom he had defeated in border warfare in the previous winter but not subdued. Since he did not disturb the peace of Iberia he probably took the direct route northward from Artaxata by Lake Sevan to the Albanian frontier. He certainly entered Albania through the barren district of Cambysene, the border land between Armenia, Iberia and Albania.⁴⁶ Thence he marched into the heart of the country until in the intense heat of late summer at the crossing of the Abas river he met the main forces of Oroises, reputed to number 60,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry. He awaited their attack with his infantry immobile, and inflicted a crushing defeat. Victory was followed by the grant of peace and the submission of adjacent peoples. Pompey continued his march southwards through a harsh and barren land towards the Caspian coast, but withdrew when faced by intolerable physical conditions at three days' march from the sea. This was the pattern of conquest that Caesar followed later in his first years in Gaul, where his spectacular victories in major battles were followed by the general submission of large groups of peoples without a systematic reduction of their lands.

By the end of 65 Pompey had returned to bases in Lesser Armenia and Pontus. His Caucasian campaigns, the last of his active warfare in the East, apart from local operations in Syria and Judaea in 63, are the only major military actions in which he advanced beyond the scope of his predecessor Lucullus. Since in his first campaign he began operations in Pontus far to the east of the area in which Lucullus had defeated Mithridates, it is not surprising that he reached the eastern limits of the Armenian empire, and in Albania advanced somewhat further. These campaigns gained Rome valuable support in the East. Twenty years later the Iberians quickly yielded to a legate of Antonius, and afterwards in the first century of the imperial period they regularly assisted in the defence of the Armenian area against the Parthians.

Pompey showed a certain interest in the trade routes described by ancient geographers that linked the trading stations at the eastern end of the Black Sea with the far-eastern caravan routes through eastern Iran and Bactria to India. The main route led from Phasis city by the Phasis and Cyrus valleys across the Caspian sea to the Hyrcanian coast, where it linked with the route from Syria and Babylonia through Iran to Bactria. Pompey secured information about the route and the transit of 'Indian goods', and doubtless marched along a sector of the highway through Iberia to Colchis, where Strabo describes it as a paved road for a four

⁴⁵ Plut. *Pomp.* 39.1.

⁴⁶ Route, cf. Plut. *Pomp.* 35.2-3, Dio xxxvii.3.3-5.

days' journey between the upper Phasis and the Cyrus valleys. There is no reason to doubt that this route, first mentioned by Herodotus, was active at this time for the transport of oriental wares to the dynasts of Colchis and the Crimean area together with another route to the north of the Caucasus, operated profitably by the Aorsi in the fifties and forties' B.C.⁴⁷ But there is no reason to connect the mention of this trade with the economic interests of the magnates of the Roman business world. Their activities were confined at this time to easily accessible areas – tax-collection and money-lending in the settled provinces and subordinate kingdoms of the pacified Roman world, and the wholesale trade in slaves through Asia by the mart of Delos to the Roman market. The numerous men of affairs for whom Cicero wrote his letters of recommendation to proconsuls in the next twenty years were mostly confined in their scope to the older provinces of Asia, Macedonia and Achaëa. A few reached Bithynia, none travelled further.⁴⁸

IX. THE ORGANIZATION OF GAINS AND THE ANNEXATION OF SYRIA

Little is known about the activities of Pompey between the end of the Albanian campaign in the autumn of 65 and his arrival in northern Syria late in 64. There is no report of any military action apart from the capture of certain isolated fortresses. The winter was spent in Aspis, an unidentified site in Lesser Armenia. Much time was taken in checking the contents of the numerous treasure-houses of Mithridates, notably that at Talaura, where thirty days were spent on the count. In all Pompey collected no less than 36,000 talents in gold and silver, mostly in coined money at 6,000 drachmae to a talent. All had to be counted and registered in their lists by the proconsular *scribae*. The quaestors of Pompey were in charge of the audit, and since such vast sums were at stake Pompey, who prided himself upon his honesty in public finances, must have made some check upon the accounts, for which he was ultimately responsible.⁴⁹

The main task of this year was the reorganization of Pontus as a province and the appointment or renewal of tenure of kings and princes in the numerous subordinate kingdoms that Pompey recognized or re-established in Anatolia. But these were not tasks on which proconsuls spent a great deal of time, if one may judge by the settlement of Anatolia after the defeat of Antiochus III in 189, or the pacification of Asia by

⁴⁷ Trade and routes, cf. Strab. II.1.15 (73), XI.2.17 (498), 3.5 (500), 7.3 (509), with Pliny *HN* VI.52 and *Hdt.* I.104.1, II.2, IV.37.1. Aorsi route Strab. XI.5.8 (506).

⁴⁸ Cf. Cic. *Fam.* XIII *passim*; Philomelium *ibid.* 43–5, Bithynia, *ibid.* 61.

⁴⁹ The chronology of Dio XXXVII.7.5 has been misunderstood as placing 'Aspis' near the Albanian border. Treasure-houses, App. *Mith.* 107, 115, Dio XXXVII.7.5.

Sulla in 85, who left the detailed work to his legates. More time may have been required by the initiation of the scheme for the creation or enlargement of eleven Greek cities charged with the internal administration of the core of Pontus. But how much of the municipal detail was devised or set on foot personally by Pompey is unknown. In the course of the year Pompey was also occupied with negotiations with the Parthian king: a mission was received and letters were despatched. The legates likewise were no longer occupied with warfare: their operations in Adiabene and Mesopotamia were completed by the winter or spring of 64. Hence it was being said at Rome, as Plutarch records, that Pompey was 'ordering provinces and handing out gifts while the enemy – Mithridates – was still active and uncaptured'.⁵⁰

Late in 64 Pompey moved southwards through Cappadocia and Cilicia into northern Syria. There was no organized resistance except possibly in Commagene, the mountainous principality wedged between the Taurus watershed, Cappadocia and the Syrian foothills. Its ruler Antiochus had made himself an independent king after the end of Seleucid power, and as the enemy of Tigranes had opened negotiations with Lucullus. He now yielded to Pompey who recognized his kingship and awarded him an extension of territory into western Mesopotamia.⁵¹

Pompey had already decided to annex northern Syria as a Roman province before he met Antiochus Philadelphos at Antioch, late in 64. This prince, whose claim to the kingship of Egypt had been vainly advanced at Rome by his mother Selene before 70, had secured the Seleucid succession at Antioch after the withdrawal of the Armenian forces from Syria in 69–68, and held it for a year, though at variance with his kinsman Philip, who maintained himself in lowland Cilicia. Both princes turned for help to Arab dynasts, Sampsiceramus of Emesa and one Zizos, who plotted to murder their protégés and to seize the kingdom. The plots failed, and Philip secured the support of Marcius Rex, proconsul of Syria in 67, who sent P. Clodius to assist him at Antioch. His rival Antiochus meanwhile had escaped from the hands of Sampsiceramus. When Pompey reached Antioch in 64 it was Antiochus, not Philip, who came to claim the Seleucid throne. But he did not satisfy Pompey, who is reported as saying that he could not grant the diadem to a man who could not keep his kingdom and was unwelcome to his subjects, and added that he would not allow Syria to fall to the despoiling raids of Arabs and Jews.⁵² This is a clear reference to the activities of such men as Sampsiceramus, Aretas of Petra, the overlord of Nabatene beyond Jordan, and the brigand Cynaras, who held much of the

⁵⁰ Plut. *Pomp.* 38.2; cities, below, pp. 266–8.

⁵¹ Commagene, cf. App. *Mith.* 106, 117, Plut. *Pomp.* 45.5.

⁵² Cf. Just. *Epit.* xl.2.3–4; Cic. ii. *Verr.* 4.61.

Phoenician coast from Byblos to Berytus until Pompey dispossessed him, while the Hasmonean princes of Judaea had acquired many Greek settlements in southern Syria. The collapse of the Seleucid power had sown disorder among the rival dynasts of an area that had no internal unity of race or culture.

There was no general resistance to Pompey in Syria, which he annexed for the same reason that had led to the provincialization of Asia and Bithynia, the lack of any effective and trustworthy ruler who could manage the whole country in the interest of Rome. It has been widely held that Pompey annexed Syria mainly to eliminate piracy from the Levantine coast. But piracy was anathema to the trading states of Syria, which are described by Strabo in his account of the age of piracy as hemmed in by the hostile powers of Egypt, Cyprus and even Rhodes, that refused them help against the menace of pirates. Only a single nest of pirates is named along the Syrian coast, south of Phoenicia, at Joppa. Brigandage, which was prevalent in Syria, was a land-based activity, operated from mountain fastnesses against the coastal cities or by the desert nomads, such as Zenodorus, who somewhat later raided the caravans of Damascus. Pompey destroyed the strongholds of Syrian brigandage, but he left Cyprus, a home of pirates in the recent past, in the hands of its ruler Ptolemy brother of the Egyptian king, Auletes (ch. 8, p. 319).⁵³

Another factor in the annexation of Syria, sometimes suggested as the principal reason, was the possibility of a renewal of the Parthian interest shown by Mithridates Megas and his predecessors, who had attempted the conquest of Seleucid Syria. Parthia, it is true, did not yet appear to offer any threat to Roman supremacy. But the existence of an organized military state beyond the middle Euphrates, even if reckoned a second-class power at this time was doubtless among the factors that led Pompey to annex Syria and to establish some four legions in Cilicia and northern Syria. If the Romans left Syria to itself the Parthians were likely to intervene just as Tigranes had done.⁵⁴

XI. POMPEY IN JUDAEA AND NABATENE

The first intention of Pompey in southern Syria was to deal with the aggressive king Aretas of Nabatene. However, he was approached by emissaries from the rival claimants to the high priesthood and kingship of Judaea, Hyrcanus and Aristobulus. Aretas had extended his power northward through Transjordan to the neighbourhood of Damascus, which he held for some years, and recently he had intervened in Judaea

⁵³ Pirates, cf. Strab. XIV. 5.2 (669), XVI. 2. 28 (759). Brigands. *ibid.* XVI. 2.8 (751), 18 (755), 20 (756), 37 (761).

⁵⁴ Parthia, see below pp. 262-5.

on the side of Hyrcanus. His power threatened the peace of Syria, while the feud between the Judean princes was an internal affair that had raged intermittently since the death of the regent Alexandra in 69. Before the arrival of Pompey the legate Aemilius Scaurus had gone to Syria in 64, apparently without any armed forces, to investigate the situation. He met representatives of Hyrcanus and Aristobulus in Judaea at the time when Hyrcanus had the advantage through the military support of Aretas. Scaurus not surprisingly favoured Aristobulus, and required Aretas to withdraw from Judaea.

By the time that Pompey had reached Antioch in the autumn of 64 Aristobulus had the upper hand in Judaea and Aretas had retired to Philadelphia in Transjordan. Pompey required both parties to await a settlement after his proposed expedition against Aretas. But when he learned early in 63 that Aristobulus had upset the situation by mobilizing forces at Alexandrion, a fortress that dominated the road from Damascus to Jerusalem, he promptly marched instead against Aristobulus and confronted him.⁵⁵ After fruitless parleys Aristobulus withdrew to Jerusalem, where he renewed his evasive negotiations. Pompey lost patience and managed to capture the recalcitrant prince outside the city. The partisans of Hyrcanus opened the gates to Pompey, but the numerous priesthood, with the supporters of Aristobulus, held the strongly fortified temple area against the invader for a siege of three months' duration. The final storming was simplified by exploitation of the inactivity of the defenders on the Sabbath days, which enabled the Romans to complete the machinery of assault and to take the stronghold on the Day of Atonement towards the beginning of October.⁵⁶ The fighting, though claimed as the conquest of Judaea by Roman sources, was limited to the fortress in Jerusalem. After its capture Pompey treated Judaea no differently from other subject principalities. He established Hyrcanus as high priest and ethnarch rather than king of Judaea, to the satisfaction of the numerous Jews, particularly amongst the clergy, who objected to the secular kingship. The man was more likely to make a pliant ruler than the unreliable Aristobulus, who was despatched as a prisoner to Rome.

The Hellenized territories in the north and the coastal settlements such as Gaza and Joppa that the Maccabean kings had taken from Seleucid control were returned to the Syrian province. Judaea was confined to the lands of the Jewish people. Pompey did not renew his interrupted campaign against Aretas. News of the death of Mithridates

⁵⁵ The prime source is Joseph. *AJ* xiv.2 (29)–4 (79), *BJ* 1.6.2–7 (127–57). Little of use is added by Dio xxxvii.16–16.1 and Plut. *Pomp.* 39.3.

⁵⁶ Joseph. *AJ* xiv.4.3 (64–6), confirmed by Strab. xvi.2.40 (763); against the confusion of Dio xxxvii.16.2–4. Cf. Schürer 1973–87 (D 153) 12.239 n. 23.

in the Crimean Bosphorus, received before he reached Jerusalem, drew him back to Amisus in Pontus, when the siege ended, to settle affairs with Pharnaces, who took over the power of the king. Aretas was left to Aemilius Scaurus, whom Pompey placed in charge of Syria. Scaurus raided Nabatean territory but did not take Petra or defeat the main forces of Aretas, who made a nominal submission and paid a fine or bribe of 300 talents to Scaurus. But the kingdom survived in diminishing independence until the time of the emperor Trajan.

XI. PARTHIA AND ROME

It has been widely held that the Parthians, the paramount power that displaced the Seleucids in the Orient, had no western ambitions before the defeat of M. Crassus in 53. But Parthian enterprise in the West began in the time of Mithridates I, who after the defeat of the Seleucid king Demetrius II Nicator in Media, in 130–129 B.C., retained him as a diplomatic prisoner with the intention of restoring him to the throne at Antioch as a Parthian vassal. Ten years later Mithridates' successor Phraates I after defeating the invasion of Antiochus Sidetes planned a counter-attack on Syria that was forestalled when eastern Iran was invaded by a horde from Sacastan. Mithridates II Megas revived these plans by subduing the dependent ruler of the north Syrian Galilee, who owed fealty to Antiochus Eusebes, about 93–92 B.C., and somewhat later defeated the last effective Seleucid king, Demetrius III, at Beroia in northern Syria, in support of his rival Philip.

While Mithridates was preparing his plans against Syria the incident occurred on the Cappadocian frontier that introduced the Parthians to the existence of the Roman power. The *propraetor* Sulla, after expelling from Cappadocia the Armenian forces that had resisted the restoration of Ariobarzanes to the kingdom, encountered the Parthian envoy Orobazus and held a tripartite discussion with Ariobarzanes and the Parthian about the possibility of friendship and alliance between Rome and Parthia. Or so Sulla reported. This has been taken to mean the actual establishment of a treaty relationship between the two powers. But such arrangements at this date, and later, required the sanction of the Senate or the Senate and People of Rome, as Sulla was well aware. When in Numidia in 105, he had duly forwarded the request of the Mauretanian king for a treaty with Rome through his *proconsul* to the Senate.⁵⁷ No proposals were now referred to Rome, and the Parthian king ordered the execution of Orobazus for lowering the dignity of himself by dealing with a barbarian on equal terms.

After 90 B.C. the Parthian power was diminished by dynastic feuds

⁵⁷ Cf. Plut. *Sulla*, 5.8–9, with Sall. *Iug.* 104.

that enabled the king of Armenia, Tigranes, to establish his independence and, as has been seen, to take control of the Parthian territories between Babylonia and southern Armenia, with Media Atropatene in the north-east, and to annex northern Syria and coastal Cilicia in the south-west. The rise of Tigranes coincided with the collapse of Roman power in Anatolia in the eighties and the renewed challenge of Mithridates Eupator in the later seventies. Contact between Rome and Parthia was restored when Lucullus invaded southern Armenia. After his victory at Tigranocerta he opened lengthy negotiations with the recently established king, Phraates III. But the king came to distrust the Roman envoys and no definitive agreement was made.⁵⁸

When Pompey took charge of the war in the East he immediately reopened negotiations with Phraates, offering the same terms as Tigranes and Mithridates Eupator, who were still seeking Parthian aid. This presumably meant the transfer of the three regions of Adiabene, Mesopotamia and Gordyene, which are later mentioned as what Phraates regained, or expected to gain, in return for his invasion of Armenia. After some hesitation Phraates carried out his agreement, urged on by the disloyal son of Tigranes, who hoped to oust his father, in the summer of 66. He invaded northern Armenia by the Araxes valley and besieged Tigranes in Artaxata. Tigranes managed to vacate the city with his main forces and the siege was unsuccessful, but Phraates had prevented Tigranes from giving any help to Mithridates in Pontus. By the end of 65 Phraates had occupied Adiabene and Gordyene, when he was alarmed by the report of the advance of the legate Gabinus, who had marched by the route of Lucullus to recover southern Armenia and might threaten Mesopotamia, which Phraates had not yet occupied. The king promptly sought the 'renewal and confirmation' of his agreement. Pompey retaliated by demanding the surrender of Gordyene. When Phraates objected he sent a second legate, Afranius, to seize the region and to install Tigranes as its ruler. The Parthians departed without resistance, and Afranius pursued them beyond the Tigris into Adiabene as far as Arbela. Thence in the winter of 65 he withdrew his forces through the dry steppes of Mesopotamia, where he suffered difficulties with supplies that were solved by the semi-Greek city of Carrhae, before he reached northern Syria.

Cassius Dio states that the operations of Afranius were contrary to the agreement with Phraates, who sent a second mission to Pompey, demanding that the Euphrates should form the boundary between the two powers.⁵⁹ This was the first time that the issue of the Euphrates

⁵⁸ See pp. 241–2 above. For a fuller account see *Cambridge History of Iran* III.1 (Cambridge, 1983).

⁵⁹ Afranius in Gordyene, Adiabene, Mesopotamia, cf. Plut. *Pomp.* 36.2, Dio xxxvii.5.2–5. Second Parthian mission, cf. Plut. *Pomp.* 33.8, Dio xxxvii.6.3.

boundary arose between Rome and Parthia. There is a vague statement in the late Epitomator Orosius that Licinius Crassus invaded Mesopotamia 'contrary to the terms accepted by Lucullus and Pompey', but, since Mesopotamia was held by Armenia down to 65, and no Roman forces entered northern Syria until 64, there was no earlier opportunity for a conflict over the Euphrates frontier. When Pompey replied evasively that he would reckon as the Roman frontier 'whatever was right', and withheld the title of King of Kings from Phraates, the king sought redress by attacking Tigranes in southern Armenia in the summer of 64. The conflict with Tigranes ended in a stalemate, and left Pompey with an excuse for making war on Phraates in defence of Tigranes, who had recently been recognized as a 'friend and ally' of Rome. Pompey eventually rejected the notion, which was encouraged by his staff, with the remark that he had no formal commission to fight the Parthians. He solved the crisis that he had created by an offer of arbitration between the two kings over Gordyene which they accepted. Three nameless Romans, despatched from Syria in 64-63, settled the issue in favour of Tigranes. While the Armenian regained Gordyene, Phraates retained Mesopotamia, except for the western district of Osrhoene, which under its ruler Akbar became a Roman dependency at this time. So Pompey did not concede the Parthian claim to the Euphrates frontier, but left Phraates free to assert his control over the rest of Mesopotamia, which nine years later was Parthian territory when Crassus invaded it.⁶⁰

There is no contemporary evidence for the intentions of Pompey towards Parthia. But his refusal to recognize the title of King of Kings indicates that he meant to weaken the standing of Phraates, and he used the situation that he had engineered in Gordyene in the same way. Since Pompey preferred in general to work under the cover of legitimacy it is unlikely that he seriously considered the invasion of Parthian territory beyond the lands occupied by Tigranes, without a specific mandate, at a time when his political enemies in Rome were already criticizing him for permitting the escape of Mithridates. The Parthians were left to prove their military effectiveness at the expense of M. Crassus. Their armed strength, which the Romans had not yet tested, lay in the combination of heavily armoured cavalry and mounted archers, a totally different style from the Roman infantrymen. Pompey took account of them by leaving a strong force of Roman legions as the garrison of Syria and Cilicia. Two Syrian legions are documented immediately after the departure of Pompey by a chance mention in Josephus. The legions of Cilicia do not

⁶⁰ Dispute over Gordyene, cf. Dio xxxvii.5.3, 6.4-5, 7.3, with Plut. *Pomp.* 39.5; Strab. xii.1.24 (747), xi.14.15 (532), confusingly including Gordyene in Mesopotamia, cf. Dio xl.12.2; 13.1-2, 20.1.

appear until the province became a consular command in 57-56. But Cilicia contained many independent peoples in the highlands that no Roman had yet subdued (as Cicero later found) and could not dispense with a garrison. The two discontented legions that were on the verge of mutiny when Cicero arrived in 52, despite the demobilization of time-served men by his predecessor, had been in Cilicia for many years. Four legions in Cilicia and Syria could deal with any trouble that the Parthians were likely to create on their present form, and maintain order within the provincial area.

XII. THE EASTERN SETTLEMENT OF POMPEY

1. *Military Control*

From the arrangements that Pompey made for the control of eastern Anatolia it is clear that military defence was not in the forefront of his mind. The frontier regions of Anatolia remained in the hands of politically reliable dynasts. The long-suffering Ariobarzanes was reinstated once more in Cappadocia. His territory was extended to include the region of Cybistra in eastern Lycaonia, through which passed the essential highway from Apamea in Phrygia through the Cilician Gates in the Taurus range to the Cilician coast and to Syria. Likewise Tomisa, the Euphrates bridgehead between Melitene and Sophene, was restored to him. The Cappadocian king was thus in nominal control of the two routes linking the Roman power with the new zone of influence in southern Armenia and Mesopotamia. South of Cappadocia the Euphrates crossing at Samosata was left under the control of Antiochus, whose dynasty continued to rule the mountainous principality of Commagene, which lies between southern Cappadocia and the Euphrates gorges. The king was given additional territory east of the river that secured his hold on the crossing. The western approaches to northern Armenia lay through Lesser Armenia and the adjacent mountains largely inhabited by the ferocious Tibareni, who had given trouble to both Lucullus and Pompey. This region through to the Black Sea coast was entrusted – possibly by stages – to the reliable and effective Deiotarus, the Galatian tetrarch. In the far north the vigorous Pharnaces was left in control of the Crimean Bosporus after his elimination of Mithridates, though he was not allowed to hold Colchis, on the mainland, where a Roman nominee was installed.

Pompey thus maintained the system of indirect rule in the frontier zones beyond which lay the kingdom of Armenia, itself reduced to a calculated dependence, but likely to assert itself if opportunity arose. Roman military power was confined to the enlarged province of Cilicia,

which now included the western sector of the Taurus mountains and the coastal plain beyond, terminating at the Amanus chain that separates Cilicia from Syria. Though not a frontier province in the strict sense, Cilicia was a military zone with a force of some two legions – though their presence is not testified immediately – stationed in the western region of north Cilicia. These were a mobile force, to be used as Cicero used them in 52–51 B.C., for the repression of rebellious or unconquered peoples of upper Cilicia, and when occasion arose for the defence of the whole region against any external threat from Armenia or Parthia. As for the eastern sector of the combined province of Bithynia and Pontus, there is no evidence that whatever forces were assigned to it – which earned their praetorian proconsul the title of *imperator* in c. 57 – amounted to a substantial group. In Syria the northern territory was separated from immediate contact with Parthian commanders not only by the Euphrates river but by the principality of Osroene beyond the river in western Mesopotamia, which preferred Roman to Parthian suzerainty. The two legions testified as the Syrian garrison after the departure of Pompey were stationed presumably in the neighbourhood of Antioch, as later, when not engaged in Judaea or Nabatene in the south.⁶¹

2. *Internal government*

In Anatolia Pompey extended direct provincial government only to the Cilician plain, which was added to the province, and to central and western Pontus, which he combined with Bithynia. The two regions were very different. Coastal Cilicia was a land of Hellenistic cities which had suffered greatly through the depredations of the pirate fleets in their heyday, and by the actions of Tigranes, who had removed the populations of 'twelve Hellenic cities', mostly in the Cilician zone, to establish his new metropolis at Tigranocerta and to strengthen other settlements in that region. Pompey enlarged the achievement of Lucullus, who paid for the return of these peoples to their native cities, by the resettlement of 'vacant cities and empty lands' in the plain of coastal Cilicia with the numerous former citizens who had been driven to enlist in the pirate fleets by the badness of the times. Appian specifies Mallus, Adana and Epiphania on this account, in addition to Soli, about which Strabo enlarges, and Dyme in Achaëa: some 20,000 survivors were thus settled.⁶²

In Bithynia the Hellenic cities were numerous, being either ancient settlements or creations of the kings, though they had been largely reduced to townships by the encroachment of the royal domains on their

⁶¹ Legions, cf. Joseph. *AJ* xiv.4.5 (79), 5.2 (84), 6.2 (98).

⁶² Settlements, cf. Strab. xiv.3.3 (665), 5.8 (671), App. *Mith.* 96, 115.

former civic territories. Pompey restored to them the control of districts of adjacent territory as municipal land, and refurbished their internal government by the same system that he introduced into Pontus. Only three old Hellenic cities existed in Pontus, situated in the coastal region: Amastris, Amisus and Sinope, which had become the royal capital. In the townships of the interior there were a number of great Hellenized families, of which the best known is that of Strabo of Amasia, the geographical writer, which provided Mithridates with a number of civil administrators and military leaders. But the mass of the population lived in villages and townships according to the Iranian and pre-Iranian life-pattern.

The territory was administered under Mithridates by a system of district governorships or 'eparchies'. It was necessary for Pompey to replace these by a method of decentralized civic government with which the Romans were familiar. He promoted eight of the larger townships together with the existing Greek cities, widely distributed through the land, to the status of self-governing municipalities with a Hellenic style of internal government. Most of the land of central and western Pontus became the civic territory of the eleven cities, which each received control of several of the former eparchies. So much appears from Strabo's incomplete account of the arrangements of Pompey. Thus Amisus and Amasia each received four or five eparchies, Zela secured 'many', and Megalopolis gained the extensive districts of Colopene and Cimiane adjacent to Armenia Minor and Cappadocia.⁶³

How the cities were related to their terrains and to the rural population is not clear. There was possibly a franchise limited to the city dwellers and to magisterial families, while the bulk of the population was excluded from civil or civic rights. The reorganization of Pontus was based on the principle, familiar from the provincial system of Macedonia and Asia, that proconsular administration depended on a substratum of local self-government. The sole exception proves the rule: the temple-state of Comana was granted to the favoured Archelaus, son of Mithridates' general, with a great extension of territory, to rule as a dynast. Strabo writes of Zela, one of the eleven cities, that 'Pompey assigned many eparchies to it and called it a city': this was not a process of colonization in the old Greek sense, with the establishment of a body of settlers in a new township, but a reorganization of the existing population into a new system.⁶⁴ Pompey founded a genuinely colonial settlement only at Nicopolis in Lesser Armenia, where he established a community of ex-soldiery and native elements.

The method of civic administration introduced by Pompey is partly revealed by certain citations of the content of the *Lex Pompeia*

⁶³ Cf. Strab. XII.3.1 (541).

⁶⁴ Comana, cf. Strab. XII.3.34 (558). Zela, cf. *ibid.* 37 (560).

'concerning the cities of Bithynia and Pontus' in the letters of Pliny the Younger, imperial legate to the emperor Trajan, written about A.D. 110-11.⁶⁵ These, together with civic inscriptions from imperial times, prove that the pattern of government was basically Hellenic, with the normal machinery of elected annual magistrates, civic councils and voting assemblies of citizens. But the democratic system normal in the Hellenistic world was characteristically modified by the conversion of the city councils from annually elected bodies to permanent corporations composed of aldermen. These were nominated by censors, modelled on the Roman quinquennial pattern, who picked the councillors from the ex-magistrates and other members of the upper classes, defined by age and wealth, and expelled unsuitable persons. These methods turned the councils into local senates that represented the predominance of wealth. Their composition was controlled only by the civic censors, drawn from the same social class, and the efficacy of the censorship was limited also by the rarity of the office. The oligarchical councils doubtless rapidly acquired the ascendancy over the popular assemblies that they held in the time of Trajan, because the initiative in the presentation of proposals lay with the councillors. The size of the councils remains unknown, though the proposal for the increase of the council of Prusa in Bithynia by a hundred members, made in c. A.D. 97, suggest that as elsewhere in the Hellenized provinces the councils of Bithynia might number several hundred persons. But whether the Hellenized classes in Pontus were so numerous remains uncertain.⁶⁶

Cappadocia, to which Ariobarzanes was restored, was a land of oriental civilization in which the notables expected kingly government, and had demanded its restoration at the beginning of Ariobarzanes' career, when the Senate was minded to abolish it. The administration was divided between twelve 'generalships' on the pattern of Seleucid bureaucracy. Hellenism, introduced by Ariarathes Eusebes in the second century B.C., did not greatly flourish. Mazaca, the royal capital and the base of the royal army, had some form of internal government based on the Greek pattern and derived (it was said) from the code of the early law-giver Charondas of Catane. There were a few townships called *politumata*, which normally in Hellenistic usage refers to local settlements of privileged foreigners. Anisa, one of these, had internal self-government on the Greek pattern, but no territory outside the township. Otherwise strongholds prevailed, and temple-towns that acted as market centres. Hence Cappadocia continued to be ruled by kings even after the rise of

⁶⁵ Pliny *Ep.* x.43.1, 75-80, 110.1, 112-13.

⁶⁶ Initiative of Councils, cf. Pliny *Ep.* x.39.5, 81.1, 6, 110.1. Increase at Prusa, cf. Dio Chrys. *Or.* xlv.7. Cappadocia, see Strabo xii.1.4.

Parthian power increased its strategic importance in relation to Armenia, down to the time of Tiberius Caesar.

Though the whole of the Cilician region became a Roman province, dynastic rule was recognized in districts such as troublesome Isauria, where Antipater of Derbe had extensive power. Likewise Tarcondimotus gradually extended his control of northern Amanus, while the 'free Cilicians' of the southern Amanus were left undisturbed by the provincial regime until the proconsulship of M. Cicero in 52-51 B.C. But in the Cilician plain the numerous Greek cities, strengthened by restoration and resettlement, provided for local administration.

Galatia, within the barren zone of central Anatolia, where the three tribal groups of the Tolistobogii, Tectosagi and Trocmi retained their traditional Celtic system, though vastly reduced in power, was left to the rule of the so-called tetrarchs. The most notable was the faithful Deiotarus, who dominated the Tolistobogii of western Galatia, and eventually secured from Rome his recognition as king. He was also given, now or a few years later, the principality of Lesser Armenia, together with adjacent mountainous territories through to the Black Sea.

Pharnaces, the surviving son of Mithridates Eupator, in return for the elimination of his father and the surrender of many notable persons, was recognized as the ruler of the Crimean Bosporus, and as a 'friend and ally' of Rome, without any known financial exactions. The kingdom of Armenia, and eventually the principality of Nabatene beyond southern Syria and Judaea, were treated less favourably. But though they paid indemnities at their submission, and though southern Armenia was stripped of stored treasure, they were not required to pay annual tribute. Further afield peoples such as the Iberi and Albani in the sub-Caucasian region, who had been defeated in battle, and the Medes of Atropatene, who had submitted to military pressure, remained in effective independence.

3. Methods of Taxation

In the past century 'friends and allies' of the Roman People had not paid regular taxes to Rome. There is no evidence that tribute was now exacted from any of the loyal rulers who were restored or recognized by Pompey in Anatolia. Cicero, when proconsul of Cilicia, briefly mentions tax-collectors in his province, and has much to say about certain great Romans who were extracting the repayment of loans from the Cappadocian king, but he never suggests that the king or his subjects paid taxes to the Roman treasury. Instead, he approved an arrangement of the king's own revenues that enabled him to pay his personal debts to Roman

financiers.⁶⁷ If the weak kingdom of Cappadocia was not required to pay tribute it is unlikely that taxation was imposed on the Galatian tetrarchs, who had shown equal loyalty in the past: later Caesar required a large sum as a gift, not as arrears of taxation, from his ex-enemy Deiotarus. But the principalities carved out of the kingdom of Pontus were another matter. It is likely that they were treated like the minor dynasts in the Syrian region, who were certainly required to pay tribute. It is probable that in these territories tribute was paid in a lump sum directly to the authorities of the nearest province, Cilicia, Syria or Pontus. The proconsul of Syria a few years later arranged the collection of taxes from Syrian dynasts, under the arrangements of Pompey, and from Judaea, where he initiated the system, to the exclusion of the Roman financiers.⁶⁸

Roman *publicani* managed the collection of the land and pasture dues, which were the principal Roman impost, from the civic communities of each provincial area. But Pompey modified the system in certain ways to the benefit of tax-payers. In Asia the former method continued by which the tax-right was leased by the consuls or censors at Rome to organized groups or *societates* of Roman businessmen, who thereby secured a monopoly of the system. Something similar is indicated for the Bithynian sector of the new province of Bithynia and Pontus, because in 51–50 B.C. a single composite group of *publicani* administered the collection of the whole of Bithynia.⁶⁹ But the taxation leases of the reorganized or newly organized provinces of Cilicia and Syria were let by the proconsuls of the provinces to *publicani* at an auction within their provinces, not apparently in a single block but commune by commune. Though the collection remained in Roman hands the communes ceased to be the monopoly of a single group of *publicani*. A second change was in the method of collection. Instead of direct collection from producers at vintage or harvest the system of *pactiones*, already used as an alternative method in some districts of Asia, was made universal. By this the civic authorities were enabled to make an agreement or *pactio* with the *publicani* for the payment of a fixed sum by the whole community, which they then collected from their citizens by their own agents. Thus a system of local collection was interposed between the *publicani* and the individual tax-payers. Cicero briefly remarked that ‘the tax agreements have been completed’ before he even set foot in his province: henceforth he was able to concentrate on the control of the excesses of the great money-lenders in their dealings with provincial cities.⁷⁰

⁶⁷ Cic. *Att.* vi.1.3. ⁶⁸Cf. below, p. 273.

⁶⁹ Cf. Cic. *Fam.* xiii.9.2 for Bithynian *societas*.

⁷⁰ So much may be gathered from Cic. *Prov. Cons.* 9–10 for Syria, and from *Att.* v.14.1 for Cilicia. On *publicani* in general see Brunt 1990 (A 20) ch. 13.

XIII. GABINIUS AND THE AFTERMATH OF POMPEY

The situation around Syria remained quiescent for a few years after the departure of Pompey, though trouble persisted with the Nabatean Arabs. Aulus Gabinius, the former legate of Pompey in the Mesopotamian area, arrived in 57, after his consulship, with a military command on the pattern of the Lex Manilia. A tribunician bill gave him several legions and a considerable sum of money, though neither is precisely described, for a period of three years, and authority to deal with adjacent makers of trouble. But though Cicero talks of Babylon and Persia being subject to his exactions it is clear that he lacked the extensive powers given by the Lex Manilia to Pompey.⁷¹ Affairs in Parthia, with which at this time the ill-defined agreement with Pompey survived, gave an excuse for indirect intervention. After the murder of the king Phraates his sons Mithridates and Orodes quarrelled about the succession. Eventually Mithridates, expelled from the viceroyalty of Great Media by his brother, who held the kingship, turned to Gabinius, who initiated a pattern of intervention that had a long history in the imperial period. Lengthy intrigue was required to secure internal support in Parthia, so that the plot was not set up until the first months of 55, when Gabinius entered Mesopotamia across the Euphrates. But the unexpected opportunity of intervention in wealthy Egypt caused his sudden withdrawal.⁷²

Ptolemy Auletes, the bastard son of Ptolemy Soter, had reigned for some twenty years of insecurity after the death of his father in 81. Soter's unsuccessful rival Alexander I left a will on the basis of which, it has been argued from obscure evidence, the annexation of Egypt itself was claimed by the Senate in 87 or 86.⁷³ Some twenty years later M. Crassus as censor in 65 supported a tribunician bill that probably proposed the confiscation of the treasures of the Ptolemies on a discreditable pretext.⁷⁴ After this scheme was defeated by optimate opposition the resourceful Caesar, as consul in 59, with the support of Pompey, secured for Auletes a senatorial decree, confirmed by a law of the people, that recognized him as the 'ally and friend' of Rome, for which he is said to have agreed the payment of 6,000 talents. But a quarrel with his subjects in Alexandria forced him to fly to Rome, where in 57 he sought support

⁷¹ Powers of Gabinius: Cic. *Sest.* 24, *Dom.* 23, 55, *Pis.* 49. Length of command, *ibid.* *Prov. Cons.* 17, *Pis.* 55, 88, with Asc. 1-2c; Dio xxxix.60.4. Territorial limits, Cic. *Dom.* 23, *Rab. Post.* 20, *Pis.* 49, Strab. xii.3.34 (558), against Cicero's exaggeration in *Dom.* 60 - 'alteri Syriam Babylonem Persas... tradidisses'.

⁷² Mesopotamian incursion: Joseph. *AJ* xiv.6.2 (98), *BJ* 1.8.7 (175-6), App. *Syr.* 51, Dio xxxix.56.3, with Cic. *Att.* iv.10.1, fix the date.

⁷³ The will of Alexander: see Cic. *Leg. Agr.* 1.1, 2.41, *Reg. Alex.* fr.5, as elucidated by Badian 1967 (p. 169). For an alternative view Braund 1983 (A 13) 24-8.

⁷⁴ Cic. *Reg. Alex.* fr. 6.6, suggesting the exaction of concessions through threats, is to be set against the proposal for direct subjugation in Plut. *Crass.* 13.2, Suet. *Iul.* 11.

for his restoration against the counter-claims of Alexandria in the name of his elder daughter Berenice. The consul Lentulus Spinther, then an associate of Pompey, secured a senatorial decree authorizing the restoration of Auletes by himself as proconsul of Cilicia in the following year. But the authority was disputed at Rome early in 56 by the henchmen of Pompey and Crassus, seeking the transfer of the mission, and by optimate opponents of both who invoked a Sibylline oracle barring the use of force. Hence nothing was done, and Auletes left Rome a disappointed man, unaware that the private reconciliation of Pompey and Crassus by Caesar at Luca in April 56 had solved his problem: he was to be restored to the throne of Egypt by the agency of Gabinius as proconsul of Syria.

The situation was complicated when Archelaus of Comana, until recently the henchmen of Gabinius, unaware of the compact of Luca, accepted the invitation of the controllers of Alexandria to marry Berenice, the nominal queen of Egypt, and to resist the restoration of Auletes. In the spring of 55 Auletes reached Syria with a letter from Pompey as consul requiring Gabinius to restore the king to his kingdom. Gabinius promptly complied. He invaded Egypt, eliminated Archelaus and Berenice, and set up Auletes as king with a small force of Roman troops as his personal guard. He left the equestrian man of affairs, Rabirius Postumus, as the financial minister or *dioiketes* of Egypt, to secure the repayment of the Roman bankers who had supported Auletes, and to extract a reward of 10,000 talents for his services. The role of Pompey is further revealed by a scene in his house in which Rabirius, before leaving Rome, arranged a financial agreement with the king's representatives. Auletes managed to retain his throne, and after him his daughter Cleopatra ruled Egypt until the aftermath of the battle of Actium.

Whatever the faults of Gabinius he gave his first and last attention to the maintenance of order within his province. He did not intervene in Parthian affairs until the third year of his command. The first two years were spent in suppressing a revolt in Judaea stirred up by the Maccabean prince Alexander, son of the troublesome Aristobulus, now a prisoner at Rome. Alexander raised a considerable force to reoccupy the strongholds in eastern Judaea from which Pompey had driven his father. Hardly had Gabinius marched southward with his legions and defeated Alexander when Aristobulus escaped from Rome and arrived in Judaea to renew the rebellion with the same result. These operations marked the first conquest of the people and territory of Judaea by Roman forces in widespread fighting, in contrast to the isolated if considerable action of Pompey at Jerusalem. They revealed the intransigence not only of the clerical faction at Jerusalem but of the Jewish people against Roman

intervention. Gabinius had the backing at first of the supporters of the high priest Hyrcanus, but the defection of the influential Pitholaus and his forces to Aristobulus undermined his position in Jewish esteem. Aristobulus was sent back to Rome, but Alexander remained in Judaea thanks to his mother's influence, where he stirred up yet another unsuccessful rebellion in 55. Gabinius in his last months after his return from Egypt repressed both this and a hostile movement in Nabatene.

Gabinius had followed up his victories by an attempt at a peaceful settlement before his Egyptian adventure. The high priest having proved an ineffectual ruler, unable to control his powerful kinsmen, was restricted to the religious supervision of Jerusalem. His political role was transferred to five regional councils, or *synhedria*, based on townships in the four principal regions of Judaea – Galilee, Peraea across Jordan, Idumea in the south, and Judaea proper, which was apparently split between the councils of Jerusalem and Jericho. Nothing more is known about them, apart from a general resemblance to the regional federations in Macedonia, Asia and Achaea, like which they 'had their civic life' and 'were organized as members of the *synhedria*'. These seem to have survived as a substratum under the power of Antipater (Hyrcanus' vizier and a potent aide to Gabinius) when he later became the effective ruler of Judaea, after which they disappear from certain record.⁷⁵

The financial arrangements of Gabinius for his province, which are known obscurely from the ferocious and allusive attack of his political enemy Cicero, are of special interest. Gabinius hampered or restricted the Roman *publicani* in their activities by rulings at his tribunal and by administrative action, including the direct collection of taxation by his own agents in certain cities and principalities. Amongst these was Judaea, for which Gabinius appears to have established the system of direct payment to the Roman quaestor at Sidon. Gabinius, like Pompey, enriched himself at the expense of kings, but aimed at the fair treatment of the tax-paying provincials. Josephus, the local historian, writes over a century later that Gabinius 'departed after performing great and famous deeds in his government'. But that did not save him from condemnation by the *quaestio repetundarum* at Rome, manned largely by the people that he had offended.⁷⁶

⁷⁵ Civic leagues: Joseph. *AJ* xiv. 5.4 (91), *BJ* 1.8.4–5 (170). Cf. *AJ* xiv.9.2 (158), *BJ* 1.10.4 (203).

⁷⁶ For the innovations of Gabinius in Syrian taxation see Cicero's hostile version in *Prov. Cons.* 9.10, with *Pis.* 41. For Judaeian taxation cf. Dio xxxix.56.6 with Joseph. *AJ* xiv.10.6 (203). Comment of Josephus, *AJ* xiv.6.4 (104).

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Abbreviations

<i>AcA</i>	<i>Antike und Abendland</i>
<i>AAntHung</i>	<i>Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae</i>
<i>AAPal</i>	<i>Atti dell'accademia di scienze, lettere e arti di Palermo</i>
<i>AAWM</i>	<i>Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Mainz, geistes- und sozialwissenschaftliche Klasse</i>
<i>ABAW</i>	<i>Abhandlungen der bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, philos.-hist. Klasse</i>
<i>ABSA</i>	<i>Annual of the British School at Athens</i>
<i>AC</i>	<i>L'antiquité classique</i>
<i>ACD</i>	<i>Acta Classica Universitatis Scientiarum Debrecensis</i>
<i>AClass</i>	<i>Acta Classica. Proceedings of the Classical Association of South Africa</i>
<i>AD</i>	<i>Ἀρχαιολογικὸν Δελτίον</i>
<i>AE</i>	<i>L'année épigraphique</i>
<i>AEA</i>	<i>Archivo español de arqueología</i>
<i>AFLC</i>	<i>Annali della facoltà di lettere e filosofia della Università di Cagliari</i>
<i>AG</i>	<i>Archivio giuridico</i>
<i>AHB</i>	<i>The Ancient History Bulletin</i>
<i>AHR</i>	<i>American Historical Review</i>
<i>AIIN</i>	<i>Annali dell'istituto italiano di numismatica</i>
<i>AIRF</i>	<i>Acta Instituti Romani Finlandiae</i>
<i>AJA</i>	<i>American Journal of Archaeology</i>
<i>AJAH</i>	<i>American Journal of Ancient History</i>
<i>AJPh</i>	<i>American Journal of Philology</i>
<i>AMA</i>	<i>Antičnyj Mir i Arkheologija</i>
<i>AMSI</i>	<i>Atti e memorie della società istriana di archeologia e storia patria</i>
<i>AncSoc</i>	<i>Ancient Society</i>
<i>Annales (ESC)</i>	<i>Annales (Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations)</i>
<i>ANRW</i>	<i>Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt</i> , ed. H. Temporini and W. Haase. Berlin and New York, 1972–
<i>ANSMusN</i>	<i>The American Numismatic Society Museum Notes</i>
<i>APhD</i>	<i>Archives de philosophie du droit</i>
<i>ArchOrient</i>	<i>Archiv Orientalni</i>
<i>ARID</i>	<i>Analecta Romana Instituti Danici</i>
<i>ArchClass</i>	<i>Archeologia Classica</i>

- AS* *Anatolian Studies*
ASAW *Abhandlungen der sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig*
ASNP *Annali della scuola normale superiore di Pisa, Classe di lettere e filosofia*
ASPap *American Studies in Papyrology*
BAR *British Archaeological Reports*
BASO *Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research*
BCAR *Bullettino della commissione archeologica comunale di Roma*
BCH *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique*
BEFAR *Bibliothèque des écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome*
BGU *Aegyptische Urkunden aus den Museen zu Berlin. Griechische Urkunden. Berlin, 1895-*
BIAO *Bulletin de l'institut français d'archéologie orientale*
BICS *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies of the University of London*
BIDR *Bullettino dell'istituto di diritto romano*
Les Bourgeoisies *Les 'Bourgeoisies' municipales italiennes aux IIe et Ier siècles avant J.-C. (Colloque internat. CNRS 609, Naples 7-10 déc. 1981). Paris, 1983*
BRL *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, Manchester*
Bruns C. G. Bruns, ed., *Fontes Iuris Romani Antiqui*, edn 7 by O. Gradenwitz, Tübingen, 1909
Bull. ép. J. and L. Robert, *Bulletin épigraphique* (in REG)
CAH *The Cambridge Ancient History*
CE *Chronique d'Égypte*
Du Châtiment *Du châtiment dans la cité. Supplices corporels et peine de mort dans le monde antique* (Table ronde, Rome 9-11 nov. 1982) (Coll. éc. fr. de Rome 79). Rome, 1984
CHCL *The Cambridge History of Classical Literature: 1: Greek Literature*, ed. P. E. Easterling and B. M. W. Knox. Cambridge, 1985. *11: Latin Literature*, ed. E. J. Kenney and W. V. Clausen. Cambridge, 1982
CIJ *Corpus Inscriptionum Judaicarum*
CIL *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*
CE&M *Classica et Mediaevalia*
COrdPtol *Corpus des ordonnances des Ptolémées*, ed. M. Th. Lenger. Brussels, 1964; 2nd corr. edn 1980
CPh *Classical Philology*
CQ *Classical Quarterly*
CR *Classical Review*
CRAI *Comptes rendus de l'académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres*
CronErc *Cronache ercolanesi*
CS *Critica storica*
CSCA *California Studies in Classical Antiquity*
DArch *Dialoghi di archeologia*
Le délit religieux *Le délit religieux dans la cité antique* (Table ronde, Rome 6-7 avril 1978) (Coll. éc. fr. de Rome 48). Rome, 1981

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DHA *Dialogues d'histoire ancienne*

EEThess Ἐπιστημονικὴ Ἐπετηρὶς τῆς φιλοσοφικῆς Σχολῆς τοῦ Πανεπιστημίου Θεσσαλονίκης

EMC *Échos du monde classique*

Entretiens Hardt

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ESAR *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome*, ed. Tenney Frank. 6 vols. Baltimore, 1933-40

FGrH F. Jacoby, *Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*. Berlin and Leiden, 1923-

FIRA S. Riccobono *et al.*, *Fontes Iuris Romani Anteiustiniani*. 3 vols. Florence, 1940-3

FPL W. Morel and C. Buechner, *Fragmenta Poetarum Latinorum*. Leipzig, 1982

GIF *Giornale italiano di filologia*

Girard-Senn P.F. Girard and H. Senn, *Les lois des Romains* (Textes de droit romain 1, 7th edn revised by various persons). Paris and Naples, 1977

GLM *Geographi Latini Minores*, ed. A. Riese. Heilbron, 1878

G&R *Greece & Rome*

GRBS *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies*

Greenidge-Clay

A. H. J. Greenidge and A. M. Clay, *Sources for Roman History 133-70 B.C.* 2nd edn revised by E. W. Gray. Oxford, 1960. Further corrected and augmented 1986

GRF *Grammaticae Romanae Fragmenta*, ed. H. Funaioli (Vol. 1 only). Leipzig, 1907

HebrUCA *Hebrew Union College Annual*

Hellenismus *Hellenismus in Mittelitalien*, ed. P. Zanker (Kolloq. Göttingen 5-7 juni 1974) (Abh. Göttingen 97). Göttingen, 1976

HRR H. W. G. Peter, *Historicorum Romanorum Reliquiae*. 2 vols. Leipzig, 1906-14

HSPb *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*

HTbR *Harvard Theological Review*

IA *Iranica Antiqua*

IDélos F. Durrbach and others, *Inscriptions de Délos*. Paris, 1926-50

IEJ *Israel Exploration Journal*

IFay E. Bernard, *Recueil des inscriptions grecques du Fayoum*. 3 vols. Leiden, 1975-81

IG *Inscriptiones Graecae*

- IGBulg G. Mihailov, *Inscriptiones Graecae in Bulgaria repertae*. Sofia, 1958–
 IGRR R. Cagnat and others, *Inscriptiones Graecae ad res Romanas pertinentes* I, III, IV. Paris, 1906–27
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 ILS H. Dessau, *Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae*. 3 vols. Berlin, 1892–1916
 IMagnesia O. Kern, *Die Inschriften von Magnesia am Maeander*. Berlin, 1900
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 IOSPE B. Latyshev, *Inscriptiones Antiquae Orae Septentrionalis Ponti Euxini Graecae et Latinae*. 2nd edn St Petersburg, 1916
 IPriene F. Hiller v. Gaertringen, *Die Inschriften von Priene*. Berlin, 1906
 JBM *Jahrbuch des bernischen historischen Museums*
 JDAI *Jahrbuch des deutschen archäologischen Instituts*
 JEA *Journal of Egyptian Archaeology*
 JFA *Journal of Field Archaeology*
 JHS *Journal of Hellenic Studies*
 JJS *Journal of Jewish Studies*
 JMS *Journal of Mithraic Studies*
 JNG *Jahrbuch für Numismatik und Geldgeschichte*
 JRH *Journal of Religious History*
 JRS *Journal of Roman Studies*
 JS *Journal des Savants*
 JVEG *Jaarbericht van het Voor-Aziatisch-Egyptisch Genootschap ex Oriente Lux*
 LCM *Liverpool Classical Monthly*
 LEC *Les études classiques*
 LSJ H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, 9th edn revised by H. S. Jones. Oxford, 1940
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 MAAR *Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome*
 MDAI (A) (D) (I) (M) (R) *Mitteilungen des deutschen archäologischen Instituts (Athens, Damascus, Istanbul, Madrid, Rome)*
 MEFRÄ *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire de l'école française de Rome*
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 MH *Museum Helveticum*
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- NAWG *Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, Philol.-Hist. Klasse*
- NC *Numismatic Chronicle*
- NE *Numismatika i Epigraphica*
- NJNW *Neue Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Jugendbildung*
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- NRS *Nuova Rivista Storica*
- NSA *Notizie degli Scavi di antichità*
- NZ *Numismatische Zeitschrift*
- OGIS W. Dittenberger, *Orientis Graecae Inscriptiones Selectae*. 2 vols. Leipzig, 1903-5
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- PCPhS *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society*
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 P&P *Past and Present*
 PRyldem *Catalogue of the Demotic Papyri in the John Rylands Library, Manchester*, ed. F.Ll. Griffith. 1909
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 RAL *Rendiconti della classe di scienze morali, storiche e filologiche dell'Accademia dei Lincei*
 RAN *Revue archéologique de Narbonne*
 RBA *Revue Belge d'archéologie et d'histoire de l'art*
 RBi *Revue biblique*
 RD *Revue historique de droit français et étranger*
 RDGE R. K. Sherk, *Roman Documents from the Greek East*, Baltimore, 1969
 RE A. Pauly, G. Wissowa and W. Kroll, *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*
 REA *Revue des études anciennes*
 REG *Revue des études grecques*
 REgypt *Revue d'égyptologie*
 REJ *Revue des études juives*
 REL *Revue des études latines*
 RFIC *Rivista di filologia e di istruzione classica*
 RHD *Revue d'histoire du droit* (= *Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis*)
 RhM *Rheinisches Museum*
 RHR *Revue de l'histoire des religions*
 RIA *Rivista dell'istituto nazionale di archeologia e storia dell'arte*
 RIDA *Revue internationale des droits de l'antiquité*
 RIL *Rendiconti dell'istituto Lombardo, Classe di lettere, scienze morali e storiche*
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- RPh *Revue de philologie*
- RPhilos *Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger*
- RSA *Rivista storica dell'antichità*
- RSC *Rivista di studi classici*
- RSI *Rivista storica italiana*
- RSO *Rivista degli studi orientali*
- SA *Sovietskaja Archeologija*
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- SBAW *Sitzungsberichte der bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, philos.-hist. Klasse*
- SCO *Studi classici e orientali*
- SDHI *Studia et Documenta Historiae et Iuris*
- SE *Studi etruschi*
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- SGE *Soobščeniija Gosudarstvennogo Ermitaža*
- SIFC *Studi italiani di filologia classica*
- SIG W. Dittenberger, *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum*. 4 vols. 3rd edn Leipzig, 1915-24
- SMSR *Studi e materiali di storia delle religioni*
- SO *Symbolae Osloenses*
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Società romana e produzione schiavistica, edd. A. Giardina and A. Schiavone (Acta of the Colloquium, Pisa 1979), 3 vols. Bari, 1981
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Tskhaltubo II

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UPZ

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VDI

Vestnik Drevnei Istorii

WChrest

L. Mitteis and U. Wilcken, *Grundzüge und Chrestomathie der Papyruskunde* 1. Part 2 (*Chrestomathie*)

WJA

Würzburger Jahrbücher für die Altertumswissenschaft

WS

Wiener Studien

ZPE

Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik

ZSS

Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte (romanistische Abteilung)

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